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ABSTRACT 
Maikel Fariñas Borrego: Envisioning Capitalist Alternatives: Business Leaders and the Politics 
of Influence in Cuba, 1920-1940 
(Under the direction of Louis A. Pérez, Jr.) 
 
My dissertation examines the organization of business leaders in voluntary associations 
to collaborate and compete within urban centers across Cuba. Businessmen on the island 
commonly used the local Rotary Club to create networks among themselves and to advance 
collective interests, at both local and national levels. From the crash of the sugar market in 1920, 
and contrary to what the historiography has established, these businessmen became increasingly 
disaffected with large U.S. corporate interests, rejected the continued foreign penetration of the 
economy, and were concerned with what they viewed as the ruin of the country at the expense of 
American business interests. Business leaders were not opposed to the continuation of the cash 
crop export economy, but they supported any alternative economic development that would find 
solutions to the socioeconomic challenges produced by that variant of capitalism.  
I argue that Cuban business leaders created a network within civic associations to 
promote capitalist alternatives away from the sugar industry and the foreign control of the 
economy. Although they were unable to fully challenge US business interests in the island, these 
businessmen established reform roadmaps for gradual change and envisioned the economic 
independence for the country within the margins of capitalism. Capitalist alternatives were 
centered on encouraging a civic nationalism to protect the national interest, promoting economic 
diversification to reduce the reliance on the sugar production, expanding the nation’s trading 
networks beyond the markets of the northern neighbor, investing in regional infrastructures to 
iv 
boost business growth and internal consumption, and reaching an economic development that 
mirrored industrialized nations. These business leaders sought to solve the two major economic 
problems affecting the nation: sugar monoculture and the overconcentration of the nation’s 
export into a single market, the United States. Cuban republican order lasted for almost six 
decades 1902-1958, but this investigation focuses on 1920-1940. The selected periodization 
covers from the crash of the sugar market in 1920 to the promulgation of the last republican 
constitution in 1940. Within these years, Cuban businessmen created a nationalist network and 
platform from which to articulate their aspirations for economic change attired with the raiment 
of civic virtue. 
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Sugar Economy: A Bitter Variant of Capitalism 
In 1921, an affluent businessman in Havana expressed his concern with what he viewed 
as the ruin of the country at the expense of American business interests. At the head of Sarrá 
Drugstores, Ernesto Sarrá thought that US businesses were “ruining Cuba.”1 A trade magazine, 
Drug Trade Weekly published that “Ernesto Sarrá, wholesale druggist of Havana, Cuba, a well-
known figure in the drug trade …, as head of the old Cuban house selling under the name, 
Droguería José Sarrá, has been taking an important part in the Cuban agitation against provisions 
of the Fordney [-McCumber] Tariff imposing a duty on Cuban sugar.”2 A business leader, whose 
primary business occupation was notably distant from agriculture, Ernesto Sarrá protested a US 
tariff on the cash crop export system. By voicing his apprehensions, Sarrá revealed the extent to 
which the overreliance on the sugar industry affected the entire economy of the country because 
a contraction of the sugar economy also impacted his bottom line. The concerns expressed by 
Sarrá revealed the emerging contradictions between capitalist interests and business leaders from 
both Cuba and the United States. 
After the crash of the sugar market in 1920 the Cuban economy tanked, and the timing 
for the Fordney-McCumber tariff was particularly bad for the island. The post-World War I 
sugar boom, with an unprecedented period of prosperity, was followed by a sharp price decline 
                                                 
1 “Dr. Sarrá Proposes Reciprocity” Drug trade weekly 4, no. 52 (December 24, 1921): 14. 
2 Ibid. The Fordney–McCumber Tariff was signed into law the following year (1922), protecting the US from 
foreign competition by raising import rates. The tariff included sugar imported from Cuba.  
2 
in the world market starting in May 1920. By October of that year, the crisis reached its peak, 
and the economy of the country collapsed steeply, almost to the same levels that existed at the 
end of the war for independence–and this time with a tripled population. A long-established 
economic undertaking in Cuba, the sugar agroindustry dominated the entire economy of the 
country.3 The trajectory of the cash crop production for the world market resulted in a deformed 
national economy, the effects of which were visible in three aspects that characterized Cuba in 
the first half of the twentieth century: the island developed a sugar monoculture, a multi-import 
economy, and an overconcentration of its exports into a single market, the United States.4 After 
the crash of 1920, all of these realities became ever more pressing in the eyes of Cuban business 
leaders, and from that moment many businessmen sought to modify the economic order in the 
island.  
Beyond sugar, the history of business in Cuba and the contours of capitalism outside of 
the cash crop production for the world market have been insufficiently investigated. Little is 
known about manufacturing enterprises developed on the island, other–non-sugar–agricultural 
productions aside from tobacco, transportation businesses outside of railroads connecting the 
sugar mills to the harbors, and the transformation of a traditional service industry into touristic 
                                                 
3 The literature on the sugar agroindustry in Cuba is extensive and very rigorous. The following is short list of books 
and some of the most relevant investigations focused on that economic undertaking: Mercedes García Rodríguez, 
Entre haciendas y plantaciones: Orígenes de la manufactura azucarera en La Habana; Manuel Moreno Fraginals, 
El Ingenio: El complejo económico cubano del azúcar; Óscar Zanetti Lecuona and Alejandro García Álvarez, 
Caminos para el azúcar and United Fruit Company: un caso del dominio imperialista en Cuba; Fe Iglesias García, 
Del ingenio al central; Oscar Zanetti, “El comercio exterior de la república neocolonial,” and Los cautivos de la 
reciprocidad; Gillian McGillivray, Blazing Cane: Sugar Communities, Class, and State Formation; Roland T. Ely, 
Cuando reinaba su majestad el azúcar. 
4 For most of the republican period (1902-1958), the sugar industry accounted for up to 80 percent of Cuban exports. 
The remaining 20 percent included tobacco, mineral extraction, and all other exports. Sugar exports concentrated on 
the United States. See: Oscar Zanetti, “El comercio exterior de la república neocolonial,” 
3 
opportunities for the country in the twentieth century.5 Just as these economic endeavors remain 
understudied, Cuban business leaders, especially those who were not sugar barons and forged 
their fortunes by developing different commercial efforts, have been mostly ignored in the 
scholarship. Thus, there is minimal understanding of non-sugar business operations conducted on 
the island, and how businessmen viewed the nation’s deformed economy.  
Many of those business leaders sought to transform the country’s economic structures 
and to amend Cuban capitalism.6 For example, to address the nation’s financial problems and to 
safeguard his own business, Ernesto Sarrá stressed the necessity of a “new mutual American-
Cuban Reciprocity Treaty.”7 The old trade agreement signed in 1903 gained more and more 
                                                 
5 Investigations about transportation are centered on railroads but there is nothing on cabotage trading or the 
formation of trucking companies, for example. Regarding the industry of services, Havana harbored the Spanish 
fleet and was a transit port between the Europa and Continental America for centuries, thus the number of hostals, 
bars, and restaurants have not been investigated. About the railroads see: Óscar Zanetti Lecuona and Alejandro 
García Álvarez, Caminos para el azúcar; Juan Carlos Santamarina, “The Cuba Company and Cuban development, 
1900-1959;”  
6 Beyond sugar, there is only one major investigation into other industries in the historiography: María Antonia 
Marqués Dolz, Las industrias menores: empresarios y empresas en Cuba, 1880-1920. See also: Mary Speck, 
“Prosperity, Progress, and Wealth: Cuban Enterprise during the Early Republic, 1902-1927.” There are many other 
instigations on the tobacco industry, but these focus more on labor than on the economic aspects of this industry. 
There are even fewer investigations on coffee, mineral extraction, the service economy, and the emergence of 
tourism. There are also a few monographs that focus on specific industries, such as perfumes and soaps. See for 
example: Jesús A. Chía Garzón, El monopolio del jabón y el perfume en Cuba.  
7 Sarrá was not an expert in international trade dealings and his proposition was considerably flawed and failed to 
find a definitive solution. Instead of the current system Sarrá proposed “providing a differential column of 60 per 
cent discount on duties on American goods entering Cuba and the same 60 per cent discount on Cuban goods 
entering the United States.” Such proposition did not consider that Cuba had fewer items to export compared to the 
United States, and the island would end up flooded with American goods. However, it is quite clear that he wanted 
true reciprocity in the commerce between the two nations. See: “Dr. Sarra Proposes Reciprocity” Drug trade weekly 
4, no. 52 (December 24, 1921): 14.  
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opponents.8 Sarrá concluded that the United States was ruining Cuba, and sought to influence 
North American businessmen to defend the interests of the island.9  
Almost twenty years after Sarrá expressed his concerns, Enrique J. Montoulieu de la 
Torre and Julio Blanco Herrera published a report demanding “fairness in our business dealings” 
with the United States.10 Montoulieu de la Torre was a civil-engineering graduate from Harvard, 
and a member of one of the oldest families established in Camagüey; while Julio Blanco Herrera, 
a Cuban with Spanish nobility titles, headed the La Tropical brewery and the New Ice Plant in 
Havana. These two business leaders, whose main industries were not connected to the sugar 
economy, were making a direct appeal to the people of the United States because of the 
                                                 
8 The 1903 treaty of reciprocity helped to boost the Cuban economy for a few years after the devastation of the wars 
of independence. However, this economic growth was basically based on a deformed expansion of the sugar 
industry at a very costly price for the rest of the economy. The 1903 commercial agreement favored the importation 
of Cuban products with a 20% discount on duties due on entry to the United States, and the main product of the 
island for export was sugar. The same benefit was offered to US products, but the neighboring country had 
developed into an economic powerhouse with many more products ready to export. The treaty offered three 
additional discounts to specific items for importation into Cuba: first, 25% of machinery, ships, steel, iron, glass, 
pottery, whiskeys and fish; second, 30% of butter, wheat flour, maize flour, chemicals, drugs, beers, nonalcoholic 
beverages, dyes, glass for windows, several fibers (hemp, pita, jute, henequen, ramie), musical instruments, paper 
(not of the kind used for newspapers), cotton and cotton products, knifes, boots and shoes, drawings, photographs, 
soaps, conserves of vegetables and legumes, mineral waters, and wines; third, 40% manufactures of cotton, cheeses, 
preserved fruits, perfumery and essences, porcelain, umbrellas, watches, wool, silk, rice and cattle. See: Cuba. 
Tratado de reciprocidad comercial entre la República de Cuba y los Estados Unidos de América (La Habana: 
Imprenta de Rambla y Bouza, 1903). To study the impact of the treaty on the Cuban economy see: Oscar Zanetti, 
Los cautivos de la reciprocidad; and Louis A. Pérez, Cuba Under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934.  
9 Ernesto Sarrá went as far as to write an open letter “to the American manufacturers.” The Cuban businessman 
argued that American exporters would be affected as much as Cuban consumers because of the reduced purchasing 
capacity for the people on the island as a direct result from the tariff implementation. He started by posing a question 
to his American business counterparts “Have you realized the amount of sales to Cuba lost by the American 
manufacturers and exporters due to the Fordney Tariff establishing prohibitive duties on Cuban Sugar…?” He then 
added that “the Fordney Emergency Tariff, if continued, will totally ruin Cuba, one of the best customers of the 
American products and manufactures” This US tariff benefited American sugar producers and severely affected 
Cuban sugar industry, but Sarrá argued that it was “a monstrous injustice to sacrifice all of the American 
manufacturers and exporters to favor just a few American sugar producers.” In the effort to undermine the tariff, 
Sarrá suggested that it was unconstitutional according to US traditions and interpretations of its fundamental law. If 
continued, “this will be an un-American and unconstitutional privilege to favor an excessively reduced number of 
private American sugar interests.” See: “Dr. Sarra Proposes Reciprocity” Drug trade weekly 4, no. 52 (December 
24, 1921): 14. 
10 Original in Spanish: “Pedimos mejora equitativa en nuestros tratos comerciales.” Julio Blanco Herrera and 
Enrique J. Montoulieu, El azúcar de Cuba en 1939: Al gran pueblo norteamericano, el pueblo cubano, 14. 
5 
“progressive ruin of Cuba’s first industry.”11 If twenty years earlier, Ernesto Sarrá voiced his 
concerns about the direction of the economy, Montoulieu de la Torre and Blanco Herrera 
described a far worse economic reality for the nation. 
Sugar, as Montoulieu de la Torre and Blanco Herrera explained, was the “industry to 
which we have unwittingly subordinated, year after year, our entire national economy.”12 The 
authors explained what had happened in the country with a graphic focused on the past twenty 
years, 1919-1939. The diagram detailed how at the beginning of the period Cuba produced 25 
percent of the sugar in the world market, and that twenty years later, the island was only 
accountable for the 10 percent of that production.13 Despite the efforts to develop other 
industries, no other economic undertakings in Cuba were able to replace the position that the 
sugar industry had within the national economy. Thus, Montoulieu de la Torre and Blanco 
Herrera decided to identify the external factors that dragged the economy of the nation. They 
protested the “so badly misnamed treaty of reciprocity,” with the United States and demanded its 
modification because there was nothing reciprocal about it.14 These two business leaders joined 
                                                 
11 Original in Spanish: “La ruina progresiva de la primera industria de Cuba.” Julio Blanco Herrera and Enrique J. 
Montoulieu, El azúcar de Cuba en 1939, accompanying graphic without a page number added at the end of the 
report.      
12 Original in Spanish: “La industria a la que hemos inconscientemente subordinado, año tras año, toda nuestra 
nacional economía” Julio Blanco Herrera and Enrique J. Montoulieu, El azúcar de Cuba en 1939, 13-14. 
13 Julio Blanco Herrera and Enrique J. Montoulieu, El azúcar de Cuba en 1939, 15. 
14 Original in Spanish: “Tan mal llamado tratado de reciprocidad” Julio Blanco Herrera and Enrique J. Montoulieu, 
El azúcar de Cuba en 1939, 10. The first treaty had been replaced with a second reciprocity treaty after the Platt 
Amendment had been abolished. The terms were yet more disadvantageous to Cuba than the first one. The 1934 
reciprocity treaty and how it came into existence has not been investigated. See: Cuba. Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
between the United States of America and Cuba, and exchange of notes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1934. 
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their pens to address Cuba’s mounting economic problems and underscored the United States’ 
responsibility for the island’s ruin.15  
The authors protested the unfairness of the commercial relations between the two 
countries. They lamented the US quota system for Cuban sugars and the continuous pressure 
from the United States to maintain a commercial preference for US products on the island, 
followed by the flooding of the local markets with cheap imports. They denounced that the 
United States was “limiting its great market to our vital productions [this is mainly sugar], and 
what is worse, pretending an almost total preference for the consumption of their products in our 
market.”16 They described the subordination of the deformed Cuban economy to the United 
States and revealed the worsening of the island’s economic problems. Montoulieu de la Torre 
and Blanco Herrera appealed to the sympathy of the North American people, stating that the 
continuation of the sugar monoculture and the multi-import economy subordinated to the United 
States amounted to their “economic ruin.”17   
                                                 
15 They pointed to the debts of gratitude that the northern neighbor should have with Cuba for adapting the island to 
satisfy the desires of the US market, and especially for meeting wartime needs. They made it clear that “Americans 
[ought to] remember that when they went to the World War, we were entrusted … to cut down and destroy our rich 
forests of precious woods, from one end to another of this Island, to turn Cuba, as it transformed, into an immense 
sugarcane field, and in the most giant sugar factory in the world, which as a staple food for war, served as an aid to 
Allied Armies and Peoples, and it is noteworthy in this case that the sale and price of that product, sugar, was 
militarily controlled from Washington.” This later point about sugar being “militarily controlled from Washington” 
emphasized that the profits for the island were undercut to satisfy the needs of the United States and reduced the 
margin of profits for Cuban businessmen. This is the original in Spanish: “Recuerden los Norte-americanos que 
cuando fueron a la Guerra Mundial, se nos confió a los cubanos el talar y arrasar nuestros ricos bosques de maderas 
preciosas, de punta a punta de esta Isla, para convertir a Cuba, como se convirtió, en un inmenso-Cañaveral, y en la 
más gigante fábrica de azúcar del mundo, que como alimento básico de guerra, sirvió de auxilio a los ejércitos y 
pueblos aliados, y es de notar en este caso que la venta y precio de ese producto, azúcar, fue controlado militarmente 
desde Washington.” Julio Blanco Herrera and Enrique J. Montoulieu, El azúcar de Cuba en 1939, 11. 
16 Original in Spanish: “Limitándonos su gran Mercado a nuestros Productos Vitales, y lo que es peor, pretendiendo 
una casi total preferencia para el consumo de sus productos en el mercado nuestro.” Julio Blanco Herrera and 
Enrique J. Montoulieu, El azúcar de Cuba en 1939, 10. 
17 Julio Blanco Herrera and Enrique J. Montoulieu, El azúcar de Cuba en 1939, 13.  
7 
Many Cuban businessmen aspired to modify the prevailing economic order for the 
exclusive benefit of local capitalist interests above foreign ones. These aims were connected to 
the rise of nationalism on the island and have not been investigated because historians defined 
nationalism as a social phenomenon that emanates mainly from popular culture. The scholarship 
has overlooked how business leaders and capitalist interests expressed their nationalist 
aspirations. The students, the working-classes, and many left-leaning leaders have been 
historicized as the protagonists of nationalist drives in Cuba, while business leaders were either 
ignored or regarded as the antithesis of those popular aims.18 Thus, the aspirations for economic 
nationalism developed by a considerable number of businessmen on the island–and a large group 
of professionals closely connected to the same private interests–are no more than a bizarre 
occurrence to the traditional scholarship.  
Many business leaders sought to change the Cuban economic order within the margins of 
capitalism. Their goals included reforming the nation and challenging US hegemony in the 
country, and they sought to achieve those goals by forging business networks, lobbying for their 
interests in the North, and negotiating with their peers in the United States. The emerging rivalry 
that Cuban business leaders developed with their North American peers demonstrated the extent 
to which the deformed Cuban sugar economy had grown into a bitter variant of capitalism.19 
                                                 
18 See for example: Ladislao González Carbajal, El Ala Izquierda Estudiantil y su época; José A. Tabares del Real, 
La Revolución del 30: Sus dos últimos años, Lionel Soto, La Revolución precursora de 1933…; Instituto de Historia 
del Movimiento Comunista y de la Revolución Socialista de Cuba. Historia del movimiento obrero cubano, 1865-
1958; Carlos del Toro González, Algunos aspectos económicos, sociales y políticos del movimiento obrero cubano 
(1933-1958); Mirta Rosell, Luchas obreras contra Machado, Angelina Rojas Blaquier, El primer Partido 
Comunista de Cuba 
19 Sarrá’s chief preoccupation was that American business interests were “ruining Cuba. Not protecting her [Cuba] 
against the effects of the Fordney Tariff, will mean killing Cuba's paying power to liquidate the huge sums of money 
due to American manufacturers and exporters.” “Dr. Sarra Proposes Reciprocity” Drug trade weekly 4, no. 52 
(December 24, 1921): 14. Regarding the variants of capitalism and the history of business, the historiography has 
developed a strong interest in the history of businesses in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the management of 
the people in the region. This scholarly interest focused on the extraction of raw materials, the plantation system, 
colonialism, imperialism, and foreign relations, development and underdevelopment, and the enthronization of 
8 
Uprooting Capitalism: The Historiography on the Republican Period    
In 1959, the prominent historian Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring described the Cuban 
Republic period in very negative terms, and this was in a preface to a compilation of Fidel 
Castro’s speeches.20 The collection included the address of the revolutionary leader to the 
Havana Rotary Club in January 1959, where the republic was described as corrupt, having 
limited sovereignty, and dominated by foreign interests.21 Roig de Leuchsenring illustrated what 
was “wrong with Cuba” in the preface by listing the harming aspects that had affected the 
country for almost six decades of republican order: “privilege and embezzlement, monopoly, 
contraband, gambling, and the absence of education and culture.”22 In his view of the nation’s 
most recent past, these were “the evils, the very grave evils suffered by Republican Cuba,”23 a 
period from 1902 to 1958. 
                                                 
hierarchical systems based on race, and social class. In the past forty years a growing number of historians have 
made business and management the center of their investigations and also established connections to the Atlantic 
World. This scholarship emanates investigations connecting the history of capitalism in the United States, Europe, 
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. See: Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in 
American Business; H. V. Nelles. “Latin American Business History since 1965: A View from North of the Border;” 
María Inés Barbero, “Business History in Latin America: A Historiographical Perspective;” Tamás Szmrecsanyi and 
Topik, Steven. “Business History in Latin America;” Carlos Dávila L. de Guevara and Rory Miller. Business history 
in Latin America: the experience of seven countries; Jürgen Kocka, “Writing the History of Capitalism;” Sven 
Beckert, “History of Capitalism;” Rory M. Miller, “Latin American Business History and Varieties of Capitalism;” 
Marcelo Rougier, “Introducción: Reflexiones sobre la historia de la industria y las empresas en América Latina;” 
Carlos Dávila, “The Current State of Business History in Latin America;” Paloma Fernández Pérez and Andrea 
Lluch, Evolution of Family Business: Continuity and Change in Latin America and Spain; and Waterhouse, 
Benjamin C. The Land of Enterprise: A Business History of the United States. 
20 Fidel Castro, Discursos del Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz comandante en jefe del Ejército Rebelde 26 de julio y primer 
ministro del gobierno revolucionario. 
21 Fidel Castro, “Discurso y respuestas en la sesión del Club Rotario de La Habana el 15 de enero de 1959” in Fidel 
Castro, Discursos del Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz …, 126-145. 
22 Original in Spanish: “Lo que hay de malo en Cuba es, exactamente … el privilegio y el peculado, el monopolio, el 
contrabando, el juego, y la ausencia de educación y cultura.” See: Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, “Prefacio,” in Fidel 
Castro, Discursos del Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz …, 9. 
23 This is the original in Spanish: “Los males, los gravísimos males que ha padecido Cuba Republicana, y 
especialmente, esta segunda tiranía [referring to Batista], cuyas características fueron –en grado superlativo– los 
latrocinios y los asesinatos con sus horrendas torturas, se deben, precisamente, a todo lo contrario de lo que han 
querido hacernos creer muchos norteamericanos, algunos cubanos al yanqui vendidos y otros a los que Martí 
9 
After 1959, the condemnations to the previous republican experience transformed into a 
criticism of the old regime. The views held by Fidel Castro and Roig de Leuchsenring have been 
confirmed in posterior investigations because many aspects of the republican life merited a 
critical revision. However, it is important to note that this was a pivotal point in the history of the 
island, one in which capitalism and any connections to the United States began to be regarded as 
detrimental to the existence of the nation.24  
The vast majority of the historical investigations about Cuba focused on the history of the 
nation, and it transformed into an inescapable theme for generations of historians. Almost any 
object of historical inquiry–a battle, an organization, an individual, a race, an ethnic group, a 
social class, a province, a work of art, even a historical period–is questioned around its 
contribution to the nation or the processes of national formation. The nation has become a 
hundred-year thematic interest for the historiography since it was developed in the 1920s due to 
an increased nationalist consciousness on the island.25 A large number of social movements, 
nationalist demands, popular and economic claims that sprang up throughout the third decade of 
the twentieth century marked a turning point in the collective awareness for the people of the 
island, and this is the starting point of Cuban nationalism in the twentieth century.  
                                                 
calificó, para siempre, de ‘hombres de siete meses,’ porque ‘no tienen fe en su pueblo.’” See: Emilio Roig de 
Leuchsenring, “Prefacio,” in Fidel Castro, Discursos del Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz …, 9.  
24 Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring explained that these sociopolitical ills were “due, precisely, to the opposite of what 
many Americans wanted to make us believe,” that Cuba’s difficulties were born out of internal problems and not 
due to US interferences in the island’s affairs. Roig de Leuchsenring was a prolific writer and a firm anti-imperialist 
who had devoted many years to explaining the old historiographic misconceptions suggesting that Cuba owed its 
independence to the United States. 
25 Three scholars have been recognized as the most important renovators for Cuban historiography, as they brought 
this nationalist awareness into the fields of history and anthropology. They were Ramiro Guerra Sánchez, Fernando 
Ortiz Fernández, and Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring. These scholars were young men when the Spanish dominium in 
the island ended, lived throughout the republican period when they all developed successful professional careers, 
and died a few years into the revolutionary period.  
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However, there is a large body of the scholarship that has transformed the history of the 
nation, and the expressions of nationalism, into a teleological framework centered on finding the 
antecedents of the Cuban revolution.26 This teleology is especially visible in the work of many 
historians who contributed to presenting Cuba’s history as a narrative of continuity towards the 
revolution.27 The periodization for the history of Cuba most commonly accepted defines three 
large stages: colonial, republican, and revolutionary periods. For the past sixty years within the 
revolutionary period, the historiographic production focused on the Republic (1902-1958) 
largely dismissed any expression of nationalism that did not anticipate a future of socialism for 
the island. The consequence was an uprooting of capitalism based on the claim that the 
fulfillment of Cuba, as a fully independent nation, could only be reached under socialism. 
Therefore, a critical viewing of that scholarship reveals a teleological narrative expressing a 
thesis of oppression in capitalism as the direct antithesis of freedom in socialism.  
The scholarship that supported these ideas of freedom in socialism drew a hard line 
between the republican past and the revolution. For these scholars, the past was that of 
capitalism, and the future was for socialism–at least for the island. Thus, the post-1959 
                                                 
26 Oscar Zanetti Lecuona mentions that teleological orientation in Cuban historiography as he explained that “ese 
sesgo teleológico por supuesto (…) no ha sido privativo de los historiadores de la isla. La dimensión histórica de la 
Revolución ha llevado igualmente a muchos autores extranjeros a reducir la historia anterior de Cuba a la condición 
de antecedente, raíz o prólogo del presente revolucionario” Oscar Zanetti Lecuona, “Medio siglo de historiografía en 
Cuba: La impronta de la revolución,” 101. Robert Whitney also points that “there is a general tendency to view 
Cuban history as a series of political and economic processes that would eventually (perhaps inevitably?) lead to 
Fidel Castro’s victory.” Robert Whitney, “History or Teleology? Recent Scholarship on Cuba Before 1959,” 221. 
27 This is a short list of books to consider: Julio Le Riverend Brusone, La República: Dependencia y revolución; 
Teresita Yglesia Martínez, Cuba Primera República, Segunda Ocupación and El segundo ensayo de república; 
Ramón de Armas, La revolución pospuesta: Contenido y alcance de la revolución martiana por la independencia; 
Francisco López Segrera, Sociología de la colonia y neocolonia cubana, 1510-1959; Jorge Ibarra Cuesta, Cuba 
1898-1958: Estructura y procesos sociales; José Cantón Navarro, et al. Historia de Cuba: La neocolonia: 
organización y crisis desde 1899 hasta 1940; Joel James Figarola, Cuba 1900-1928: La República dividida contra sí 
misma; Jules R. Benjamin, The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an 
Age of National Liberation. 
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historiography abhorred the inequalities of capitalism while valuing anti-capitalist struggles; this 
included an idealization of left-leaning organizations and any historical event or individual that 
hinted in that direction.28 It is important to note that this scholarship became dominant 
throughout the Cold War period and occasionally carried strong partisan ideologies. 
Consequently, capitalism and business leaders were transformed not into subjects of study in 
themselves, but into obstacles that had to be uprooted to obtain said freedom and patriotic 
fulfillment in socialism.29 Thus, the study of the Republic transformed into the history of the 
struggles against capitalism and the historical actors who sought to put an end to that economic 
system; this is by raising to the profile of working-class heroes and systematically condemning 
the greed of capitalist villains.  
This post-1959 scholarship centered on establishing an anti-capitalist narrative of 
revolutionary continuity. Historians focused on finding the nationalist connections between the 
independence movements–in the later part of the nineteenth century, to the anti-capitalist 
struggles throughout the republican period, and the culmination of those patriotic sacrifices in the 
triumph of the revolution in 1959.30 Fidel Castro later established this historiographic view as the 
                                                 
28 On the one hand, the result is a picture that enshrines working class leaders, validates revolutionary movements as 
the optimal path for social change, and cherishes the radicalism of the left. On the other, the image describes an 
abhorrent capitalist exploitation, rampant corruption, and the intrusion of a foreign power undermining Cuban 
national sovereignty, the United States imperialism. See for example: Lionel Soto, La Revolución precursora de 
1933: un momento trascendental en la continuidad revolucionaria de José Martí: Ensayo de indagación político-
social y económico en un período reciente de la historia de Cuba. 
29 See for example a book by José Cantón Navarro, Cuba, el desafio del yugo y la estrella: biografía de un pueblo 
which was widely distributed. To mention a book used for educational purposes see Susana Callejas Opisso et. al. 
Historia de Cuba: Nivel medio superior. The first chapter is entitled “Antecedentes del proceso revolucionario 
cubano. El camino hacia la nacionalidad y nación cubanas” which declares from the beginning what constitutes the 
path for nationhood for Cuba: the Cuban revolution.  
30 This scholarship was developed by many historians, but it is worth highlighting the work of Julio Le Riverend, 
Sergio Aguirre Carreras, Raúl Roa, and Jorge Ibarra Cuesta who drew extensively of the work of Roig de 
Leuchsenring. Julio Le Riverend Brusone, La República: Dependencia y revolución; Raúl Roa, La revolución del 30 
se fue a bolina; Dirección Política de las F.A.R. [Jorge Ibarra Cuesta], Historia de Cuba. 
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official version of Cuban history in 1968 when he launched the thesis of the hundred years of 
revolutionary struggle.31 From that point in time, for a body of the scholarship–and the most 
widely diffused one–the history of the nation transformed into the making of the Cuban 
revolution. However, there was another essential body of scholarship which, without challenging 
the teleological nature of those investigations, focused on writing a history of capitalist 
deformations by centering on the sugar industry.32   
For both bodies of the historiography, Cuban business leaders were on the wrong side of 
history because the nation that they envisioned supported a continuation of capitalism. This was 
a continuum to either the deformed variant of capitalism described, or the one that Sarrá, 
Montoulieu de la Torre, and Blanco Herrera sought to create for their exclusive benefit. One of 
the most important consequences of this limited viewing of business leaders and capitalism was 
that both the individuals and the economic system were regarded as complicit with the United 
States’ domination over Cuba. According to this perspective, the dependency of the Cuban 
bourgeoise was so ingrained in these individuals that they needed the support of a foreign power 
to subsist economically. For example, Oscar Zanetti pointed to the “degree of internalization of 
their weakened economic position, of their virtual impotence, but also of the clear awareness that 
their future as a social class was intimately associated with the establishment of a type of 
commercial integration [with a foreign power] that entailed an economic subordination.”33  
                                                 
31 Fidel Castro Ruz, “Discurso pronunciado … el 10 de octubre de 1968.” This interpretation of Cuban history was 
made official in the first Congress of the Communist Party. See: Partido Comunista de Cuba and Fidel Castro, 
Informe del Comité Central del PCC al primer Congreso. 
32 Refer to footnote no. 3 
33 Original in Spanish: “Resultaba una evidencia, no solo del grado de interiorización de su debilitada posición 
económica, de su virtual impotencia, sino también de la clara consciencia de que su porvenir como clase estaba 
íntimamente asociado al establecimiento de un tipo de integración mercantil que entrañaba la subordinación 
económica.” Oscar Zanetti Lecuona, Los cautivos de la reciprocidad, 27. In this segment, Zanetti was referring to 
the “ruling classes” and for his scholarship that definition was another way to identify the bourgeoise. To use the 
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Many historians have argued that only students, the working classes, and leaders with 
socialist leanings opposed foreign domination. Thus, the organizations and individuals 
embracing political and economic reform, seeking to effect change within the margins of 
capitalism, and over a lengthier period would be regarded as adopting an erroneous strategy.34 
According to Zanetti “reformism [as an ideology and a political strategy] expressed the 
incapacity of a social class [the bourgeoise] to transform the obsolete relations of production on 
which its diminished power was based.”35 For the historiography, the right path for the nation 
was to apply radical measures to support the working classes, embrace the revolution, and to 
bring capitalism to an end. 
Business Leaders: Civic Associations and the Expressions of Capitalist Nationalism 
Once businessmen were found to be on the wrong side of history, and contrary to the 
egalitarian aspirations of the working classes, their capitalist interests were defined as 
insufficiently nationalist.36 This misconception was used to support another underlying argument 
in the histography which suggested that the bourgeoisie and their capitalist interests were anti-
                                                 
words of Roig de Leuchsenring “some Cubans [were] sold out to the Yankees.” Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, 
“Prefacio,” in Fidel Castro, Discursos del Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz, 9. 
34 The best examples is the book by Jorge Renato Ibarra Guitart, El fracaso de los moderados en Cuba: las 
alternativas reformistas de 1957 a 1958. 
35 Original in Spanish: “El reformismo expresaba la incapacidad de una clase social para transformar las obsoletas 
relaciones de producción sobre las que se asentaba su menguado poder.” Oscar Zanetti Lecuona, Los cautivos de la 
reciprocidad, 27. 
36 Historian Pedro Pablo Rodríguez argued that “It seems difficult to speak of a national bourgeoisie in Cuba in the 
first republican decades, given the absence in the social reality of a rural and urban propertied class with the 
possibility of increasing its presence in society through a productive activity propitiating the development of a 
capitalism of national function and not dependent on the United States.” Original in Spanish: “Parece bastante difícil 
hablar de una burguesía nacional en Cuba en las primeras décadas republicanas, ante la ausencia en la realidad social 
de una clase propietaria rural y urbana con posibilidades de acrecentar su presencia en la sociedad a través de una 
actividad productiva propiciatoria del desarrollo de un capitalismo de función nacional y no dependiente de Estados 
Unidos” Pedro Pablo Rodríguez, “Pensamiento nacional burgués: El caso de José Comallonga,” in Nación e 
independencia económica, 119. 
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national.37 The historiography has commonly identified entrepreneurs and business leaders as the 
Cuban bourgeoisie.38 It is thus important to note that the term “bourgeoise” carries considerable 
negative connotations for generations of Cubans educated after the revolution. Therefore, the 
notion of business leaders allows for distance from a politically charged definition, and develops 
a different perspective focused on the role of businesspeople as decision-makers within the 
society in which they lived. 
The suggestion that Cuban business leaders also promoted nationalism is a problematic 
notion, difficult to accommodate to the established historiography. In addition, to claim that the 
manifestations of a love of country shown by well-off Cubans expressed discord with the United 
States is unthinkable based on decades of an anti-capitalist historiographic production. Many 
business leaders sought to defend Cuban interests against those of the United States, yet the 
evidence of entrepreneurs promoting nationalist capitalism constitutes a profound contradiction 
with the historiography. Montoulieu de la Torre and Blanco Herrera believed that with their 
                                                 
37 The first author to use the term Anti-Cuban was Emilio Roig Leuchsenring in 1945. Roig defined the position of 
the Autonomist Party in the island as both reactionary and Anti-Cuban during the struggles for independence from 
1895 to 1898. Original in Spanish: “Posición Reaccionaria y Anticubana del Autonomismo, de 1895 a 1898.” See: 
Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, 13 conclusiones fundamentales sobre la guerra libertadora cubana de 1895, 11. The 
Autonomist Party was made up of reformist Cubans and a few Spaniards, many of whom were of middle-class 
origin. These individuals aspired to a limited sovereignty by making Cuba autonomous under Spanish nationality. 
This moderate position was criticized by two other radical positions at the time, one by the conservative Unión 
Constitutional for which Cuba had to remain Spanish without any concessions and second by the Cuban 
Revolutionary Party that aspired to a full independence. The importance of this assessment within the historiography 
is the consideration of a moderate political position as antinational, regardless of its viability as a political project. A 
similar assessment was further developed within the historiography produced in the revolutionary period. This 
historiography suggested that having moderate positions during the republican period were incompatible with Cuban 
nationhood. The loyalty and the nationhood of individuals and organizations that supported capitalism were brought 
into question, because these authors considered that capitalism was not suited for Cuba. See for example: Francisco 
López Segrera, Cuba capitalismo dependiente y subdesarrollo, 1510-1959; Rodolfo Sarracino, El grupo Rockefeller 
actúa: Entreguismo e injerencia anglo-yanqui en la década del treinta; Reinerio Lorenzo, El fracaso de una 
ideología: Quiebra de la ideología burguesa en Cuba; Jorge Renato Ibarra Guitart: El fracaso de los moderados en 
Cuba: las alternativas reformistas de 1957 a 1958. 
38 For example: Sergio Aguirre, “Seis actitudes de la burguesía cubana en el siglo XIX;” Emma Alvarez-Tabío Albo, 
Vida, mansión y muerte de la burguesía cubana; Alfred L. Padula, “The fall of the Bourgeoisie: Cuba, 1959-1961,” 
Carlos del Toro, La alta burguesía cubana, 1920-1958. 
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public stance they were contributing to “the work of avoiding lamentable consequences to the 
patria,”39 and their patria was Cuba.  
For prominent Cuban historian Jorge Ibarra Cuesta, the expressions of a capitalist 
nationalism would be implausible based on the perspective he developed, along with many other 
historians discussing the pre-revolutionary times. In his books, Ibarra promoted a socialist-
nationalist viewing of the past by conceptualizing Cuban business leaders as weak-natured and 
treasonous to their nation.40 His books are some of the best examples of the scholarship that 
constructed a nationalist narrative oriented towards a disapproval of Cuban businessmen because 
they did not espouse socialist ideas or revolutionary goals before the revolution. To add to the 
confusion, Ibarra Cuesta established that “there was … no line that delimited the interests of the 
different sectors of the Cuban bourgeoisie and those of the monopolistic bourgeoisie of Yankee 
imperialism.”41 The same author described Cuban business leaders as members of a 
socioeconomic amalgam that he defined as an “antinational oligarchic block,” and thus opposed 
to the interests of their nation.42 By blurring the distinctions between businessmen from two 
nations and aligning the interests of Cuban business leaders with those of the United States, the 
“Cuban bourgeoise” was transformed into an agent of a foreign power. 
                                                 
39 “La obra de evitar lamentables consecuencias a la patria.” Julio Blanco Herrera and Enrique J. Montoulieu, El 
azúcar de Cuba en 1939, 3. 
40 See for example: Dirección Política de las F.A.R. [Jorge Ibarra Cuesta], Historia de Cuba (La Habana: Dirección 
Política de las F.A.R., 1967) and Cuba, 1898-1958: Estructura y procesos sociales (La Habana: Editorial de 
Ciencias Sociales, 1995). 
41 Original in Spanish: “No existía tampoco una línea que delimitara los intereses de los distintos sectores de la 
burguesía cubana y de los de la burguesía monopolista del imperialismo yanqui.” Dirección Política de las F.A.R., 
Historia de Cuba, 575-578. 
42 Jorge Ibarra Cuesta, Cuba, 1898-1958: Estructura y procesos sociales, 7-88. 
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The ideas of Ibarra Cuesta and the followers of this historiography have remained 
unchallenged for decades. This scholarship established that Cuban capitalist interests had neither 
the capacity nor the intention to defend the country from the United States’ imperialist goals, 
precisely because they were, in fact, aligned with the same capitalist interests. This narrative 
emanates from the idea that capital is international and therefore businesspeople, who are 
believed to be mere profit seekers and driven by their love of money, are impaired from growing 
nationalist sentiments. Many historians expressed a negative view of Cuba’s capitalist past and 
referred to the Cuban bourgeoisie as oppressors and exploiters of the working classes. There was 
no nuance as to suggest that the bourgeoisie were also the producers of wealth for the nation, for 
example. Consequently, they described the “bourgeoisie” as complicit with US imperialism and 
the foreign penetration of the economy.43 The confusion generated by identifying foreign capital 
ambitions with those of local capitalist interests, as if they were in a complete accord, has created 
a profound misinterpretation for which the expressions of love of country from Ernesto Sarrá, 
Montoulieu de la Torre, and Blanco Herrera seem implausible, just because they were on the side 
of capitalism.  
On numerous occasions, business leaders expressed their ideas publicly about the state of 
the nation or supported discussions on how to change the political economy on the island. Their 
aspirations for change have been ignored for the historiography because they were regarded as a 
path to reform, to changing over lengthier periods and opposed to those revolutionary goals that 
the scholarship preferred to investigate. Those aims for a changing the country and that were not 
heading to revolutionary ends were deemed insufficiently radical, like something from the past 
                                                 
43 Oscar Pino Santos, El asalto a Cuba por la oligarquía financiera yanqui; Jorge Ibarra Cuesta, Cuba 1898-1958: 
Estructura y procesos sociales. 
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that did not anticipate the revolution. It was more important to investigate revolutionaries and 
thinkers whose writings were interpreted as left-leaning for a historiography enamored with 
radicalism and revolution.44 Those who advocated for reform within capitalism would be 
regarded as the defenders of a lost cause.  
Business leaders referred to themselves as the “economic classes” of the nation.45 Such 
definition, however, has many limitations because it defines the “economic classes” as distinct 
from the political classes–political appointees or those who were political figures in the country– 
and also different from the working classes. The term “economic classes” is misleading because 
it suggests that businessmen were not involved in politics, and that was not the case as will be 
explained. Throughout the republican period, business leaders had very active participation in the 
political life of the nation. However, I will use the term economic classes occasionally, to avoid 
the repetition of business leaders and businessmen, understanding that their role was more than 
just economic. 
I define business leaders as the heads of industry, commerce, and professional services 
for profit; these were for example, businessmen, proprietors, high profile managers, 
shareholders, merchants, and also a large professional class closely associated with the private 
                                                 
44 For that scholarship, it was more important to find evidence of socialist antecedents before the revolution. See: 
Félix Torres Verde, El Pensamiento económico de Jacinto Torras and El pensamiento económico de Raúl Cepero 
Bonilla; Carlos Tablada Pérez, El pensamiento económico de Ernesto Che Guevara; Pedro Pablo Rodríguez, 
“Rubén Martínez Villena: el marxismo entra en el pensamiento económico cubano,” Rafael Almanza Alonso, En 
torno al pensamiento económico de José Martí; Rafael Antonio Sorhegui Ortega, “El pensamiento económico 
cubano, vísperas de la revolución,” Ernesto Molina Molina, El pensamiento económico en la nación cubana. 
Notable exceptions: Julio Travieso Serrano, El pensamiento económico de Francisco Arango y Parreño, and Lázaro 
Díaz Fariñas, “Análisis crítico de la concepción estructuralista del desarrollo económico en el pensamiento de Felipe 
Pazos: 1935-1962.” The exceptions were designed to offer a critical analysis of those aligned with capitalism. 
45 Economic classes (“clases económicas” as originally expressed in Spanish) was the denomination used by these 
individuals to refer to themselves collectively. See two examples in: Junta Cubana de Renovación Nacional. 
“Manifiesto a los cubanos por la Junta Cubana de Renovación Nacional,” and Las clases económicas de Cuba. “Las 
clases económicas de Cuba a ´Cuba Importadora e Industrial´.”  
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sector. Their business interests were inextricably connected to the advancement of the economy 
of the country.46 They were the standard bearers of capitalism on the island because 
prerevolutionary Cuba was a society where economic success translated into monetary 
achievement and ownership.47 Therefore, the definition of business leaders goes beyond an 
inherited social status or the prestige of a renowned family name. Business leaders were profit-
driven decision-makers whose choices carried a considerable weight within the areas where they 
conducted business operations. As such, they continuously sought to exert influence in their 
locales, within the provincial political boundaries, and the nation.  
Business leaders were conscious political actors for whom civic associations offered the 
ability to combine their efforts beyond partisan organizations. They preferred distance from 
partisan politics and sought to find a moderate political tone that would serve their business 
interests. Businessmen on the island developed nationalist aspirations as they began to conceive 
economic initiatives and policy reforms to disrupt US presence and control over the island, and 
that continued to happen as they viewed the neighboring country as a model nation. This view of 
the United States as a model nation made them have many ambiguous positions towards US 
culture; they were eager to embrace it while complaining about the advances of US corporations 
on the island. By adapting business practices, cultural norms, and models of civic association, 
                                                 
46 The focus of this investigation is not on agrarian sectors, especially related to sugar production. However, 
Colonos and hacendados were agrarian business leaders and they expressed their nationalist aspirations too. See: 
Gillian McGillivray, “Dear President Machado": 'colono' Nationalism During Cuba's Turbulent 1920s and 1930s.” 
47 The “captains of industry” of the island, if such denomination could be applicable, are absent in the 
historiography. Only a few of the most prominent Cuban capitalists and their companies have been studied, 
especially outside of the island. See: David Greising, I'd Like the World to Buy a Coke: The Life and Leadership of 
Roberto Goizueta; Ileana Fuentes-Pérez, Monique Fernández, Oscar A. Echevarría Salvat, and Carlos Alberto 
Montaner, Miguel Angel Falla: The Cuban sugar industry; Muriel McAvoy, Sugar Baron: Manuel Rionda and the 
Fortunes of Pre-Castro Cuba; Dolores Miram Pérez Tarrau, La saga cubana de los Samà, 1794-1933; Eduardo 
Marrero Cruz, Julián de Zulueta y Amondo: Promotor del capitalismo en Cuba; John Paul Rathbone, The Sugar 
King of Havana: The Rise and Fall of Julio Lobo, Cuba's Last Tycoon; Janet Iglesias Cruz & Javier Gutiérrez Forte, 
“José López Rodríguez: Un gallego que hizo las Américas en Cuba.” 
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they expected to reach the economic development seen in the 
neighboring nation. In the process of adopting elements from the 
culture of the northern neighbor, and adapting them to their norms 
and values, business leaders ended up reinterpreting a US model of a 
civic association, the Rotary Club, as a vehicle to advance Cuban 
nationalist ideas. 48 
A palm tree illustrated the nationalist imagery used in the 
letterheads of the Havana Rotary Club to indicate how the spirit of this 
organization was adapted to the character of its membership.49 The 
Rotary Club was a civic association that spread from the United States 
and it sought to attract individuals in positions of leadership on every nation.50 Cuba was the fifth 
                                                 
48 The scholarship has adopted several denominations to establish what type of voluntary association is the Rotary 
Club. In the United States it has been especially recognized as a service club, which was the denomination used by 
Rotarians themselves. However, they should be identified as civic clubs because they developed actions typical of a 
civic club. These scholars used the definition of service club: Charles F. Marden, Rotary and Its Brothers: An 
Analysis and Interpretation of the Men's Service Club; Clarence S. Hunsinger, “Rural-Urban Coordination…;” 
Thomas A. Wikle, “International Expansion of the American-Style Service Club;” Jeffrey A. Charles, Service Clubs 
in American Society: Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lions; William R. Wilburn, “Old dogs, new tricks: Approaching their 
100th birthdays, these aging service clubs struggle to remain relevant.” Other scholars opted to define Rotary as a 
grassroots association. See: David Horton Smith “The International History of Grassroots Associations.” Rotary has 
been defined as a voluntary association by David L. Sills “Voluntary Associations: Sociological Aspects,” and 
Michael A. Stoll “Race, Neighborhood Poverty, and Participation in Voluntary Associations.” Oher authors have 
emphasized the role of Rotary as a civic organization for example Terry L. Besser and Nancy J. Miller, “The Risks 
of Enlightened Self-Interest: Small Businesses and Support for Community,” and also Brendan Goff, Op. Cit. 
Rotary has been defined as a privileged group by Melissa K. Miller, “Membership Has Its Privileges: How 
Voluntary Groups Exacerbate the Participatory Bias,” and by Wealth, Whiteness, and the Matrix of Privilege: The 
View from the Country Club, who also emphasizes its whiteness. Rotary has been also defined as a local 
organization by Besser, Terry L. and Nancy J. Miller Op. Cit. Elisabeth S. Clemens in “From City Club to Nation 
State: Business Networks in American Political Development,” has defined Rotary as a business network. Rotary 
was also denominated as non-profit organization by Kathryn Ann Agard, Leadership in Nonprofit Organizations. 
49 Alberto Crusellas presidente del Club Rotario de La Habana al Gobernador Provincial, September 17, 1921, 
Legajo 697, Folder 18104, Fondo Registro de Asociaciones, Archivo Nacional de Cuba. Many more Clubs in The 
United States and other nations adapted the icon, but that practice was abandoned in the 1920s.  
50 The scholarship on the Rotary Club has mainly investigated the development of these civic clubs and their impact 
within the United States and Western Europe, although more recent investigations focused on Japan, Melanesia, and 
Cuba. See: Jeffrey A. Charles, Service Clubs in American Society: Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lions; Thomas A. Wikle, 
“International Expansion of the American-Style Service Club;” Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America's 
Figure 1. A Cuban Palm Tree 
Inserted in the Rotary Gear 
Wheel. Source: Alberto 
Crusellas presidente del Club 
Rotario de La Habana al 
Gobernador Provincial, 
September 17, 1921, Legajo 
697, Folder 18104, Fondo 
Registro de Asociaciones, 
Archivo Nacional de Cuba. 
20 
country in which this type voluntary association was chartered, as Rotarians continued to 
multiply worldwide.51    
The Rotary Club was a typically urban voluntary association,52 and Rotarians managed to 
attract a membership of business leaders in every city where a club was chartered. The 
requirements to be accepted as member were very specific, Rotarians had to be “adult male 
persons of good character and good business reputation engaged as proprietor, partner, corporate 
officer, or manager, of any worthy and recognized business.”53 In addition, “each active member 
of a Rotary Club shall be personally and actively engaged, within the territorial limits of his club,  
 
 
                                                 
Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe; Brendan M. Goff, “The Heartland Abroad: The Rotary Club's Mission 
of Civic Internationalism” and “Philanthropy and the ‘Perfect Democracy’ of Rotary;” Agnès Camus, “Le Rotary-
club: Une forme de sociabilité américaine dans le bocage normand;” Jonathan S. Wiesen, “Service above Self? 
Rotary Clubs, National Socialism, and Transnational Memory in the 1960s and 1970s;” Frederick Errington and 
Deborah Gewertz. “The Wewak Rotary Club: The Middle Class in Melanesia.” For the specific case of Cuba see: 
Brendan M. Goff’s dissertation and Jorge Abdala Franco, “El club rotario de Santiago de Cuba 1950-1960;” Ana 
Leonor González, “El rotarismo en Cuba a través de los fondos del Archivo Histórico Provincial de Holguín;” 
Maikel Fariñas Borrego, “District 25: Rotary Clubs and Regional Civic Power in Cuba, 1916-1940;” Ileana M. 
Diago López, “Asociacionismo y Rotarismo en Cuba. Finales del siglo xix, principios del xx.” and “El club rotario 
de la ciudad de Matanzas y su impronta en los años veinte de la república burguesa.”  
51 By tis fiftieth anniversary the organization had spread worldwide. See: Rotary International. Rotary: Fifty Years of 
Service, 1905-1955. 
52 David L. Sills, “Voluntary Associations: Sociological Aspects.” 
53 “Constitution and By-Laws of the International Association of Rotary Clubs” International Association of Rotary 
Clubs, Proceedings Twelfth Annual Convention of the International Association of Rotary Clubs, 542. In this book 
see also “Membership in Rotary” and “Rotary Classifications” 527-533 and 534-540. Once the organization changed 
its name to Rotary International, these ideas about who could become a member remained unaltered. See 
“Constitution of Rotary International,” Rotary International, Proceedings Fifteenth Annual Convention of Rotary 
International, Toronto, Ontario, Canada June 16-20, 1924, 416-417. The translation into Spanish can be found in 
Club Rotario de La Habana Constitución de clubs rotarios, it also was included in the trove of materials included in 
René Acevedo Laborde, Manual Rotario.  
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Figure 2. Expansion of Rotary Clubs Around the World. Source: Rotary International. Rotary: Fifty Years of 
Service, 96-97. 
 
in the business or profession under which he is classified.”54 Thus, this was an opportunity for 
business leaders to develop a network within their locale and extend it to the nation and beyond.  
On the island, the members of the Rotary Club were commonly business leaders whose 
first line of businesses occupations were not focused on sugar production. The heads of some of 
the most prominent alternative businesses on the island became members of the Rotary Club, for 
example: Enrique Schueg Chassin with the Compañía Ron Bacardí, Juan Sabatés Pérez with 
Sabatés, Julio Blanco Herrera and the Nueva Fábrica de Hielo, Alberto Johnson and his Drogería 
de Johnson, and Alberto Crusellas with the Crusellas and the Compañía Nacional de Perfumería. 
Notable exceptions existed such as the case of sugar magnate Julio Lobo Olavarría.55 
                                                 
54 Rotary International, Proceedings Fifteenth Annual Convention of Rotary International, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada June 16-20, 1924 (Chicago: Rotary International, 1924) 416-417.  
55 Julio Lobo Olavarría was a member of the Havana Rotary Club in 1930. See: “Censo del distrito,” La Nota 
Rotaria 8, no. 90 (March 1930): 21-33. Hacendados and colonos were members of these clubs in a reduced scale, 
but they were not excluded from participating. Hacendados were Juan Felipe Alzugaray from the Colón Rotary Club 
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Figure 3. Expansion of Rotary Clubs Across Cuba up to 1927. Source: “VI Conferencia del Distrito... 25, Rotary 
International,” La Nota Rotaria 5, no. 55 (April 1927) 12-13. 
 
Rotarians developed codes of ethics for business practices and elaborated norms about 
the role of businessmen in society; Lions and Kiwanis Clubs followed their success in this 
direction. Rotarians believed that club members had to render a social service to the community 
through their particular business dealings.56 Such idea was intended to forge the cooperation and 
responsibility among businessmen, which was beneficial for them in preventing manifestations 
of pillage capitalism among themselves.57 Thus, business leaders saw themselves as activists for 
the betterment of the country in which they lived.  
                                                 
and Arturo Infante Maldonado from the Holguín Rotary Club. Colonos were Aurelio Vigil from the Camagüey 
Rotary Club and Luis Vega Pérez from the Sagua la Grande Rotary Club. See: Rotary International [Distrito 25], 
Programa de la XIX Conferencia del Distrito 25 de Rotary International mayo 5, 6 y 7 de 1939, 22. and “Censo del 
distrito,” Op. Cit. 
56 Jeffrey A. Charles, Service Clubs in American Society: Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lions (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1993), 51.  
57 The code of ethics for Rotarians emphasized that: “My business standards shall have in them a note of sympathy 
for our common humanity. My business dealings, ambitions and relations shall always cause me to take into 
consideration my highest duties as a member of society.” The code of ethics can be found in: International 
Association of Rotary Clubs, “The rotary code of ethics for business men of all lines. Adopted by the Sixth Annual 
Convention of the International Association of Rotary Clubs at San Francisco, July 19-23, 1915,” in International 
Association of Rotary Clubs. Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Convention of the International Association of Rotary 
Clubs (Chicago: International Association of Rotary Clubs, 1918), 620-621. The translation of this code of ethics in 
Spanish appeared in René Acevedo Laborde in his work Manual Rotario (La Habana: Rambla Bouza y Co., 1925), 
84-85. 
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According to historian Jeffrey A. Charles, the theme “of ethical business assumed nearly 
a religious intensity,” 58 and the members adopted the language of a social gospel in club 
speeches and many of their activities. This idealism helped club members see themselves as 
missionaries carrying good stewardship in the promotion of modern business practices. When 
these business missionaries went abroad, they brought the ideas of a vocational service as yet 
another form of a U.S. cultural and economic expansion, as described by the historian Emily S. 
Rosenberg.59 In Italy for example, and according to the contemporary perspective of Antonio 
Gramsci observing the development of Rotary in that country, a new capitalist spirit developed 
that promoted the idea that industrial and commercial undertakings should be considered a social 
service before being understood as businesses.60  
Structure of the Dissertation 
The entire republican period needs further investigation, but my research focuses on the 
first two decades of a prolonged nationalist period in Cuba. This nationalism emerges in the 
aftermath of a significant economic crisis in the island, and it drove the country into a 
transformative phase to reclaim Cuban nationhood as a priority for the people on the island. This 
first phase of Cuban nationalism is marked on the one hand by popular upheaval and on the other 
                                                 
58 Jeffrey A. Charles, Service Clubs in American Society: Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lions (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1993), 51.  
59 To learn more about the numerous manifestations of private citizens coming from the United States and diffusing 
American norms as form of cultural and economic expansion read: Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American 
Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982). 
60 Gramsci’s views on Italian Rotary Clubs sparked from his interest in analyzing the civil society, and the local 
reaction of the Catholic press against Rotary for its connections to freemasonry and protestant churches. Grasmci 
explained that the Rotarian program “parece ser la difusión de un nuevo espíritu capitalista, es decir, la idea de que 
la industria y el comercio, antes que ser un negocio, son un servicio social, incluso que son y pueden ser un negocio 
en cuanto son un ‘servicio’.” Antonio Gramsci, Cuadernos de la Cárcel, Vol-2, 249-51. To learn more about the 
history of the organization in Italy see Elena Rambaldi, Rotary International, a "brotherhood of leadership": Il caso 
italiano tra fascismo e primi passi della Repubblica. Roma: Carocci editore, 2006, and Bruno Cousin and Sébastien 
Chauvin, “La dimension symbolique du capital social: les grandes cercles et Rotary clubs de Milan,”  
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by many demands for reforms from business leaders seeking to find paths for change within the 
margins of capitalism. This phase ended with a constitutional convention and the establishment 
of a more advanced democratic order on the island after 1940.  
My dissertation raises four questions: What was the role of business leaders on the island 
during the first phase of its nationalist period 1920-1940? Did the emergence of Cuban capitalist 
interests, beyond sugar businesses, contribute to such nationalism? Why did business interests 
choose to organize themselves into civic associations? What goals did they envision to 
accomplish together? Rather than finding the antecedents of subsequent historical events, my 
dissertation studies the expressions of nationalism that aspired to improve the variant of 
capitalism developed on the island. The investigation examines the organization of business 
leaders in voluntary associations to collaborate and compete within urban centers across Cuba. 
Businessmen on the island commonly used the local Rotary Club to create networks among 
themselves and to advance collective interests, at both local and national levels.  
 From the crash of the sugar market in 1920, many business leaders became increasingly 
disaffected with large U.S. corporate interests, rejected the continued foreign penetration of the 
economy, and were concerned with what they viewed as the ruin of the country at the expense of 
American business interests. Business leaders were not opposed to the continuation of the cash 
crop export economy, but they supported any alternative economic development that would find 
solutions to the socioeconomic challenges produced by that variant of capitalism. 
I argue that Cuban business leaders created a network within civic associations to 
promote capitalist alternatives away from the sugar industry and the foreign control of the 
economy. Although they were unable to challenge US business interests on the island entirely, 
these businessmen established reform roadmaps for gradual change and envisioned the economic 
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independence for the country within the margins of capitalism. Capitalist alternatives were 
centered on encouraging a civic nationalism to protect the national interest, promoting economic 
diversification to reduce the reliance on the sugar production, expanding the nation’s trading 
networks beyond the markets of the northern neighbor, investing in regional infrastructures to 
boost business growth and internal consumption, and reaching an economic development that 
mirrored industrialized nations. These business leaders sought to solve the two major economic 
problems affecting the country: sugar monoculture and the overconcentration of the nation’s 
export into a single market, the United States. Cuban businessmen created a nationalist network 
and platform from which to articulate their aspirations for economic change attired with the 
raiment of civic virtue.  
The investigation subdivides into four chapters: First, “Collaborate and Compete: A 
Businessmen Network in the Making” In this chapter, I argue that the three business 
communities at the top of the social ladder in the island–composed of Cuban businessmen, 
Spanish merchants, and American entrepreneurs–came together by 1920 and created a network 
to collaborate and compete. Within this businessmen network, status was no longer based on the 
prestige of a well-known last name associated with a landed aristocracy or an abstract social 
standing based on traditions, but rather on business acumen, professionalism, and monetary 
achievement. Previous scholarship produced generalizations that ignored the internal divisions 
based on national origin, cultural background, regional business orientation, and the different 
statuses within these groups. That is precisely the focus of this chapter: the initial transformation 
of formal and informal groupings into a network of businessmen. The institutionalization of a 
network to collaborate and compete, in the form of voluntary associations, lessened the tensions 
within disparate business communities in Cuba. As businessmen came together in those 
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formalized associations, they favored civility among themselves and promoted the modernization 
of urban landscapes to make their cities ready for business. 
Second, “Tracing Business Leaders: Generational Change and Civic Nationalism.” This 
chapter traces the entrepreneurial and the family origin ownership of several prominent 
businesses on the island. The new generation of capitalists that rose to prominence in about 1920 
transformed themselves into modern business leaders. However, they did not create impersonal 
corporations, but rather companies which were to a considerable degree responsible for the 
destinies and the livelihood of the family group that used their last name as a business name. 
Modern business leaders on the island aspired to control their companies and to influence the 
economic direction of the country in which they had been born. I argue that these business 
leaders were conscious political actors for whom the format of a local Rotary Club offered the 
ability to create a network among themselves–both locally and nationally–and to forge a 
platform from which to articulate their aspirations for a change.   
Third, “Envisioning Capitalist Alternatives: Reform Roadmaps for Economic 
Independence.” Historians have argued for decades that Cuban business leaders never developed 
nationalist sentiments and that their business interests were against those of the nation. 
Commonly conceptualized as the Cuban bourgeoisie, businessmen from the island have been 
described as mere collaborators of foreign investments, and complicit with the US exploitation of 
the country. In this chapter, I argue that many businessmen from the island were in fact 
supporters of the national interest precisely because their business pursuits compelled them to 
develop a nationalist position. Cuban business leaders envisioned capitalist alternatives to solve 
the two major economic problems affecting the nation: sugar monoculture and the 
overconcentration of the nation’s export into a single market, the United States. Those business 
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leaders challenged US companies on the island, developed economic policy papers to reform the 
country and disrupt US control over the island’s economy. Those policy papers were conceived 
as roadmaps for reaching Cuba’s economic independence from the United States within the 
margins of capitalism. The two policy papers discussed in the chapter show that the goal was for 
the nation to become economically self-sufficient and to develop commercial diplomacy to the 
benefit of the island.   
Fourth, “The Politics of Influence: Unsweetened Nationalist Aspirations.” The 
scholarship has not addressed the manifestations of local engagement that helped business 
leaders to find avenues for collective political participation by using notions of civic duty. This 
chapter focuses on the role of businessmen and professionals aspiring to achieve socioeconomic 
change, their incursions into the realm of politics, and development of economic initiatives. I 
argue that, under the guise that it was not partisan politics, businessmen continuously intervened 
in the public life of the nation using their civic clubs and the networks they had formed. After the 
collapse of the sugar market in 1920, urban entrepreneurs sought to transform the Cuban 
economy away from monoculture by promoting economic nationalism and civic pride to protect 
the national interest. These individuals transformed into the leading proponents of capitalist 
alternatives for the island seeking to solve the two major issues affecting the nation: sugar 
monoculture and overconcentration of the nation’s export into a single market, the United States.  
A hundred years after the blossoming of nationalist impulses in twentieth-century Cuba, 
it is time to take a critical approach to the narrowly defined nationalism that has prevailed in the 
scholarship; and open paths for new interpretations, sources, and discussions with this 
investigation.    
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CHAPTER 1. COLLABORATE AND COMPETE: A BUSINESSMEN NETWORK IN 
THE MAKING 
In 1917, The Bulletin of the Pan-American Union published an article pronouncing 
Havana as “the greatest club city in the world.”1 Such a claim was no mere overstatement given 
the number of voluntary associations in existence and their large memberships. The Galician 
Center (1880) alone had over 45,000 members, closely followed by the Asturian Center (1886) 
with 37,000. Given such precedents, The Rotarian –the international magazine for Rotary Clubs– 
argued that “it was quite natural that Habana should be the first city in a non-English speaking 
country to have a Rotary club,”2 a civic club starting to spread in the United States and abroad. 
Some of the entities based on Spanish associational traditions offered an impressive number of 
benefits to club members. For example, for a monthly fee the participants of any of the 
mentioned Spanish regional centers were offered an array of free benefits: health care, hospital 
care, evening classes on various topics, gymnasiums, access to leisure facilities, and even burial 
coverage for family members, among many other forms of aid. Helping the living and the dead, 
the voluntary associations in the capital of Cuba drew a large segment of the city’s population 
into their clubhouses. By the time the first Rotary Club was chartered in Havana, numerous 
organizations existed on the island, and Cubans were accustomed to having voluntary 
associations in their lives. 
                                                 
1 “Habana: The Greatest Club City in the World,” Bulletin of the Pan American Union 45 (July 1917): 43. 
2 “Habana, Club City of the World: First Spanish Rotary Club City in Class by Itself,” The Rotarian 13, no. 3 
(September 1918): 111-112.  
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Numerous voluntary associations came into existence in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century to cover the most basic needs and interests of grouped individuals. As more and more 
countries adopted the premises of liberalism–and the principles of freedom of association in 
particular–these social units started to populate every nation. I define a voluntary association as 
any form of human grouping whose members govern themselves according to formalized rules, 
regardless of its origins. The example of Cuba demonstrates that this phenomenon was not 
exclusive to the United States or European societies. In fact, the institutions above-mentioned 
were founded under Spanish colonial rule, except the Rotary Club (1916), and those voluntary 
associations continued to thrive after the nation became a US protectorate in 1902. This is 
important to highlight because neither colonialism nor the protectorate order hindered the 
associational facets of a vibrant civil society in Cuba.  
The associational life in the republic was intense and diverse. The spectrum of voluntary 
associations grouped individuals from all corners of the island along the lines of race, gender, 
class, and other forms of shared identification. Members usually framed the organization around 
a collective form of identity, or a common activity they sought to undertake as a group. 
Numerous organizations were created for all purposes of life, promoting change or fighting 
against it, maintaining traditions or embracing modernity. For example, voluntary associations 
brought together individuals in the pursuit of religious aspirations, seeing to advance the labor 
rights of working people, to protect the interests of specific industries, as well as to reunite sport 
aficionados among many other leisure activities. Scholars have demonstrated how voluntary 
associations and other grouping strategies helped the working classes to develop their own 
solidarity networks, and to create the bonds they needed to help each other in a changing 
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society.3 Others focused on voluntary associations as essential to assist the middle and upper 
classes in drawing lines for social distinction and hierarchy. For the latter, it was crucial to mark 
their social spaces as selective, and to 
place themselves beyond the reach of 
ordinary people. These practices were 
also used to communicate to other 
wealthy individuals who they were in 
society, and to maintain their social 
standing by turning hierarchy into an 
inheritable form of prestige, usually 
packaged in the form of a respected last 
name.4  
Conrado Walter Massaguer, a 
young artist and a printing entrepreneur 
who later joined the Rotary Club, drew a 
caricature in 1916 which can be taken as 
a graphic synthesis of the associational 
preferences of the upper classes in Havana.5 The artist characterized the membership of the most 
prominent leisure associations in the city. Many of these institutions were later replicated in 
other parts of the country for their image of success. These social clubs helped to establish social 
                                                 
3 María del Carmen Barcia, Capas populares y modernidad en Cuba.  
4 Maikel Fariñas Borrego, Sociabilidad y cultura del ocio.  
5 Conrado W. Massaguer: “Dime con quién andas… y te diré a qué Club perteneces”, Social 1, no. 9 (septiembre, 
1916), 15. 
Figure 4. Associational Preferences for the Upper Classes in 
Havana. Source: Conrado W. Massaguer: “Dime con quién 
andas… y te diré a qué Club perteneces”, Social 1, no. 9 
(septiembre, 1916), 15. 
Figure 4. Associational Preferences for the Upper Classes in 
Havana. Source: Conrado W. Massaguer: “Dime con quién 
andas… y te diré a qué Club perteneces”, Social 1, no. 9 
(septiembre, 1916), 15. 
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distinctions on the island; the style of each character in the drawing and their adjacent acronyms 
were therefore easily recognized by contemporaries, especially by the members of each 
association. These were the voluntary associations that Massaguer used to illustrate associational 
preferences in Havana, and the communities they represented: Vedado Tennis Club (VTC), 
Habana Yacht Club (HYC), Casino Alemán (CA), Country Club de la Habana (CC), American 
Club (AC), Unión Club (UC), Casino Español (CE). The membership of each of these leisure 
associations reflected the social make up among upper classes in urban centers.  
The first two associations caricatured, the Habana Yacht Club (1886) and the Vedado 
Tennis Club (1902), grouped Cuban upper classes and some foreigners–mostly Britons and 
North Americans.6 As for the rest of the voluntary associations represented in the drawing, 
Cubans were not necessarily the largest part of the membership. For example, North-Americans 
forged their own exclusive voluntary association: the American Club (1901), and many were also 
a prominent group within the Country Club de la Habana (1912). Spaniards came together in the 
Casino Español (1869) and Germans in the Casino Alemán (1862). Spaniards and Cubans with 
close ties to Spanish interests on the island frequented the Union Club (1880). Massaguer 
                                                 
6 In Spanish, there are two forms to identify the individuals who are from the United States of America: 
norteamericano and estadounidense. To Latin-Americans and to scholars focused in the region, the term 
“American” alone conflicts with the identities of those individuals who live to the south of the Rio Grande. Latin-
Americans consider themselves Americans too. In fact, they have three layers of identities: (1) as the nationals from 
a specific country (for example: Mexican, Argentinian, Brazilian, and Colombian); (2) as Lationamericanos to 
express a shared identity based on culture, not only in the spoken language, which is used to establish as a contrast 
with Anglo-America, especially with the United States and; (3) as Americanos, because they are also from the 
Americas. Existing scholarship has adopted an anglicized version of norteamericano as “North Americans,” but it 
resonates more as a geographical term to the English speaker. In this chapter, I will use the term North American as 
a cultural referent, to identify the citizens or inhabitants of the United States and their culture. In doing so, I 
emphasize two things: their national origin and their condition as immigrants to Latin America, and particularly to 
Cuba because of the focus of this investigation. Henceforth: North American immigrants or North American culture. 
I will not use the term “expat” to refer to North Americans because of its implicit bias. Expat is used to define the 
migrant who originates from a wealthier country and discredits those migrants who originate in poorer countries. 
Therefore Spaniards, Jamaicans, Haitians and North Americans who adopted residence in Cuba will be all regarded 
as immigrants. 
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entitled the drawing with his own version of an old adage–a man is known by the company he 
keeps–but he associated it with the membership to a social club: “dime con quién andas… y te 
diré a qué club perteneces.”7 In the end, the number of foreigners who participated in the social 
and associational life on the island was particularly high. At the top layers of their society, Cuban 
upper classes saw themselves conducting business and everyday life activities with foreigners as 
equals.8   
In this chapter, I argue that the three communities at the top of the social ladder–
composed of Cuban proprietors and liberal professionals, North American businessmen, and 
Spanish merchants–came together to forge a distinctive privileged class on the island. This is a 
business class in which status was no longer based on the prestige of renowned last name 
associated to a landed aristocracy or an abstract social standing, but rather on business acumen, 
professionalism, and monetary achievement. Previous investigations tended to emphasize social 
class above everything else, usually disregarding the internal divisions based on national origin, 
cultural background, regional business orientation, and the different statuses within these groups. 
The focus of this chapter is the initial transformation of formal and informal groupings into a 
network of businessmen. The institutionalization of a network to collaborate and compete, in the 
form of voluntary associations, lessened the tensions within disparate business communities in 
                                                 
7 This phrase translates literally to “say with whom you walk, and I will tell you to what club you belong” and it is 
equivalent in English to “a man is known by the company he keeps” 
8 Cuban working classes also who had to compete for jobs with the thousands of foreigners who were brought into 
the island. British West Indian and Haitian laborers came to work in the sugar industry and competed for jobs with 
Cuban workers. Capitalists created a very diverse workforce to reduce the worker’s compensation and prevent labor 
organization. Marc C. McLeod, “Undesirable Aliens: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism in the Comparison of Haitian 
and British West Indian Immigrant Workers in Cuba, 1912-1939;” Robert Whitney and Graciela Chailloux Laffita. 
Subjects or Citizens: British Caribbean Workers in Cuba, 1900-1960. The presence of foreigners, and scabs was 
used to create divisions between Spanish immigrant workers and Cubans, thus limiting the capacities of the labor 
movement. The largest strike in the early republican period was that of the workers in the sewer in which 1500 
workers participated, and only the 25 % of them were Cubans. See: Teresita Yglesia Martínez, “Organización de la 
república neocolonial,” 88. 
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Cuba. As businessmen came together in those formalized associations, they favored civility 
among themselves and promoted the modernization of urban landscapes to make their cities 
ready for business.  
Business Communities in a Crowded Transnational Society 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Cuba transitioned from a Spanish colony to a US 
protectorate. Throughout the nineteenth century, the acquisition of Cuba was deemed a 
fundamental part in the United States’ aspirations to control the Caribbean. In 1898, the United 
States intervention in the Cuban war of independence transformed into the Cuban-Spanish-
American war. The United States ignored Cuban participation in the conflict and negotiated the 
peace terms with Spain unilaterally. Thus, the imperial succession discourses framed the island 
and its inhabitants as a territory incapable of having a separate nationhood.9  
The military occupation of Cuba began in 1899 and, in seeking the pacification of the 
island, it succeeded in dismantling the three political and military institutions Cubans forged for 
their independence: The Liberation Army, the Revolutionary Party (dissolved in 1898) and the 
unicameral assembly for the Cuban government in arms. The call for municipal elections in 1901 
resulted in a serious blow to the U.S aspirations of gaining permanent control of the island 
because Cubans did not elect the candidates backed by the Unites States, who represented the 
“better classes” and held conservative views. The electorate had been reduced to five percent of 
the population, yet still supported the candidates of independentismo and those who backed the 
application of the Joint Resolution of US Congress, which indicated that the United States could 
not take possession of the island other than for a ‘pacification.’ The meaning of pacification was 
                                                 
9 Louis A.  Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos. Louis A. Pérez, Cuba 
under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934, 29. 
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stretched by the US occupation officers to mean something more than the cessation of hostilities; 
that is, socioeconomic stability in an environment that encouraged the flow of private capital and 
public confidence.10  
While the constitutional assemblymen were drafting a new constitution for Cuba, they 
were presented with the Platt Amendment, the last North-American effort in the pursuit of 
hegemony over Cuba. The provisions included in that policy established that the United States 
reserved the right to intervene in Cuba for the preservation of its independence and maintenance 
of a stable government capable of protecting life and property; that Cuba could not establish 
treaties capable of undermining the independence of the island; that the United States may 
acquire land for naval stations on the island; and that acts of the US Military Government could 
not be overturned. These provisions imposed a binding relationship with the United States, and 
they were presented as conditions for the military evacuation of the island. The policy served as 
a substitute for annexation. It transformed the Cuban republic established in 1902 into an 
extension of the US national system.   
After three decades of intermittent warfare against Spain and colonialism between 1868-
1898, Cuban patriots gained an incomplete independence from the European metropolis only to 
see their country fall under the control of the United States. These events brought profound 
transformations which altered the Cuban social order at all levels of society. For example, the 
changes in ownership ruined the Cuban sugar planter class, particularly those involved in the 
separatist cause. This process started at the end of the first decade of struggles for independence 
in 1878; property changed hands because of the punitive expropriations imposed by Spanish 
colonial authorities, rising taxes to finance the war, the decline of prices, and the growing 
                                                 
10 Ibrahim Hidalgo Paz, Cuba, 1895-1898: Contradicciones y disoluciones.  
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indebtedness of sugar producers. Many of the sugar mills in operations prior the war ended up 
devastated because of the armed conflict, and numerous of those sugar factories that survived 
ended up in foreclosure. Simultaneously, Cuba’s economy transformed from a slave workforce 
to wage-based labor, and blacks entered the paid labor market at its worst times. The 
immigration of dispossessed Spaniards increased and many more peninsulares came seeking to 
suck the benefits offered in the colony to them. The tensions between Cubans and Spaniards 
remained very high during and after the US military occupation.    
Cuban middle and upper classes fragmented as a consequence of the conflict and the 
Spanish punitive measures, but also because of the influx of foreign capital.11 Affluent Cubans 
typically had inherited land titles and the wealth they used to position themselves in the 
productive end of the economy.12 Given the number of bankruptcies among the planter class on 
the island and the advances of US capital, many Cuban proprietors opted to exchange their titles 
of property for stocks in US corporations. Consequently, they ceased to exist as rent-earner 
landowners and transformed into wage-earner administrators of the land they previously owned. 
The demotion of the Cuban planter class into shareholders and administrators turned them into 
agents of US capital on the island. Thus, the penetration of the Cuban economy made these 
individuals agents of US interests in Cuba and advocates of US intervention. The former 
members of a landed aristocracy now depended on the success of foreign capital seeking to 
control the means of production.13   
                                                 
11 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934, 13. 
12 Alejandro García Álvarez, La gran burguesía comercial en Cuba, 1899-1920, 15.  
13 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934, 13. 
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Spanish merchants were among the most prominent businessmen in Cuban society 
throughout colonial times, and the scholarship has registered their lasting preeminence in 
commerce up to the first two decades of the twentieth century. Spanish immigrants used their 
privileges under the colonial regime to situate themselves in the trading business, outranking 
Cubans and any other nationals who conducted export-import transactions with the island. 
Spaniards owned most warehouses and controlled commerce at all ends, from wholesale to retail 
operations. The extent of their enterprises and consumption traditions helped them to maintain a 
stronghold in commercial business for a couple of decades after 1898.14   
Spanish immigrants conducting mercantile businesses still profited from the remnants of 
an old and quite extensive set of networks that had connected the two ends of the Spanish 
Atlantic World for centuries, even if substantially diminished in the nineteenth century. Most 
merchants in Cuba were established in the traditional port cities, were given access to subsidies 
from metropolitan authorities, and were the main beneficiaries of the easement created for them 
to gain access to port facilities and warehouses. Cubans, Britons and US businessmen were far 
behind in this sector of the island’s economy. North Americans were the closest competitors in 
this field, but even after the imperial succession, the United States merchant fleet was still too 
small and unable to outrank Spaniards and the old consumer-based tradition of European goods. 
Therefore, the first US move to outmaneuver the Spanish without charge was to control trade 
mechanisms such as the reduction of tariff fees in order to import US products. 15  
                                                 
14 Alejandro García Álvarez, La gran burguesía comercial en Cuba, 1899-1920, 78. The author mentioned two of 
these privileges: the Spain’s government subsidies and the ease of access to port facilities and warehouses. In 
addition, there was a well-organized Cuban and Spanish coastal commercial navigation system (cabotaje), which 
was conducted by experienced sailors. The US merchant marine was unable to compete with these commercial 
infrastructures (pages 84-86). 
15 Alejandro García Álvarez, La gran burguesía comercial en Cuba, 1899-1920, 34, 82-85.  
37 
Spanish immigrants developed various other business interests, but nowhere did they 
predominate like in trade. The historiography has documented the adaptation of these Spanish 
traders into money lenders as the market offered them an advantageous position to speculate in 
sugar prices.16 Between 1880 and 1920, an important number of them settled on the island as 
residents and acquired properties; as they did so, a group of them joined the agribusiness sector 
of the economy. By the time when the sugar industry underwent major transformations, they 
were more likely to have accumulated the capital to invest in the adaptation of sugar mills from 
the ingenio to the central.17 Such a profound change refers to the modernization of the sugar 
business on the island by introducing large sugar factories and producing a division of labor 
between farmers (colonos) and factory owners (hacendados). But such transformations did not 
appear to have altered the Spanish traditional footing in commerce.18  
It was common to see a reduced minority of Spaniards reaching a very strong position in 
commerce and bureaucratic posts as wealthy Cubans continued to be the recipients of lands and 
other properties via inheritance. This social landscape contributed to the perception of Spaniards 
as traders, even if they had other business dealings or owned properties, and Cubans as 
landowners and sugar barons. Given the number of matrimonial alliances between these two 
communities, they also developed very complex family ties. Nevertheless, their occupational 
characterizations were consistent with the public perceptions at the time, and historians have 
echoed this feature.19 The imperial transfer did not bring significant change to the status quo. 
                                                 
16 Jacobo de la Pezuela, Diccionario geográfico, estadístico, histórico, de la isla de Cuba, vol. 2, 246. Alejandro 
García Álvarez, La gran burguesía comercial en Cuba, 1899-1920, 17. 
17 Fe Iglesias García, Del ingenio al central 
18 Alejandro García Álvarez, La gran burguesía comercial en Cuba, 1899-1920, 14-15, 18. 
19 Alejandro García Álvarez, La gran burguesía comercial en Cuba, 1899-1920, 15, 21, 23-25. 
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Throughout the rest of Latin America, the patriots always took control of the country, expelled 
Spaniards, abolished the privileges granted to colonial officers, and seized their properties upon 
independence. But the US military occupation prevented Cuban patriots from gaining control of 
the country for themselves and recover from the economic losses they had in the struggle.  
Under the banner of Spain in Cuba, business groups and political interests facilitated the 
formation of voluntary associations reinforcing the fragmented Spanish identities based on 
Iberian regionalisms. Those regionalisms presented themselves as separate national projects 
within Spain and developed their own aspirations for nationhood. On the island, those identities 
organized into voluntary associations as they sought to advance their community interests in 
Cuba and Spain. For example, the Centro Gallego and the Centro Asturiano connected 
immigrants to their cultural roots helping them to navigate challenges and facilitating their 
settling processes into the island. These institutions served as associational hubs for many other 
voluntary associations offering resources and benefits to Spanish immigrants.20 These support 
networks facilitated the adaptation of Spaniards migrating into the colony and contributed to 
advancing peninsulares above any other community on the island.  
It took over a decade after the republican inauguration to see an easement of the tensions 
between Cubans and Spaniards. Various factors helped to build a bridge between businessmen 
from these communities, especially the growth of a labor movement on many points on the 
island. Anarcho-syndicalists were leading the labor movement up to the first republican decade, 
and from that point in time socialist ideological currents began to gain terrain. Two major strikes, 
one in 1907 and the second in 1911, demonstrated the organizing effort among the working 
                                                 
20 Dolores Guerra López, Canarios en Cuba, sus asociaciones insignes; Dolores Guerra López, “Las sociedades 
regionales de beneficencia de los inmigrantes hispanos en Cuba,” Jesús Guanche, España en la savia de Cuba: los 
componentes hispánicos en el etnos cubano. 
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classes. These two business communities–Cubans and Spaniards–began to realize by the mid-
1910s that their economic interests were not as starkly different as they were during colonial 
times, and most importantly, that they had to compete with North American capitalists in the 
country they both saw as theirs. The merging of the identities of the former two groupings was 
undertaken via matrimonial alliances, through business agreements, or on purely political 
interests, but between 1910 and 1940s it ended up blurring the lines that marked their previous 
differences.21  
The process of amalgamation increased when business was booming in Cuba between 
1915 and 1920. The prices of raw materials and commodities produced on the island peaked 
during World War I and the value of sugar reached record highs. Cuban proprietors and liberal 
professionals, North American businessmen, and Spanish merchants could find common ground 
during the times of the “fat cows.” As business offered a more amicable environment for them to 
transform into an extended informal grouping, they forged institutions that would help them 
come together into a formalized group. Cuban proprietors and Spanish merchants merged into a 
completely undifferentiated group between the 1910s and 1940s, mainly because their economic 
interests converged into the same core objectives, as could not have happened in colonial times. 
During Spanish rule, the number of privileges granted to the peninsulares curtailed the 
aspirations of Cubans on the island and that was even despite their complex family ties with 
Spaniards.22 Around 1920, the two communities amalgamated into the same group of Cuban 
                                                 
21 After the 1940s Spanish immigration was no longer relevant. 
22 In colonial times, “peninsulares monopolized more than public positions. They also dominated private property. 
Spaniards controlled trade and commerce, banking and finance, industry and manufacturing. They owned and 
managed the factories and the farms, they were retail shopkeepers and wholesale merchants as well as the 
moneylenders and land brokers. Spaniards were preponderant in the professions and trades as artisans and 
apprentices, in the offices as clerks, and in the fields as day laborers. Most of all, they controlled the jobs. And 
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businessmen of Spanish ancestry. This is part of what many historians have described as the 
formation of a new Cuban business class.23  
The 1921 bank crash had a preponderant role in all of these transformations. 
Bankruptcies affected Cuban- and Spanish-owned banks primarily, as well as their typical clients 
who were of the same origins. Those subsidiary banks connecting the island with the US banking 
ecosystem survived the crisis, and protected their North American customers, and the few 
Cubans who had savings in those institutions. North Americans businessmen on the island did 
not suffer the same impact once the crisis arrived because their savings were not deposited in 
Cuban or Spanish banks. From that moment in time the differences between Spanish and Cubans 
began to disappear, their political differences lessened significantly. Cuban/Spanish business 
communities merged into the same core of objectives and they needed a social space to compete 
and coordinate actions with North Americans on the island.  
Cubans of Spanish ancestry and the Spaniards on the island became predominant in the 
Havana Rotary Club and they ended up turning the civic association into an institution posed to 
defend national interests. The number of nationalist actions undertaken by the club in the third 
decade of the twentieth century was noteworthy as we will discuss in the next chapters. Still, 
Cuban businessmen of Spanish ancestry had a fine line to walk, without denouncing or 
combating North American economic preponderance on the island. This was precisely the 
success of Rotary in Cuba that rather than becoming a club controlled by North American 
                                                 
whether by formal contract or informal consensus, Spaniards preferred to hire Spaniards, a private practice that 
coincided with public policy.” Louis A. Pérez, Cuba under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934, 10. 
23 The historiography has established the second decade of the twentieth century as the division line between an old 
and a new “bourgeoisie.” See: María Antonia Marqués Dolz, Las industrias menores: empresarios y empresas en 
Cuba, 1880-1920; Carlos del Toro, La alta burguesía cubana, 1920-1958. 
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immigrants in alliance with other foreigners on the island, Cubans took the Rotarian movement 
to defend the interest of the Cuban business communities.      
The number of US citizens on the island fluctuated decade after decade while US cultural 
norms and consumption items from the North diffused steadily.24 The spreading of US culture in 
Cuba exceeded by large the potential impact of those immigrants, and this phenomenon 
developed because of the willingness of many Cubans to embrace those cultural norms from the 
North as more modern and advanced.25 The peak of US citizens’ migratory movement to Cuba 
was in 1919. The fluctuation of this population was mainly caused by economic crisis either in 
Cuban or US soil, and that made many return to their home country.26 The scholarship has 
studied those enclaves or “asentamientos comunales” as a means of cultural preservation for 
North Americans living outside of the US, but these spaces also contributed to the rise of cultural 
                                                 
24 North American immigrants began to settle in Cuba in last two decades of the eighteenth century. These 
individuals were merchants and businessmen who established temporary residence on the island once Spain gave the 
authorization to trade with foreign allies in 1779. In the nineteenth century, many North Americans settle 
permanently on the island, especially after two decrees issued in 1815 and 1818, which were designed to favor the 
colonization of whites and to promote free trade policies. The number of North Americans who settle in Cuba grew 
up to over 6000 individuals at the turn of the twentieth century. There were sources indicating a presence of 13 000 
North Americans on the island by 1905, yet the 1907 census only recorded over 6,000. However, between 1908 and 
1919, over 33,000 North Americans arrived on Cuba as immigrants. José Vega Suñol, Norteamericanos en Cuba, 
17-34. In 1919, North American immigrants were typically employed as farmers, merchants and servants. The 
census indicated the presence on the island of 994 farmers, 651 merchants, 541 servants, 245 mechanics, 164 bank 
agents, 125 business employees, 125 school teachers, 102 civil engineers and surveyors, among others. Cuba, 
Dirección General del Censo. Censo de la república de Cuba año de 1919; The scholarship has observed that a 
quarter of the farmers were female, 264 to be precise, and that the large number of servants coincided with an 
increase of African American immigrants on that year. North Americans also had a balanced gender distribution, 
although many of the women established on the island were to remain at home in the cities or in the restricted areas 
of closed communities. José Vega Suñol, Norteamericanos en Cuba, 39-40, 43, 104. 
25 Louis A. Pérez, On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture; Rosenberg, Emily S. Spreading the 
American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945; Pablo Riaño San Marful, Gallos y toros 
en Cuba; Marial Iglesias Utset, Las metáforas del cambio en la vida cotidiana: Cuba 1898-1902. 
26 By 1943, the number of North Americans on the island had decreased to 3800 and a decade later the number 
augmented to 6503. A decade after the 1959 revolution, 1681 North Americans remained on the island. José Vega 
Suñol, Norteamericanos en Cuba, 30-34.  
42 
and interethnic conflicts with the Cuban population.27 In urban settings, the North American 
colony tended to be more socially active, particularly in Havana. They frequented the American 
Club and the Country Club and produced their own newspaper, The Havana Post.28  
North American businessmen did not assimilate as well as the first two groups. US 
citizens living on the island had a system of privileges and protections available to them, such as 
financial backing from the United States and the protection of the US government which 
guaranteed their properties and business on the island. In this context, Cubans/Spaniards who 
developed close ties with US businesses in Cuba put themselves in a good position. For example, 
there were always more opportunities to those who studied in the United States, worked for US 
companies on the island, conducted business in the branches of US banks operating on the 
island, or established matrimonial alliances with North Americans. Any strong form of linkage to 
the United States and its culture was favorable for the upper and the middle classes on the island 
and their aspirations to succeed in a very competitive society. This explains why the upper 
classes on the island grouped in social clubs whose cultural origins could be traced to Britain or 
the United States, even when they were founded by Cubans without any support from those 
nations.    
This was not the scenario in which the Havana Rotary Club was founded in 1916. The 
members of the new club were Cuban proprietors and liberal professionals of Spanish descent, 
                                                 
27 José Vega Suñol, Norteamericanos en Cuba, 114. This was a common pattern of North American settlements in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. See for example: Ronald Harpelle, “White zones: American enclave communities 
of Central America,” 307-333. In addition, the recollections of Virginia M. Schofield are highly informative of those 
tensions between North Americas and Cubans before the revolution in 1959. Virginia M. Schofield to Louis A. 
Pérez, Jr. “Virginia Schofield recollections 1910-1959 (1991),” Folder 1, in the Louis A. Perez Papers on Americans 
in Cuba, 1910-1959, 1991-1992. Collection Number: 12017-z. Rare Book Literary and Historical Papers, The 
Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
28 José Vega Suñol, Norteamericanos en Cuba, 51-52.  
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North American businessmen, and Spanish merchants. These were the three most prominent 
business communities in Cuba, and they found common ground in this associative strategy. The 
first Rotary Club on the island helped these groupings to create a network to collaborate and 
compete and overcome their national or ethnic origin. Still, the differences between these 
communities were not resolved speedily. The three communities named an unlikely arbiter to 
preside over them, one who would ease the tensions between them. The three communities of 
businessmen elected Rene Berndes, a German entrepreneur, as their first president. Berndes was 
considered a safe choice because he was close to Cubans, and North Americans did not see him 
as a menace. The second Rotary Club founded on the island was in Santiago de Cuba and it 
followed the same pattern as in Havana. These events confirmed that foreigners held important 
sway on the island: Cuba was not only an open economy; it was also a crowded transnational 
society.  
A Businessmen Network to Collaborate and Compete 
Up to the second decade of the twentieth century, business communities in Cuba were 
particularly distant from each other. When asked in 1915, the manager of the Havana branch of 
the National City Bank of New York, Porfirio Franca Álvarez de la Campa, had a dire opinion 
on the prospect of forming a club to bring together businessmen operating in Cuba: “They won’t 
get together, and if they do, they will not stay together any length of time.”29 A Tampa-based 
businessman, John A. Turner, had been commissioned with the task of exploring the terrain in 
Havana to create a Rotary Club. According to the requirements designed by the IARC, Turner 
                                                 
29 John A. Turner, “Rotary in Spanish-Speaking Countries,” The Rotarian vol. 21, no. 2 (August 1922): 70-72. 
Because of a typo in the article Mr. Franca is identified as “Mr. Franco.” Porfirio Franca had “been for years [the] 
managing director of the Havana branch of the National City Bank of New York and is a man of pronounced ability 
and has a great many friends throughout the Island.” See: “Financial developments” The Cuba Review 19, no. 5 
(April 1921), 10. 
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came to Cuba with the intention to find “adult male persons of good character and good business 
reputation engaged as proprietor, partner, corporate officer, or manager, of any worthy and 
recognized business”30 The interest was to find creditable businessmen and reputable 
professionals to join into a civic association which defined its goals as a service to the 
community. Still, according to this well-connected banker visited by Turner, even such a 
proposition to unite folks in a club seemed beyond reach for the business communities on the 
island.     
Business communities in Cuba operated independently from each other and they did not 
consider themselves to be part of the same social element. “The fellows in Havana do not have 
the habit of getting together or doing things as a body,” Porfirio Franca added.31 For his part, 
Turner reminisced years later how the first Rotary club was established in Cuba: “Havana Rotary 
was organized with the different elements, Spaniards, Cubans, Americans, and English, about 
equally divided, so that no one race predominated.”32 Thus, these three ethnic groups were 
regarded as different races, even when all their components were European and European 
descendants.33 Historians considered upper classes as a single and undifferentiated social group, 
                                                 
30 “Constitution and By-Laws of the International Association of Rotary Clubs” International Association of Rotary 
Clubs, Proceedings Twelfth Annual Convention of the International Association of Rotary Clubs, 542. In this book 
see also “Membership in Rotary” and “Rotary Classifications” 527-533 and 534-540. Once the organization changed 
its name to Rotary International, these ideas about who could become a member remained unaltered. See 
“Constitution of Rotary International,” Rotary International, Proceedings Fifteenth Annual Convention of Rotary 
International, Toronto, Ontario, Canada June 16-20, 1924, 416-417. The translation into Spanish can be found in 
Club Rotario de La Habana Constitución de clubs rotarios, it also was included in the trove of materials included in 
René Acevedo Laborde, Manual Rotario.  
31 John A. Turner, “Rotary in Spanish-Speaking Countries,” The Rotarian 21, no. 2 (August 1922): 70-72. 
32 Ibid. 
33 This is a conflicting vision with the perspectives presented by the historian Carlos del Toro in his study about the 
Cuban bourgeoisie. The error consisted in that social class was regarded as a given condition, assuming the elements 
of the bourgeoisie belonged to the same grouping and shared the same class consciousness. See: Carlos del Toro, La 
alta burguesía cubana, 1920-1958.  
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seemingly suggesting that the property-owning individuals have a class consciousness fixated to 
their class condition, disregarding national origin and cultural background.34 Since Cuba was a 
crowded transnational society where many business interests coexisted, the formation of a 
community was crucial for them. The shared social spaces starting to emerge and the possibility 
to interact with each other and then reach collective understandings served their interests and 
helped them to gain an identity.  
According to Porfirio Franca, business communities on the island lacked the 
infrastructures or the civic spaces to bring them together. Franca was adamant that “we do not 
even have a clearing house here for the banks, much less can we expect to get an organization 
like the Rotary Club going and keep it alive.”35 But there are only two options, either Porfirio 
Franca was wrong, or he was intentionally misleading Mr. Turner. By the mid-1910s several 
conditions favored the rapprochement between the various business sectors in Havana and 
Porfirio must have been very well informed about that. Porfirio Franca was not only the manager 
of the Havana branch of the National City Bank of New York, he was also the president of one 
of the most prominent clubs in the city, the Vedado Tennis Club (VTC). The VTC was a leisure 
                                                 
34 See Carlos del Toro, La alta burguesía cubana, 1920-1958; Jorge Ibarra Cuesta, Cuba 1898-1958: Estructura y 
procesos sociales. On the other hand, the working classes had to achieve a class consciousness in the social struggle, 
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35 John A. Turner, “Rotary in Spanish-Speaking Countries,” The Rotarian vol. 21, no. 2 (August 1922): 70-72. The 
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institution in the midst of fierce competition with the Habana Yacht Club to be the most 
conspicuous social club in the city for the supposed “better classes.”  
There is no evidence to prove any obscure intention from Franca, but he did paint a dark 
picture to the Rotarian envoy. Turner had done his homework and he replied back to the banker: 
“I reminded him of the wonderful clubs of Havana, the ‘Centro Asturiano,’ the ‘Centro de 
Dependientes,’ and the ‘Centro Español.’ One of these clubs boasts a membership list of as many 
as 35,000 members.” But, a high-profile banker such as Franca was not interested in the large 
membership of those social clubs over the social standing of a very selective membership. 
Turner continued his exposition and this time he brought a better argument “I also pointed out to 
him their perfectly splendid ‘Cámara de Comercio,’ an organization built along the lines of our 
own Chambers of Commerce but serving in a different manner.”36 There is no evidence to 
indicate Franca’s actual reaction to this proposition, but he was uncooperative. As the president 
of one prestigious voluntary association, the fear of competition in attracting the “better classes” 
could have driven his indifference. If that were the case, Franca’s perception was not unfounded. 
Turner reported in 1916 about the success in forming the club in Havana: “they intend to be the 
best club in the city of Havana. With the material with which they have started there is no doubt 
but that the Club will be a credit to itself and Rotary.”37  
The Havana Rotary Club was founded by three businessmen from Tampa. The first 
discussions about founding a Rotary club in Havana were held in 1914, thanks to the efforts of 
Ernest Berger who initiated talks with his counterparts in Havana during a business trip. In 1916 
Berger returned to Havana accompanied by two other Tampa businessmen, John A. Turner and 
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Ángel Cuesta.38 John Turner was at the time the chairman of the committee on Extension Work 
in Latin-America.39 These three Rotarians worked together to introduce the first Latin American 
Rotary Club which was finally created on April 29, 1916.40 The official name was Club Rotario 
de La Habana, in Spanish, and it held the regular luncheon weekly meetings on Thursdays at 
noon, at the Hotel Sevilla.41 The club was created “with a charter membership of 22 of the 
leading Havana business and professional men.”42 In Turner’s own words “I am proud of the 
personnel of this club, as it is composed of some of the most prominent business men on the 
island of Cuba.”43 He also added that the club “has the co-operation and assistance of the Cuban 
government, and of the daily press of Havana.”44 Turner was reporting back to the Rotarian 
Convention and there is a chance that he was overstating his joy, especially in regard to the 
backing of the local authorities. 
The evidence suggest that it was important to have a prestigious banker among the 
founders of a social club hoping to attract the most prominent social sectors in society. This is a 
visible pattern in the foundation among all the major social clubs having inspiration in North 
American or British culture in Havana. The Havana Yacht Club and the Vedado Tennis Club 
became the most prominent spaces for the elites in the city, somehow demoting the social 
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ranking of those associational centers who had a strong linkage to Madrid during colonial times, 
such as the Casino Español. Associations shaped in the form of a club were deemed to be more 
in fashion as recreational spaces for the elites and social climbers. The Yacht Club and the 
Tennis Club had among their founding figures two prestigious bankers, De Zaldo and Porfirio 
Franca, respectively.45 But it is important to establish that these two clubs were founded by the 
initiative of the local elites and not because of the efforts of any foreign organization, as it was 
the case with Rotary. The efforts from the part of the Floridians in Havana to create the first 
Rotary Club in a Spanish-speaking country reveals also the intention of having a banker in the 
directive board of any new association aspiring to congregate the elites. That explains the 
interactions of Turner and Franca. Franca was either consulted or invited to be part of the new 
club. It appears that Franca was not interested, or even opposed to forming a new social club, and 
that can be noticed in his conversations with Turner, who remembered those interactions with a 
bad flavor.46  
The Committee on Extension Work in Latin-America created by the International 
Association of Rotary Clubs, and its chairman Mr. Turner, were determined to have a banker 
among the chartered members of the first Rotary Club in Cuba. In the same bank in which 
Franca worked, someone else took the offer with far more interest: Albert W. Hoffman the 
manager of the foreign department of the National City Bank of New York City in Havana.47 
Hoffman’s opinions were not quite different from those expressed by Franca, and he uttered 
them as the representative from the Cuban Club visiting a Rotarian convention in the United 
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States: “in Havana (…) it is a very different condition from that prevailing here, and anybody 
who does not know Latin American countries cannot understand why they fail to appreciate and 
understand the motive power, the spirit of enthusiasm and get-together spirit which I think 
permeates and is the whole heart and soul of the Rotary organization.” 48 Given what we already 
know about the civil society on the island, his report was not entirely accurate. It was a plain 
overgeneralization. But in the end it is consistent with other perceptions presented before about 
the disunion of the various social elements in Cuba, and Hoffman took the opportunity to 
extrapolate his impressions to read the entire Latin American region. Yet, the reasons preventing 
people from coming together were very rational to the other two elements in the discussion; 
Spaniards and Cubans. The Rotary movement was established at a time in which these elements 
saw the need for coming together. Hoffman observed that the Rotary Club: “In Havana (…) is 
bringing all the different elements together, which up to the present time, I am sorry to say, for 
diverse reasons–political, social, religious and otherwise–have not been co-operating very 
closely.”49 The fact that Hoffman did not mention economic or business reasons pulling apart 
these communities from each other seemed a conscious omission to avoid mentioning the most 
tense aspect of their differences. 
National origin and cultural background were important elements to establish distinctions 
among the business leaders on the island. Hoffman was very explicit about it: “I will say [that in 
the Havana Rotary Club] we have the representatives of the best that there is in the city, of the 
Cubans, primarily, and Americans, and some Spaniards.”50 Not only nationality, but cultural 
                                                 




background and the ability to speak English and Spanish were very important as well. When 
Hoffman was asked “what percentage speak English in the club?” He responded: “Only a small 
per cent do not speak it. The official language of the club is Spanish.”51 Cubans were the largest 
group in the club, and several of them seemed to be fluent in English.  
A year later, in 1917, Allen D. Albert, the past president of the Rotarian organization 
recounted his visit to Cuba. He described the membership in similar terms. He observed the club 
and distinguished the number of Anglos in the Club, and their language usage. “Somewhat less 
than half the membership is American or English. Somewhat less than a score of the men [who] 
do not speak English. All speak Spanish and Spanish is the official tongue of Rotary in Cuba.”52 
It appears that North Americans initially hoped that English would prevail as the language of the 
club, but the development of the organization in the first non-English speaking country 
convinced them of the contrary and the possibility of taking the organization elsewhere, 
regardless of language and cultural difference. Havana proved that it was possible to organize a 
club in a completely different cultural environment, using another language, and still be a 
successful institution for its own members and to North-American perceptions.  
The creation of the first club was a success, based on the number of entrepreneurs who 
became interested in joining the club. In fact, the club members decided to go slow in the 
enrollment process, and still the number was quite extensive compared to the clubs in the United 
States: “the policy of the club is to go slowly and to take in only men who are the most 
representative of their line of business. (…) It is hoped that the club will reach one hundred 
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members.” They even hoped to bring relevant national figures to join the club and use their 
symbolic capital to gain more prestige. “It is hoped that [the] President [of the republic Mario 
García] Menocal will become an honorary member of the club, and I am sure he will.”53 There is 
no evidence to corroborate that Menocal joined the club as an active or honorary member. 
However, it was not uncommon to find members of the cabinet as members of the Havana 
Rotary Club, for example “Dr. Enrique Nuñez, [was the] Secretary of Health of the Republic of 
Cuba, and a member of the Rotary Club of Havana.”54 
The capital city is commonly one of the most impacted regions by the penetration of 
foreign capital, and it was there where foreign businessmen preferred to establish their residence. 
But, in the early republic, the extent of foreign capital penetration in Cuba was so pervasive that 
the same phenomenon we have discussed for Havana happened in other cities as well. The same 
prevailing nationalities were notable among the business communities in the second largest city 
on the island. In 1922, in the membership of the local Rotary Club for the city of Santiago de 
Cuba there was a similar social make up to that of the Rotary Club of Havana.  
In the Santiago de Cuba Rotary Club half of the membership of thirty were Cubans with a 
wide variety of business occupations. One third of the membership was composed of foreign-
born individuals. Eleven clubmen indicated to have a nationality other than Cuban: seven 
Spaniards, four North-Americans and one Briton. One of the North Americans was no less than a 
representative of the U.S consulate in the city and another one was a banker representing the 
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National City Bank.55 Thus, even with such a miniscule representation, the North Americans had 
in the club the capacity to access two important networks of power: The Department of State and 
the US financial system. The two other communities represented in the club had no access to 
such a well-connected support system. It is not unsafe to assume that these two individuals 
sought to advance their fellow nationals over the rest, and to favor US capital expansionism on 
the island.  
There were notable benefits for creating networks of businessmen using voluntary 
associations. Business leaders saw a great potential in those business connections, as expressed 
by Hoffman at the Seventh Annual Convention of the International Association of Rotary Clubs: 
“We feel that it is going to do more than anything else in bringing about closer relations between 
Havana and other places in the Island of Cuba and between Cuban business men, and business 
men in the United States.”56 The social distance between the two mentioned business 
communities can be noted in these words. The social landscape on the island is quite revealing if 
a North American businessman, a banker in this case, had so many difficulties to reach 
customers, Cuban businessmen in particular. The banker was in fact revealing the lack of 
confidence he noted and his needs, as a North American immigrant representing big financial 
interests, to engage with his business counterparts on the island. Obviously, he saw this space as 
an opportunity to advance US banking interests on the island and to compete with Spanish 
bankers. His main interest as a banker was to reach Cuban businessmen. This is evidence of the 
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business rivalries and the benefits of creating a network were individuals from different 
nationalities and cultural backgrounds could collaborate and compete.  
The Cuban businessmen were the most numerous group within the organization and for 
obvious reasons “they want[ed] to make Spanish the language of the club.”57 In addition to that, 
Cubans expressed nationalist emotions within the club and used their majority among the three 
business communities to push their identity over the other two groups. The Cuban business 
community in the club had made it clear that “they want[ed] to make it distinctly Cuban.”58 That 
was not a superfluous idea, but a policy within the organization implemented by the president of 
the Havana Rotary Club. “And I think that is the right policy for Mr. Berndes to adopt,”59 
evaluated Hoffman.  
Rene Berndes, the first president of Havana Rotary Club, was himself the incarnation of 
the divisions between the three business communities at the time of foundation of the club. The 
organization had three distinctive subgroups of North Americans, Spaniards, and Cubans, and 
yet they elected a German immigrant as their first president. North Americans and Spaniards 
appear to have considered him a safe choice, as an immigrant entrepreneur himself, but the 
Cuban group did not consider him a threat at all. The fact that Rene Berndes became the 
promotor of a Cuban identification within the organization suggests that he was either very well 
acculturated or that he had very close relations with Cuban businessmen.  
Club members did not want to make themselves the most inclusive of all organizations in 
the city. They wanted to attract to their ranks the most prominent businessmen from every walk 
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of life and represent their line of business, but not just everyone. The evidence suggest that they 
received too many applications and they opted to be more selective in accepting new members. 
“Like all the clubs organized last year, that in Havana has not desired to grow in numbers 
rapidly. It has at this writing less than 100 members. These have been chosen according to the 
excellent test of responsiveness to Rotary ideals, commercial standing and personal acceptability. 
They constitute a group of the most progressive commercial factors of Cuba.”60 These 
commercial factors represented a variety of business interests, among the three communities 
discussed here, who wanted to improve business conditions on the island.  
The aspirations of Rotarians in Cuba were so advanced that Allen D. Albert, the 
Immediate Past President of the IARC, establishing a comparison of the Havana Rotary Club 
with two Rotary Clubs of Minneapolis and Chicago, concluded that in matters of civics and 
leadership, Havana Rotarians were ahead of these two clubs, and that they were in the front of all 
clubs in the US. In Albert’s own words: “Their problems of membership were substantially like 
those of the Minneapolis club. Their methods for developing personal capability were not less 
clear than those of the Chicago club. But in the field of leadership in civics it is not too much to 
say that they have gone far beyond either of the two American groups cited for illustration, have 
gone well toward the front of all the clubs in the wide circle of Rotary.”61 That is, the club in 
Havana became a success story even compared with its counterparts in the United States.  
The competition among the three business communities was relentless because Cubans 
were not in control of the direction of the economy. Indeed, they controlled the national 
government, but at every attempt to bend the status quo to benefit Cuban interests over the US 
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corporations or businessmen on the island, they ended up face to face with Washington’s rule 
over Cuba. The protectorate was set in action via the mechanisms of the Platt Amendment to 
undercut any initiatives capable of affecting US control of the economy.62 The conspicuous 
presence of foreign actors acting within this society showed how Cuban businessmen had to 
compete with North American and Spanish capitalists in their own land, and this is typically a 
Caribbean phenomenon.  
The US intervention in 1898 prevented Cubans from expelling Spaniards and seizing 
their business and properties as it happened elsewhere in Latin American countries. In doing so, 
Latin American patriots and businessmen became the strongest economic force in their own 
nations, but Cubans could not. They also had to compete from a position of disadvantage in their 
homeland. Cuba, like many other nations in the Caribbean, was forced to have an open economy 
and make its nationals struggle and compete in a multinational economic setting established by 
foreign empires in their own nation. Thus, the fact that the island operated as an open economy, 
mainly to the benefit of US interests, also produced a crowded transnational society.  
Forging Civic Enterprises for Urban Development 
In 1905, a group of four individuals founded in Chicago a voluntary association to attract 
businessmen into weekly social gatherings, the first Rotary Club. These four men–Paul Harris, 
Gustavus Loehr, Silvester Schiele, and Hiram Shorey–rotated their business offices as meeting 
locations because they had not yet established a formal place to meet. As the idea attracted many 
more entrepreneurs, they could not continue to meet in the same fashion, and they had to find 
larger locations to meet. As time passed by, and other clubs were created, Rotarians opted to 
have their weekly meeting around a lunch table in restaurants. The memory of the initial times, 
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rotating from one business office to the next, served to name the organization as Rotary. In only 
a few years, this associational space transformed from a single luncheon club into an expanding 
national association of clubs across the United States. The National Association of Rotary Clubs 
(NARC) was created in 1910, having Paul Harris as the first president and Chesley R. Perry as 
the secretary general.63 The connections between these clubs and the national organization 
located in Chicago forged a network of businessmen with nodes in an ever-growing number of 
cities.  
The spread of these voluntary associations was so fast that by 1912 the Rotarians had to 
adapt to the internationalization of the organization. The institutional name was changed to 
International Association of Rotary Clubs.64 From the capital city of every country, the network 
expanded into the hinterlands reaching every major city and town of political or commercial 
relevance.  
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By 1922, the organization changed its name for the last time to Rotary International (RI), 
and that included the formulation of a new constitution and by-laws. In the process of adapting to 
such a profuse dissemination over US 
territory and other nations, RI adopted 
organizational structures similar to 
those developed by big businesses in 
the United States. The work of Alfred 
D. Chandler studies how the multiunit 
business enterprise replaced the 
traditional family firm, moving from 
family business to financial 
capitalism.65 It is striking to observe 
how those processes in the business 
world impacted the formation of this 
type of civic association and 
transformed it into a corporate 
organization. Since the members of the 
organization were already businessmen, it is unsurprising that they brought with them those 
organizational initiatives.  
 The success of the organization and its outstanding expansionism can be traced to the 
establishment of a managerial membership class, and the formation of a multiunit administrative 
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organization. A 1924 organization outline revealed the multiple units used to manage Rotarian 
businesses, both nationally and internationally.66 This means that Rotary transformed into an 
institutional edifice controlled by a multinational board of directors and a powerful secretary. 
This was also a moving structure because the expansion generated the continuous need to 
rearrange the managerial units. The creation of a managerial hierarchy and a hierarchical ladder 
based on prestige and commitment to the organization offered a path for career managers. These 
were career managers of a different kind, which I define as civic managers to establish a 
difference between them and what we know as business corporate managers. It is important to 
note that managerial roles in any voluntary association were unpaid positions and that all 
committees counted on the voluntarism of the members. There were exceptions to this rule, for 
example, the Secretary–a position filled by Chesley R. Perry for various decades–received a 
symbolic one-dollar monthly salary while amassing a wealth of networks.  
In a couple of decades, a single social unit, whose initial members were less than half a 
dozen, transformed into a global multiunit organization with hundreds of thousands of members. 
This process revealed a rapid journey from a voluntary association into a vast network of 
businessmen organized hierarchically. In every one of these voluntary associations, the members 
had a plethora of multiunit internal committees and a local board of directors to govern them. A 
cluster of clubs was organized into Rotarian districts seeming national spaces or subdivisions 
within national spaces, which were then managed by the district offices or a regional board of 
directors. Every district had a governor responding to the board of directors of Rotary 
                                                 
66 “Rotary International Organization Outline, July 1924,” Rotary International, Proceedings Fifteenth Annual 
Convention, 416-417. 
59 
International. Governors were nominated locally and then appointed at the international 
convention that the organization celebrated each year.  
Two more aspects contributed to strengthening the organization and fostered 
expansionism. First, the board of directors of RI was the only one authorized to issue charter 
documents and to accept new clubs, which in turn had to observe the regulative norms created by 
the central organization. Second, there was an annual convention in which every unit and 
multiunit parts had to send delegates.67 
Throughout the twentieth century, Rotary International became a far-reaching non-
governmental organization within US society and in the world. Scholars have used several 
definitions to describe non-state actors at the international level. Depending on the emphasis 
every author placed on the borders and the forms in which they are transcended, these entities 
have been defined as transnational NGOs.68 To gain in specificity, I define Rotary International 
as a transnational network of businesspeople.  
The voluntary associations, the local Rotary Club, acted as the organizational base within 
the borders of any nation-state and commonly developed a life of its own on the national space 
where it was adopted. However, it is important to point that the accommodation processes 
produced significant variations. For the most part, the Rotarian associative strategy was accepted 
easily because it was particularly appealing to the business sectors of every nation. But there 
were significant clashes wherever other institutions reigned and even more when any form of 
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strong nationalism aroused. For example, Rotarians faced a strong resistance from Catholic 
officials in southern Europe, particularly in Spain and Italy. Another example was the ease with 
which these clubs were accepted in Japan and Germany and their abrupt disbandment in the 
years prior to World War II. In the second part of the twentieth century, Rotarians were 
substantially weakened in those countries undergoing revolutionary processes, such as Cuba and 
Iran. The board of directors of RI dissolved the clubs in these countries a few years after the 
initial revolutionary transformations, and because local clubs had not been functioning.69  
In Cuba, the first Rotary Club was established in 1916. It was the first Latin American 
country reached by the organization and the first non-English speaking nation to adopt the 
Rotarian ideology of service to the community. This was part of an emerging capitalist mentality 
in which entrepreneurs saw themselves as benevolent forces of good in society. They came to see 
their actions in society as a service rather than a mere ambition to accumulate wealth, and 
themselves as the driving force of progress and modernity through community involvement.  
The Club Rotario de La Habana contributed to the expansion of the organization across 
the country, as it happened elsewhere. But neither in the capital nor later in the rest of the 
country were the members of these clubs ready at the service of North American interests, 
despite their connections to Rotary International. The number of Cubans in the clubs focused on 
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the development of their cities. The more than sixty clubs established after 1916 on the island 
followed the same model and defended their city and their nearby region as their patria chica 
(fatherland).  
Once the three business communities began to act as a single organized group in the form 
of one voluntary association, they developed a substantial number of projects to develop the city 
and to improve business conditions. Their social activism and the number of civic interventions 
in this arena was noteworthy: “The Rotary Club of Havana has obtained the establishment of 
traffic laws for its city. It maintains a tourist bureau which, quite free of charge, stands as the 
English-speaking friend to the tourist. It is developing one of the few genuinely comprehensive 
city plans in all the world.”70 In fact, those developing plans were so comprehensive that it was 
understood at the time as a “program of civic enterprise;” that is, a collective capitalist 
intervention to make the city ready for business, and consequently to benefit from the investment 
of public capital and money-making opportunities.71  
Under the leadership of the first Cuban president of the Havana Rotary Club, Dr. Carlos 
Alzugaray, these businessmen proposed various action plans to the point of constituting 
themselves into urban development planners. Their combined efforts resulted in a “remarkable 
platform and program of civic enterprise prepared for this club by Rotarian Dr. Carlos Alzugaray 
and adopted after a real discussion.”72 This program of civic enterprise was remarkably 
comprehensive, encompassing: the acquisition of lands in the proximity of Havana for suburban 
development expansions; the transformation of popular neighborhoods by opening fitness and 
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hygienic facilities “to acquire also suitable grounds in the most populated districts with the object 
of dedicating them to the public as playgrounds, gymnasia and bathing places;” 73 the creation of 
interconnected business districts and promenades as “a complete system of boulevards and 
avenues which will connect the various suburbs and parks with each other, including a system of 
several diagonal avenues and one or two encircling boulevards;” 74 the modernization of “the old 
method[s] of procedure in the construction and repairing of streets and highways and especially 
so in regard to all roads leading into the city;” 75 the cleanup of urban spaces to facilitate the 
comings and goings of vehicles and individuals “procur[ing] the removal of all wires, posts and 
obstructions from the streets, sidewalks and entrances;”76 the improvement of public lighting 
with the “installation of a more artistic and efficient system of street lamps and electric lights;”77 
the promotion of studies for “the city's internal development and to recommend to Congress the 
most advantageous plan for securing it;”78 the study of methods of sanitation for the poor and 
their housing in the city with “an improved system of hygienic houses, comfortable and of small 
cost, for laborers and persons of small means;”79 and the contribution to the regulation of “the 
traffic in the city of Havana.”80 These interventions reveal the areas in which the government 
was lagging behind the growing needs of cities in Cuba, but Rotarians framed these actions as 
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contributions to governability and social participation. Businessmen put up such a collaborative 
effort to the benefit of local authorities that they ended up gaining a favorable opinion from 
governmental figures.   
These connections of civility and mindfulness for the public good flourished among 
Cuban entrepreneurs who observed Rotarians’ ideals to the letter. Service above self was the 
Rotarian motto, and those businessmen who joined the organization did exactly that: they offered 
their services to the community. However, these contributions for the betterment of society were 
rarely disinterested because these businessmen typically charged for their benevolence as the 
contractors who carried on the project paid with public monies. Thus, this idea of service became 
a way to open new business opportunities for capitalist interests.  
Community service became an ideological formulation which helped to define capitalist 
activity not as a selfish enterprise but rather as a social service. In fact, Rotarians branded their 
own organization not as a civic club but rather as a service club and the rest of the clubs in the 
network had to adopt these principles. Thus, a civic enterprise was a collective intervention of 
businesspeople and professionals associated to the private sector in public affairs. This is a form 
of civic management for the betterment of the society, although in quite different form. 
Businessmen were the primary beneficiaries of any of those projects in capital gain, as they were 
the most likely recipients of state contracts, while ordinary citizens benefited in the form of jobs 
and improvement works for the modernization of life. 
As much as North-Americans capitalists wanted to develop a businessmen network to 
Central and South America, the business influences in Havana took them on a rather unexpected 
path. The connections in Havana with the former Spanish metropolis were not entirely cut off 
after the imperial transition a from colony to a protectorate. Thus, when the first club was 
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organized in Havana, North American officials visiting this club noted that in Havana they had 
their “eyes turned to Spain.”81 Madrid was still the third commercial partner of Cuba after United 
States and Great Britain. But, most importantly, there was a group of Spaniards who were active 
members in the Havana club and these businessmen hoped to carry the organizational model 
created in Chicago into their home country.  
This expansion towards Spain was an unexpectedly pleasant surprise to advance the 
organization into Southern Europe, and in the process Rotarians in Cuba revealed their racial 
ideologies. One of the members of the Board of Directors of the IARC observed that Rotarians in 
Havana were “not looking southward.” Allen D. Albert wrote: “they are looking toward the 
East.” It was clear to Albert, that “they seem to expect Rotary to bind together men of their own 
kind in Cuba, first.” And that later “they expect it to cross the Atlantic to Spain.” These words 
reveal the racialized forms of thinking at the Havana Rotary Club and which other communities 
were excluded to the membership. Those men who were expecting to unite and gain cohesion as 
a single group were the Spaniards and individuals of Spanish descent. It became apparent that 
“their own kind” was a way to say white men of European ancestry. Those who had no European 
ancestry, or were racially mixed people, would not have the same opportunity to join the club. 
This is important to note because the exclusion based on race was never expressed in any 
regulatory documents or on their publications. In the words of Albert “they” were also a distinct 
community to the third grouping active in the club: North-Americans.82   
North Americans held contradictory visions on Latin Americans and their abilities to 
socialize in social clubs. Some argued that their neighbors to the south lacked the interest to 
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forge social groupings because they had “not imbibed the ‘get-to-gether’ spirit,” but Havana was 
presented as the exception to the rule.83 “It has often been said that Rotary would never extend 
even as far as Havana.”84 According to John Turner, reporting back to the mother institution, 
“Rotary in Latin-America will be of slow growth owing to the natural conservatism of the Latin 
races and their unfamiliarity with Rotary.”85 Again, their racial thinking has to be read between 
the lines, but it was clear that in the views of North Americans the Latins were a different race 
from their own. Latin Americans were unfamiliar with Rotary indeed, but the number of 
voluntary associations in the region was very high, and mainly in the large urban centers 
developed in the twentieth century in the region. In Cuba alone, the number of voluntary 
associations and their variety was immense. In any case, Cuba was regarded as test center to later 
apply elsewhere what had already been tested in Havana. It was expected that those agents 
working on behalf of Rotary elsewhere would “have to assimilate their Cuban knowledge of 
Rotary” to be effective in propagating the organization.86 
Turner, as the Chairman of the extension committee of Rotary in Latin America, favored 
a proposal from Frank D. Waterman, from New York, who suggested that the “greatest 
assistance can be given [to] the extension work in Latin-America by the ministers and consuls of 
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the various countries in the United States.” The Rotarian from New York made a proposal to 
consider a “consular membership” for this purpose. The rationale behind the suggestion was to 
assert the powerful connections that the institution was capable of affording as well as to show 
that Rotary had the backing of “proper channels,” 87 meaning the US Department of State and the 
US government’s expanding interest in the world. Meaning: an organization which aspires to 
present itself in close association with the US government and its expanding interest in the 
world. It was also a way to suggest that they had the backing of US authorities. The push to have 
consular members was also expressed by the North American members of the club in Havana. 
Hoffman asked in the convention “for my own information, I want to know whether (…) Rotary 
Clubs are left to elect as members the residents of the consular service?”88 He received a positive 
response from Allen D. Albert. He pointed that to accomplish such a thing the clubs had the 
option to elect honorary members of their choice. 
Scholars have demonstrated that the US private sector was at the center of US 
expansionism, but the US government became more and more involved in this process of 
internationalization. The historian Emily Rosenberg characterized the increasing involvement of 
the federal government in three chronological periods: the promotional state, the cooperative 
state, and the regulatory state. If the initial impulse for expansion beyond the American borders 
came initially from missionaries and businessmen, the assistance of the US government marked a 
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different character for such drive as it became a matter of national interest for the United 
States.89  
The President of the International Association of Rotary Clubs, Allen D. Albert was 
emphatic about the extension of works south of the Rio Grande: “we must realize the importance 
of extending Rotary in Latin America.” In Albert’s eyes, Latin-Americans were a rare mix of 
kind and indecipherable people: “Latin Americans down deep in their hearts are the most 
sympathetic and the most cordial people on the face of the earth. They are people who are 
essentially Rotarians as no others are (…) on the other hand, they are encased with an extremely 
hard fold that it is almost impossible for an American to penetrate.” That is why the penetration 
into Latin America depended on the success of the extension enterprise in Cuba. Yet some were 
not equally confident about the prospect of success beyond Havana, and doubted it would go 
“even as far as Havana.”90 Havana was a secure location to create a new club, but the rest of the 
region was regarded as an uncertain terrain. That is why Cuba was a field to experiment 
institutional expansion and to improve the version of what was going to be presented elsewhere.   
US Rotarians considered Cuba as a learning platform to later expand into the rest of Latin 
America. The expansion of voluntary associations and other grouping strategies underwent 
similar expansionist processes. In this case, as it happened with other entities, civic clubs 
organized in Cuba were taken as a model to be exported to the rest of the region: “Reports from 
Havana show that the business men of that city are appreciative of Rotary and undoubtedly they 
will be in a position to give valuable assistance in extending Rotary in Central and South 
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America countries.”91 One of the most influential members of the RI Board of Directors, Chesley 
R. Perry, was happy to “report that a great deal of preparatory work has been done by the 
Secretary” for the expansion into Latin America. For example, numerous “Spanish translations 
have been made of Rotary literature.”92 This reveals part of the resources invested and the 
determination to expand southward. But most importantly, Perry revealed that “in the Rotary 
extension work in Latin America the aid and cooperation of American consuls in those countries 
and Latin American consuls in the United States have been sought, and in many instances 
secured.”93 This confirms that the expansion of US non-governmental organizations into Latin 
America counted with the support of US government officials. But it also reveals that Latin 
American consuls in the United States were simultaneously sought after to help in the same 
efforts.  
Members of the board of directors from Rotary regarded the development of the 
organization in Cuba with the excitement of an experiment. Cuban developments were so 
important that some directors started to visit the island as early as February 1917, less than a year 
after the founding of the Havana Rotary Club. These civic mangers hoped to learn firsthand how 
things had worked to that point, and to bring more businessmen and professional men into the 
organization. They also expected to improve connections with the Rotarian headquarters and to 
raise awareness among North-Americans working to expand the organization into what they 
                                                 
91 Chesley R. Perry, “Report of Chesley R. Perry Secretary I. A. of R. G. For Year Ending 30 June 1916. Extension 
Work,” The Rotarian vol. 9, no. 2 (August 1916): 140. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid. 
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defined in the moment as Spanish America.94 The dissemination of North American cultural 
patterns into Cuban society harbored the successive penetration into Latin America.   
There is an extensive body of literature discussing Cuba-United States relations and the 
mutual fascination each country held about the other. For example, Louis A. Pérez indicated that 
Cuba has a singular place in the US imperial experience. The island has served as laboratory 
where the United States tested all the methods later applied in the creation of a global empire. 
Cuba became a figment of the imagination, as the island inscribed deeply into what North 
Americans understood of themselves as a nation. In relation to Cuba, North Americans 
considered themselves as benefactors, fashioning a selfless interest which almost had the content 
of a moral imperative.95 This explains the expressions of paternalism and joy that the directors 
felt once they returned to the United States and reported to the Rotarian convention: “In the 
month of February, Allen D. Albert, Chesley Perry and I visited the Rotary Club of Havana and   
                                                 
94 “It is possible that the president and secretary will be sent to Havana in February, for the directors feel that 
thereby a service would be rendered to Rotary by bringing the only Latin-American club in closer touch with the 
International Association, by increasing the interest in and knowledge of Rotary among the business and 
professional men of Cuba and perhaps of other Latin-American countries and by widening the viewpoint of 
American Rotarians as to the problems that are to be met and solved in Rotary extension work in Spanish America.” 
See: “Atlanta Probably Next Meeting Place for Board,” in “The Third Object. Notes from the Rotary Clearing 
House,” The Rotarian 10, no. 1 (January 1917): 52.  
95 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos. 
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we found there a Rotary club that I say to you is second to no Rotary club in the world in the 
character of its men and its municipal or civic consciousness.”96 In other words: the experiment 
worked, but it took a life of its own.  
 
  
                                                 
96 International Association of Rotary Clubs. Proceedings Eight Annual Convention of the International Association 
of Rotary Clubs (Chicago: International Association of Rotary Clubs, 1917), 54. 
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CHAPTER 2. TRACING BUSINESS LEADERS: GENERATIONAL CHANGE AND 
CIVIC NATIONALISM 
In 1921, business leaders in Havana city launched a civic campaign to promote the 
economic reconstruction of Cuba after the crash of the sugar market. The economy had collapsed 
abruptly after the crash of October 1920 and this crisis became the direct antecedent of a period 
of heightened nationalism in the island. Within a crowded transnational society in which Cuban, 
Spanish, and US business interests coexisted, the first two ethnic groupings and their companies 
were the most severely affected. Cuban and Spanish oldest banks collapsed with the crisis, and 
that paved the way for a greater presence of US banking institutions on the island.  
Due to harrowing conditions of the crisis, Cuban and Spanish banks were forced to 
liquidate their assets to distressed businessmen from those national origins.1 These segments of 
the economic classes lost the financial backing that catered to their interests: Spanish and Cuban 
banks were ruined. Cuban and Spanish-owned companies–particularly sugar mills–switched 
hands from debtors of these ethnic origins to US lenders.2 Therefore, Americans, and the fewer 
Cubans who banked in US financial institutions operating on the island, did not suffer the same 
impact from the crisis given the diversification of their assets in other economic products and 
regions. The crisis had wrecked Cuba, but if anything, it served to merge Cuban and Spanish 
                                                 
1 The Torriente laws ended the moratorium initially given to Cuban and Spanish banks. In addition, the Torriente 
laws had no capacity to affect the US financial system as any legislation enacted within the protectorate could not 
possibly affect its ruling nation. 
2 Kevin Grogan, “Cuba's Dance of the Millions Examining the Causes and Consequences of Violent Price 
Fluctuations in the Sugar Market between 1919 and 1920.” 
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business interests and especially their family networks into the same socioeconomic grouping: as 
Cubans of Spanish ancestry.  
A generational change had been underway for about two decades, but the collapse of the 
sugar economy elevated to leadership positions a new generation of younger and more ambitious 
Cuban-born businessmen of Spanish 
ancestry. Many of these individuals were 
sent to study abroad, especially to France 
and the United States, they inherited the 
patrimony of their families along with their 
business traditions, and defeated old 
mercantilist views of economic dealings as 
they sought to position themselves at the top 
of the hierarchies on the island.  
Many of those business leaders 
developed gathered in the local Rotary Club 
to promote several projects to ameliorate the 
conditions on the island by advancing collaboration among the leaders of government, finance, 
industry, and commerce. One of these plans was to reassure the nation with a sense of normalcy, 
and to exhibit their positions of leadership in “a great patriotic demonstration held on October l0 
the anniversary of the first war for Cuban independence in 1868.”3 The demonstrators organized 
“a monster parade in which all branches of the government, all municipal departments, and all 
                                                 
3 “Club Notes: Havana, Cuba,” The Rotarian 19, no. 6 (December 1921): 338-339. 
Figure 6. Great Patriotic Demonstration. Marked with 
numbers in original the photo: (1) Alfredo Zayas Alfonso, 
the President of the Republic and (2) the industrialist, and 
president of the Rotary Club, Alberto Crusellas Álvarez 
heading a civic parade in 1921. Source: “Club Notes: 




civic and other organizations were represented.”4 A politician and an industrialist were at the 
head of the parade: (1) the president of the republic, Alfredo Zayas Alfonso, and (2) the president 
of the Havana Rotary Club, Alberto Crusellas Álvarez.5  
The declared goal for bringing together businessmen and politicians was to “inspire the 
masses” with a “sense of civic pride and patriotism.”6 To showcase unity among relevant 
national figures, they decided to “bring out the finer quality of the citizenship and [elevate the] 
public spirit.”7 The photographic evidence corroborates that white, privileged men, who were in 
control of political and business affairs, placed themselves ahead thinking of themselves as the 
finer segment of the population. Their social standing, and specially the positions of leadership 
that they reached in the realm of business, originated both from the specialized education they 
had received and their well-to-do family backgrounds. 
This chapter traces the family origin ownership of several prominent businesses in the 
island and explores the different entrepreneurial sectors across Cuba. The new generation of 
business leaders that rose to prominence around 1920 transformed themselves into modern 
business leaders. However, they did not create impersonal corporations, but rather companies 
which were to a considerable degree responsible for the destinies and the livelihoods of the 
family group that used their surname as a business name. Modern business leaders on the island 
aspired to influence the economic direction of the country by advancing a civic nationalism; 
which in turn helped them to gain a collective voice for incursion into politics. It also gave them 






the freedom to express their business interests as identical to those of the nation. The network 
they created among themselves helped them to forge a platform from which to articulate their 
aspirations for a change attired with the raiment of civic virtue.  
The Heads of the Industry: A Family-Business Model 
Alberto Crusellas was a perfumer who developed many of the signature products offered 
by Crusellas & Cía., a limited partnership established in Havana in 1863. For many decades 
Crusellas was not only a family name, it was also business entity, and a popular brand known 
throughout Cuba for their soaps and perfumes. The company was founded as a family firm, like 
many of the companies formed throughout the nineteenth century and the initial decades of the 
following centennial. Two Catalonian brothers, Juan and José Crusellas Vidal founded the 
company, and a couple of decades later they brought from Spain their nephews José and Ramón 
Crusellas Faura (who were also brothers, and the sons of Francisco Crusellas Vidal), and 
reorganized the company to include them as co-directors. It was a pattern followed by many 
Spaniards whose businesses thrived in Cuba. They tended to bring more family members when 
businesses expanded. The migratory trend became a “Spanish tradition in Cuba (…) [in which a] 
maternal [or paternal] uncle who claims the nephew were [the] agents of this migratory 
current.”8 It is important to acknowledge, however, that at a certain point these forms of 
entrepreneurship closely associated with a kin group ceased to be Spanish, and transformed into 
family-businesses managed by Cubans of Spanish ancestry.  
These transformations of national identity happened as asynchronous processes within 
each family, but significant changes in ownership in industrial proprieties developed within the 
                                                 
8 Original in Spanish: “La tradición española en Cuba y el tío materno que reclama al «sobrino» fueron agentes de 
esta corriente migratoria.” See: Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, Cuba vista por el emigrante español a la Isla, 1900-1959: 
un ensayo de historia oral, 37.  
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non-sugar sectors of the economy by the second decade of the twentieth century. It was Ramón 
F. Crusellas Touzet, the first Cuban-born in the family who was named as the head of the family 
business. Ramón’s brother in-law, Luis M. Santeiro Arias, married to Mercedes Crusellas 
Touzet, became the manager of the firm in 1911, and other family members participated in the 
business to varying degrees. They developed strategies deemed necessary to safeguard the 
inherited patrimony and assure the wellbeing of the family group. For example, Alberto 
Crusellas Álvarez stood alone once Crusellas & Cía merged with Ed. Plante, a competitor in the 
manufacturing of soaps, perfumes and toilet preparations. The merger created the Compañía 
Nacional de Perfumería, S.A. with one million pesos invested. The string of family members and 
their involvement in business is a complicated matter to situate, especially for the Crusellas who 
reorganized their firm on many occasions and merged several times to preserve the collective 
patrimony.9 
The diversification of the Cuban economy beyond the cash crop production for the world 
market started in the last third of the nineteenth century. Between 1880 and 1920, these new 
businesses strengthened and began offering viable paths to make fortunes in Cuba–just as the 
island was undergoing major economic, social, and political transformations. These new forms 
of entrepreneurship developed in urban centers within the realms of printing business, beer 
brewing and ice production, liqueur crafting, perfumes and soaps manufacturing, among others. 
Commonly, these businessmen arrived from Spain and benefited from Spanish colonialism to 
build their fortunes in the non-agricultural sector of the economy. Just as Cubans had become the 
                                                 
9 Jesús Chía, “El monopolio en la industria del jabón y del perfume,” 15-26; “Trade notes” The American Perfumer 
and Essential Oil Review 12, no. 1 (March 1917), 236; Official Gazette of the United States Patent Office 269 
(December 9, 1919): 371; Official Gazette of the United States Patent Office 232 (November 14, 1916): 588; 
Guillermo Jiménez, Los propietarios de Cuba 1958, 171-172. 
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owners of most sugar mills on the island throughout the nineteenth century via inheritances, 
Spaniards sought other economic opportunities to make a living and invest the capital 
accumulated in trade businesses. In fact, commerce on the island remained entirely dominated by 
Spaniards still after the end of Spanish rule over Cuba, their stronghold on trading business 
endured for two more decades. Peninsulares arrived in Cuba in large numbers fleeing from 
poverty in the peninsula and seeking the opportunity to profit from colonialism, and a portion of 
them transformed into successful businessmen. 
The industries founded by Peninsulares in Cuba were transferred to the members of the 
families they had formed on the island. The intricate details of inheritances require further 
investigations, but the leading role in business, the position of general manager, was always 
assigned to a man within the family. For example, after 1919 the head of the Bacardí firm was 
transferred to the in-laws of the family for two generations. It is in this sense that they can be 
identified as patriarchal family businesses, because the men of the family remained as the heads 
of both business and family matters. The role of these male figures in business was 
unquestionable, and they represented the family in society as well. These men were the 
guarantors for the prestige for family name in the public sphere, although women were the ones 
actively working to safeguard the family behind the scenes.10 The formation of exclusively male 
business-focused voluntary associations, such as the Rotary Clubs, in the early twentieth century 
had among its purposes the curtailing of the advances of women in modern societies.11 The goal 
                                                 
10 Still, in such a male-controlled society, women would not come to have a passive role necessarily, as they could 
rule unchallenged in the household realm. Behind the façade of a strict male domination, women would remain in 
control of domestic affairs, and within the private sphere their voice could be second to no one. 
11 Jeffrey A. Charles, Service Clubs in American Society…, 25-29. 
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was particularly clear: limiting the access of women to the world of business, and reducing their 
chances to join the directive board of any family joint or stock corporation. 
Two decades after the end of Spanish rule, many of the most prominent industrialists of 
Spanish origin were aging, and their businesses were transferred to a male descendant or a 
prominent in-law within the family. Cosme Blanco Herrera and Ramón Rambla Contreras were 
among the most prominent businessmen in the non-sugar sector of the economy in Cuba, and 
they both died in 1918.12 These two men forged innovative business paths on the island, and 
amassed their fortunes in non-agricultural sectors, one in beer brewing and the second in printing 
business. These entrepreneurs became the business patriarchs of the firms they founded. Cosme 
Blanco Herrera founded La Tropical, a firm to produce beer and ice in Havana. Ramón Rambla 
Contreras and Jesús María Bouza Bello forged Rambla, Bouza y Cía., which eventually 
transformed into one of the main printing business in Cuba upon obtaining governmental 
contracts to print the state’s official paperwork.13 After the passing of Ramón Rambla, Jesús M. 
Bouza remained in control and he is an excellent example of those families who did not fully 
acclimate to the island, as Bouza continued to be as a staunch traditionalist defending the 
linkages of Spain and Cuba. On the other hand, Cosme Blanco Herrera, who carried nobility 
titles from Spain, was succeeded by his son Julio Blanco Herrera. Julio was passionate for the 
advancement of Cuba, and his love for the island acquired strong nationalist tones–the prevailing 
pattern within many family businesses. 
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, a new generation of businessmen with 
stronger identity ties to the island supplanted their foreign-born parents, and thereupon 
                                                 
12 León Primelles, Crónica cubana, 1915-1918..., 477. 
13  Jorge Domingo Cuadriello, Españoles en Cuba en el siglo XX, 17-18. 
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modernized the inherited companies. This new generation of businessmen was more inclined to 
adapt their family businesses into modern business enterprises, and to incorporate more 
innovative practices into their industries. Cuba had transformed from a Spanish colony to a US 
protectorate at the turn of the century, and such power change altered the lives of the people on 
the island, but family structures and their tying principles remained intact. Family as a social 
group was the only institution that remained unchanged, and that was the main reason the 
modernization of business structures remained partially hybrid.  
In Cuba, the introduction of modern business enterprises did not translate into the forging 
of impersonal companies focused uniquely on profits and expansion. On the island, modern 
business enterprises remined somewhat family-controlled or had to be accountable for the 
wellbeing of that social group. The board of directors–or any other managerial body–could be 
diverse, but the central leading figure ought to be a family member, and it was easy to perceive 
ties of kin within the leading enterprises in the nation. Therefore, the passing of family members 
was a natural catalyzer for the transformation of businesses and their managing bodies.  
For the Bacardí family, the transition into Cuban-born family members happened in the 
late nineteenth century, but still around 1920 important changes occurred to both family and 
business affairs. One of the sons of Emilio Bacardí Moreau and Elvira Cape, José Bacardí Cape 
(Pepín) died in 1918. The passing of Pepín left his parents in deep sorrow, a tragedy seemingly 
connected to the ensuing changes in the family firm.14 The next year, the business structure was 
changed from a family business, usually registered as a limited partnership “S. en C.” (sociedad 
                                                 
14 José Bacardí Cape (Pepín) died on November 9, 1918. “Esta tarde ha fallecido José Bacardí Cape (Pepín) en la 
plenitud de su vida rico y feliz. Deja viuda a la Sra. Zenaida Rosen y desconsolados a sus padres don Emilio y doña 
Elvira, que con sus otras hijas se hallaban de paseo por Norteamérica.” Carlos E. Forment Rovira & Olga Portuondo 
Zúñiga, Crónicas de Santiago de Cuba II: Era republicana 1912-1920, 460.  
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en comandita, o comanditaria) to a stock corporation “S.A.” (sociedad anónima).15 Emilio 
Bacardí Moreau remained as the president, but he was no longer making decisions in the firm. 
The new position of manager-director fell on the shoulders of Enrique Schueg Chassin, who was 
also a member of the family being the son-in-law of Facundo Bacardí Massó, the business 
founder. Enrique, also known as Henri, was married to Amalia Bacardí Moreau and he was the 
first of several sons-in-law who became manager directors within the Bacardí corporation. The 
transformation in the business structure to a stock corporation did not alter the influence of the 
Bacardí family within the business affairs.   
Enrique Schueg Chassin was a descendant of a French-Haitian family established in 
Eastern Cuba, and he is good example of other European progenies who fully integrated 
Spanish/Cuban and the family/business interests. The Schuegs owned a coffee business near 
Santiago de Cuba, like many other French-Haitian families that relocated into the mountainous 
region after the Haitian revolution.16 Facundo Bacardí Massó was a Spaniard who migrated to 
Cuba when he was only sixteen years old. His son, Emilio Bacardí Moreau, who became the 
president of Bacardí y Compañía from 1877 to 1919, and then Compañía Ron Bacardí S. A. until 
his death in 1922, was also the first Cuban generation of a Spanish family (also from Catalonia). 
These two Cubans would have never used a hyphen to identify themselves as Spanish-Cuban or 
French-Cuban as these were not typical identity categories.  
The Haitian component of Schueg Chassin family would have not been understood as an 
identity marker; for them Haiti was a French colony from which they fled to be reestablished in 
                                                 
15 Carlos E. Forment Rovira & Olga Portuondo Zúñiga, Crónicas de Santiago de Cuba II…, 489. 
16 Carlos A. Rubio Cancela, “Bacardí Distillery: National Register of Historic Places Registration Form (August 6, 
2010),” Puerto Rico State Historic Preservation Office, Oficina Estatal de Conservación Histórica (OECH)  
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Eastern Cuba. At the dawn of the twentieth century, Enrique and Emilio had the opportunity to 
identify themselves as they would have preferred: either as Europeans (Spanish or French) or as 
Cubans (a new nation in the making). It is well known that Emilio was an ardent patriot and 
suffered imprisonment for the cause of free Cuba. It is less known that Enrique was also 
imprisoned by the Spanish colonial authorities under the repressive system developed by 
Valeriano Wyler. However, the French government intervened in the release of Enrique because 
he had French citizenship. Emilio fully identified as a Cuban, based on his writings and 
patriotism, but we know less about Enrique. There are no set rules to understand how an 
individual chooses to identify when they have multiple national identifiers. Under the direction 
of Emilio in 1915, a vision continued and expanded by Enrique, Bacardí transformed in the first 
Cuban multi-national corporation opening facilities in Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Spain.17 
As modern family-business enterprises, these social units could afford themselves a 
considerable degree of social and political flexibility. In the interest of self-preservation, a family 
member could affiliate with a specific political party, and channel contributions to that political 
group. Another family member could do the same for an opposing political party, and regardless 
of the winner in any political fray the family group would have a direct connection to the elected 
officials. Such linkage would always be shaped as a debt of gratitude for the support given 
during the campaign. That support in turn would become a guarantee for accessing public 
officials and lobbying, as well to protect and cover the family member who supported the 
opposing party. The tendency is to see that many family-businesses distanced from any form of 
                                                 
17 Guillermo Jiménez, Los propietarios de Cuba 1958, 515; R. M. Connell, First Secretary of the US embassy in 
Havana, to Department of State: “Treasury Minister Bosch Likely to be named President of Bacardi Company 
(August 14, 1950),” Confidential US State Department Central Files: Cuba Internal and Foreign Affairs 1950-1954; 
Robert E. Bedingfield, “Personality: From Sugar to Banking to Rum: Bacardi's President Lost a Fortune in His 
Twenties” The New York Times (June 9, 1963): 141; Tom Gjelten, Bacardi and the Long Fight for Cuba: The 
Biography of a Cause. 
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direct political participation where political groups alternated in power, and especially if those 
power shifts were accompanied by violent revolutions. Given the traumatic quarrels for political 
succession during the first two decades of the Cuban republic, making contributions from afar 
and supporting one or another candidate from a distance was the typical modus operandi for 
these businesses. Therefore, for any family-business member to take a public political stance was 
a significant risk to his own patrimony of and the family behind him.  
The participation of a member of the Crusellas family-businesses in a parade and 
associating his name with a political figure was not business as usual. Starting in the 1920s the 
participation of businessmen in politics increased considerably, because it was now a matter of 
survival for the entire family unit. The strategy most commonly recurred to was indirect political 
participation by presenting their interests with the raiment of civic virtue. It was easy to find 
many prominent business leaders among those who decided to voice their concerns about 
conditions on the island.  
Those business leaders could be easily associated to a known business because of their 
last names and the role they played in the family business. They became the representatives of a 
frequently large and wealthy family, a renowned business entity, a workplace for some and a 
consumer brand for many. Those family names transformed into a symbol of local and national 
forms of entrepreneurship and monetary success. Surnames such as Bacardí, Sabatés, Herrera, 
Johnson, and Crusellas sounded “familiar” in the ears of contemporaries. Many of those business 
leaders found their way into the local Rotary Club. It was either the leading figure of the 
companies associated to those family names, or family members who had leading roles in the 
board of directors who join the local Rotary Club. Consider for example these businessmen who 
became Rotarians: Enrique Schueg Chassin (Compañía Ron Bacardí S.A.), Juan Sabatés Pérez 
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(Sabatés S.A.), Julio Blanco Herrera (Nueva Fábrica de Hielo S.A.), Alberto Johnson (Drogería 
de Johnson S.A.), and the abovementioned Alberto Crusellas (Crusellas S.A. and Compañía 
Nacional de Perfumería, S.A.).18  
It should be noted that all of these new industries were focused on the production of 
goods for the national consumer market, and these undertakings generated a more balanced 
society. One society in which urban businessmen were more concerned with the country in 
which they lived than those primarily focused on the international market. Things were quite 
different for those business leaders whose workers and their families were also consumers of the 
product elaborated in their factories. These capitalists tended to be more paternalistic and 
understood their businesses not only as a source of personal benefits but also a as a service to 
their fellow citizens. They wanted the country to abandon sugar monoculture and change Cuba 
by taking it into a complete different economic direction: one of economic diversification and 
industrialization.  
As representatives of the leading industries of an emerging nonagricultural Cuban 
economy, they more and more entertained the idea of a different capitalist path for the island that 
would leave behind sugar monoculture. The success of their ventures was not directly tied to the 
sugar market—they were not sugar barons. Yet, they considered the sugar industry as a given 
natural development for the Cuban economy, which merely had to be diversified in order to be 
improved, and it never crossed their minds that sugar production, as a source of national wealth, 
should be abandoned. These industrialists were all Cuban-born of European ancestry (either first 
                                                 
18 Ernesto Sarrá Hernández (Drogería Sarrá) is a good counterexample of the trend, there is no evidence that he 
joined the Rotary Club. However, as discussed in the introduction his goals aligned with the rest of industrialists. He 
too envisioned different alternatives for economic development. 
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or second generation), and they all came to have a much larger role in Cuban society than the 
historiography has acknowledged.  
By 1920, the past two decades of economic growth were considered as “Cuba's industrial 
awakening,” and such a perception was based on the expansion of the sugar industry, the steps 
towards economic diversification, and an incipient industrialization process.19 It was George 
Reno, the assistant Secretary of Agriculture in Cuba, who authored the report describing the 
progress in the national economy in such terms.20 Reno was an American citizen, who attributed 
these developments to the economic support of the United States on the island, and he was 
writing for an audience of potential investors in the United States. The Bank Crash in late 1920 
altered those developments, and just as North-Americans self-congratulated for the advancement 
of the economy, Cubans were the ones marked as responsible for its failures. Yet, Reno’s report 
helps to describe the economic changes Cuba was undergoing and how business leaders begun to 
develop such aspirations for economic change.21 Many entrepreneurs did not reach the same 
amount of wealth and fortune as the business patriarchs described above. They encountered an 
intermediate social status by having a small group of employees, counting with an independent 
source of income, and by networking with their peers in social clubs such as the Rotary Club.  
                                                 
19 George Reno, “Cuba's Industrial Awakening,” The Forum vol. 63 (March 1920): 280. 
20 George Reno, “Cuba's Industrial Awakening,” The Forum vol. 63 (March 1920): 279. 
21 These are some of the economic developments that started to emerge on the island right before the 1920s 
economic crisis. Sugar was always a locomotive for the national economy, and it expanded notably because of the 
increase of cane acreage and the new machinery imported into the country. Beef cattle and milk cows were brought 
into the potreros of Camagüey, reviving the meat industry in the central-eastern region. American farmers who 
moved into Camagüey, Havana, Pinar del Río, and the Isle of Pines transformed fruit cultivation (in this order of 
relevance: pineapple, citrus, mangoes, and avocadoes). The deposits of iron and nickel ores in Oriente province were 
exported by the millions of tons, mainly by the Bethlehem Steel Company. Cooper ores in eastern Cuba had been 
exploited since colonial times, but a new and far richer mine had been found in Pinar del Río, favored by the 
demands coming from the war in Europe. The construction industry expanded notably because of “the craze for 
suburban additions in Havana.” The fabrication of beverages and alcohols gained importance in these two decades 
as well. George Reno, “Cuba's Industrial Awakening,” The Forum vol. 63 (March 1920): 280-287. 
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Business Sectors Across Cuba: A Window from the Rotarian Network  
Rotarians developed their own ideological mantra related to service: “service above self.” 
22 This motto reflected the ways in which businessmen and professionals presented themselves to 
any given community. The stated objective of Rotary was “to encourage and foster the ideal of 
service as a basis of worthy enterprise,” and therefore every “Rotarian [could see their business] 
(…) occupation as an opportunity to serve society.”23 This notion allowed businessmen in the 
organization to view their roles in society as providers of services to the community with their 
own businesses. Such re-interpretation of their role in society offered them the opportunity to 
consider themselves as concerned community members who sought the collective good.  
Based on these ideas, businesspeople aspired not to be considered voracious capitalists 
concerned with their own self-interest. They provided services to the community: for example, 
the landlord offered living spaces to renters in need of housing, the factory owner provided jobs 
and needed merchandise, and merchants facilitated the goods that consumers demanded. Thus, as 
vast sectors of the working class were in the process of being reinvented as consumers, the 
managers transformed themselves into service-providers. In an inversion of societal roles, these 
notions helped to develop a new rationale for capitalism, one in which the businesspeople were 
the workingman providing goods and services to a needy and insatiable consumer class.   
                                                 
22 The objectives of the organization were focused on this ideal of service: “The object of Rotary is to encourage and 
foster the ideal of service as a basis of worthy enterprise and, in particular, to encourage and foster: (1) The 
development of acquaintance as an opportunity for service; (2) High ethical standards in business and professions; 
the recognition of the worthiness of all useful occupations; and the dignifying by each Rotarian of his occupation as 
an opportunity to serve society; (3) The application of the ideal of service by every Rotarian to his personal, 
business and community life; (4) The advancement of international understanding, good will, and peace through a 
world fellowship of business and professional men united in the ideal of service.” See: Rotary International. Rotary: 
Fifty Years of Service, 1905-1955, 8.  
23 Rotary International. Rotary: Fifty Years of Service, 1905-1955, 8.  
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Business leaders competed among each other, but they also collaborated and forged 
voluntary associations in order to advance collective interests. Entrepreneurs and proprietors 
were driven by the pursuit of capital accumulation, but they also tend to cultivate a social capital, 
which is amassed in the form of networks of power. The combined social and economic capital 
that these individuals bring into any organization gives them a collective position of power 
within the civil society. A civic association, like a Rotary Club, composed by a small number of 
businessmen, has the capacity to exert greater influence in a polity than a trade union enlisting 
hundreds of workers, at least within the model of capitalism developed on the island.  
Rotary Clubs were not the only type of voluntary associations in which business leaders 
gathered to network and advocate for their own interests across towns and cities, but they 
became immensely popular among the upper and middle sectors of society. There are many 
types of voluntary associations in which individuals sought to participate and interact with the 
rest of the society: from the neighbor’s association, the heritage grouping, and the sports club, 
among many others.24 To name one possible goal for organizing, business leaders were keenly 
interested in preserving their status, and making it transferable to their descendants, but there 
existed as many purposes as organizations.25 For example, an Asturian merchant and banker, 
Acisclo del Valle Blanco (manager of Balbín y Valle, S. en C.), was one of the most prominent 
businessmen in Cienfuegos, and he was a member of the Cienfuegos Rotary Club.26 However, 
                                                 
24 María del Carmen Barcia, Capas populares y modernidad en Cuba, 1878-1930. 
25 Maikel Fariñas Borrego, Sociabilidad y cultura del ocio, 112-113, 184-188. 
26 In addition to manager of Balbín y Valle, S. en C., Acisclo del Valle Blanco held executive positions in several 
corporations in the region: Compañía Industrial S.A., Compañía de Mieles, Compañía Combustibles de Cienfuegos, 
Cía. de Seguros y Fianzas. Francisco González Navarro, “La muerte tomó pasaje en San Lino,” Bitácora de Jagua: 
Revista cultural 3, no. 8 (January 2017): 6-8. To corroborate his membership in the local Rotary Club, see: Dres. 
Alberto Ruiz y Sotero Ortega, secretario y presidente del Rotary Club de Cienfuegos. “Matrícula de inscripción de 
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his social capital went far beyond the world of Rotarians and, by the time of his death in 1919, he 
had been a member of the Cienfuegos Yacht Club, Spanish Colony, Hunters Club, Asturian 
Club, and the Explorers Club. He had been an officer in the Chamber of Commerce, and the 
adviser for the Center of Urban Proprietors.27 Acisclo was born in Asturias, Spain, and became a 
Rotarian for less than a year; his death is part of the same cycle of peninsular interests that 
transformed into Cuban family-businesses of Spanish ancestry. The Rotary Club attracted the 
upper and middle upper classes in almost every city in which one of these clubs was chartered.  
The formation of new economic interests in Cuba forged a cohort of urban entrepreneurs 
and they organized themselves in civic, economic, and professional associations. But, within a 
myriad of organizations, they especially tended to organize themselves into civic associations 
such as Rotary Clubs, and that became a common pattern across the most economically dynamic 
towns and cities across Cuba. A total of forty-one Rotary Clubs were created across the island 
between 1916 and 1938. Another twenty-two clubs were added between 1939 and 1959 to make 
a total of sixty-three clubs across the island throughout the republican period (Table 1).  
                                                 
miembros fundadores, cerrada el 10 de diciembre de 1919.” Box 18, Folder 6, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: 
Cienfuegos vol. 1, Rotary International Archives.  
27 Francisco González Navarro, “La muerte tomó pasaje en San Lino,” Bitácora de Jagua: Revista cultural 3, no. 8 
(January 2017): 6-8.  
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Table 1. Cities and Towns with Chartered Rotary Clubs in Cuba. Sources: René Acevedo Laborde, Manual Rotario; 
Rotary International [Distrito 25]. Programa de la XIX Conferencia del Distrito 25; Rotary Internacional [District 
25], Memoria del año oficial de 1939 a 1940, 39; Club Rotario de Marianao, Directorio 1958-59, 115-122; Cuban 
Clubs Collection AC0033, Rotary International Archives. No clubs were chartered in the years missing in the table 
between 1916-1938. There is no precise year for the creation of the clubs between 1939-1959. * The information for 
these clubs was found at the Headquarters of Rotary International, no reference was found in Cuba. ** The 
Yaguajay Rotary Club was a short-lived institution. 
 
In addition to the “adult male persons of good character and good professional reputation 
engaged in any worthy and recognized profession” that Rotary sought as members, they left 
room for individuals who had intermediate managerial ranks in big businesses and university 
graduates. 28 The rules permitted the inclusion of corporate officers geographically dispersed, 
such as those who could be “acting as the local agent or branch representative of any worthy and 
                                                 
28 “Constitution of Rotary International,” Rotary International, Proceedings Fifteenth Annual Convention of Rotary 
International, Toronto, Ontario, Canada June 16-20, 1924, 416-417.  
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recognized business, having entire charge of such agency or branch in an executive capacity.”29 
The final delineation of the membership was probably more flexible, to provide each local club 
with some wiggle room and decide on their own. They also included prominent university 
graduates who developed their own enterprises or were associated with the private sector. 
Consider for example the engineer who works as a contractor, and eventually creates his own 
firm; or the Doctor of Medicine who opens a private clinic. However, the prestige of prominent 
professionals was very attractive for the organization and they were accepted not for their 
business shrewdness but for the prestige they could bring to Rotary. 
In the local Rotary Club, university graduates encountered a space to voice their interests 
and ambitions, and it was a way to move up the social ladder. Professionals made up an 
important component of the middle classes, especially in the inner cities across Cuba. For 
example, Eduardo Justo Chibás was a civil engineer from Santiago de Cuba and a member of the 
Rotary Club in that city. He could trace his origins back to southern France and to Spain, like the 
prominent businessmen described earlier. Chibás studied in Cuba until the age of 15, and then 
continued his education in the United States, a common trend among the most successful 
professionals in Cuba at the time, since a US education opened employment paths not achievable 
otherwise.30 
It is difficult to trace the business involvement of many professionals who joined these 
Rotary Clubs on the island. The majority were physicians and attorneys, followed by 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Chibás worked for several US mining companies in Cuba, Colombia, and Venezuela. Making explorations and 
reports for large US corporations helped him to get his career started and, when the United States intervened in 
Cuba, he became the assistant to the Chief Engineer of the U. S. Army in the field, and general manager of the 
Guantanamo Railroad, 1899-1902. From this point and on in his career, he worked as a private contractor. John 
William Leonard, Who's Who in Engineering…, 260. 
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pharmacists, accountants, notaries, engineers, and educators. Some of these medium-income 
earners developed additional avenues for entrepreneurship, and expanded their monetary success 
based on the addition of those other economic interests–which were marginal to their 
presentation in society as professionals. For example, Eduardo Justo Chibás owned a “large 
interest in a modern sugar estate, ‘Central Oriente,’ to which [he] devotes much personal 
attention.”31 As a contractor, he not only “originated plans to install elec[tric] lights and 
tramways in Santiago de Cuba, and to develop hydroelectric power plant in Guantanamo,” he 
also “organized [the] companies which carried on these works and other enterprises.”32 And that 
is leaving aside his involvement in an urban developing company, and another power company 
in Oriente province.  
Given the specifications from RI, any Rotary Club offered a window into the social 
composition of the business sectors across cities and towns on the island. The guidelines from RI 
specified that the membership in the local club should “consist of but one man in each 
classification of business or profession,” and that “each member's classification shall be that of 
his principal and recognized occupation.”33 This provision gave the Rotary Club a 
representational character based on the different business occupations that existed in each town 
or city. Local businessmen engaged in a specific economic activity could only have a single 
representative in such club. For example: Manuel Arca Campos represented the wood industry in 
the Manzanillo Rotary Club, Pompilio Montero represented the printing businesses in the Sagua 
la Grande Rotary Club, Alfredo Esquerré represented the jewelry industry, and he was also an 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 “Constitution of Rotary International,” Rotary International, Proceedings Fifteenth Annual Convention of Rotary 
International, Toronto, Ontario, Canada June 16-20, 1924, 416-417.  
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optometrist, in the Matanzas Rotary Club.34 The by-laws required accurate classifications, but 
they were not observed to the letter; each club found a way to bring into its meetings the most 
prominent business leaders within their regions. In other cases, and this was the most common 
route of action, they created more categories to properly classify their membership as they saw 
fit and make the institution more able to resemble the local economic interests.35  
Albert W. Hoffman, the manager of the foreign department of the National City Bank of 
New York City in Havana, and also a Rotarian, was right to explain back in 1916 that “in Cuba 
business, is not specialized, and one man will handle a great many absolutely different lines of 
business, and he would just put in his principal line, and another man would be a competitor and 
come in in another line, and it would be impossible to have a Rotary Club of more than any one 
business in Cuba if this law was to be applied down there.”36 Hoffman was aware of the 
complexities of such classifications, and he resisted the implementation as best he could. In any 
case, the use of categories went forward, and the clubs created their own strategies to manage 
this requirement.   
However, there were other difficulties managing the membership. At times, professionals 
outnumbered local entrepreneurs, and, for the headquarters of Rotary in Chicago, this was 
                                                 
34 “Censo del distrito,” La Nota Rotaria 8, no. 90 (March 1930): 21-33. For Pompilio Montero “who says he has the 
best printing plant in his city” see: “For the attention of the manufacturer,” Office Appliances; The Magazine of 
Office Equipment 31, no. 4 (April 1920): 191; For Manuel Arca Campos see: Guillermo Jiménez, Los propietarios 
de Cuba 1958, 24; For: Alfredo Esquerré “though blind himself (…) holds the classification of optometrist. Before 
losing his sight [,] he had studied his profession to such purpose that with the help of an assistant he can still 
practice.” See: “Rotary Personalities,” The Rotarian 33, no. 4 (October 1928): 22.  
35 In addition, “each active member of a Rotary Club shall be personally and actively engaged, within the territorial 
limits of his club, in the business or profession under which he is classified.” See: “Constitution of Rotary 
International,” Rotary International, Proceedings Fifteenth Annual Convention of Rotary International, Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada June 16-20, 1924, 416-417.  
36 International Association of Rotary Clubs. Proceedings Seventh Annual Convention of the International 
Association of Rotary Clubs, 366. 
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considered a drawback affecting the character of the local rotary club. Members of the liberal 
professions were believed to be more political and their participation in the clubs was deemed 
responsible for dragging the network into the arena of politics. The Havana Rotary Club was 
criticized in the early 1920s for that reason, and Rotarian officials suggested that they needed to 
reshuffle the membership “back to commercial elements, rather than to ‘doctors’ and above 
everything else (…) cut this line of attack on the government.” 37 In fact, the members who were 
taking the club into the world of politics were not the liberal professionals, but the most 
prominent businessmen in the club who had been severely affected by the 1921 bank crash. The 
activism in the 1920s developed mainly in Havana, but it was later disseminated throughout the 
country. 
Urban entrepreneurs with a wide array of business interests were the largest subgroup 
within Rotary Clubs, and they were seconded by professionals. According to the 1930 Rotarian 
Census, there were nineteen clubs across Cuba, and the population of members reached 518 
individuals.38 Entrepreneurs made up 60 percent of the total, with 313 members. The breakdown 
of the latter figure identifies the individuals who declared occupations that could be sub-grouped 
as bankers and insurers (6 percent), manufacturers (17 percent), merchants (18 percent), service 
providers (10 percent), and farmers and miners (9 percent). Professionals, with 150 university 
                                                 
37 “Hebert P. Coates to Chesley Perry (April 24, 1924),” Box 20, Folder 6, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: 
Habana vol. 1 (1914-1923), AC0033, Rotary International Archives. 
38 These are the cities and towns: Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Matanzas, Guantánamo, Sagua La Grande, Cienfuegos, 
Sancti Spíritus, Camagüey, Caibarién, Santa Clara, Cárdenas, Pinar del Río, Camajuaní, Morón, Manzanillo, 
Güines, Colón, Holguín, Santa Cruz del Sur. The document indicates that the sum of Rotarians for the country is 
512, but six honorary members (from: Caibarién 1, Santa Clara 1, Colón 2, Holguín 2) were not included in the 
addition. Therefore, the total number of Rotarians in Cuba in 1930 is 518 individuals. See: “Censo del distrito,” La 
Nota Rotaria 8, no. 90 (March 1930): 21-33.   
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graduates, made the 29 percent of the total.39 However, the most notable aspect of the 
membership is that the Rotarian network had a very strong urban character. The graphic reveals a 
very low number of individuals whose main occupations were concentrated in agriculture and 
mining.  
Only forty-five individuals declared to have occupations in the agrarian or extractive 
industries, a very small section (9 percent) for a nation in which the main sources of income 
derived from agriculture and mining. The number of mining interests in these clubs was 
insignificant. A larger sub-group was composed of cattle ranchers, fishing, and agricultural  
 
businesses. Among the latter we find sugar, tobacco, and coffee producers–other less profitable 
productions, and the entire economic world associated with these cash crops. Some of these 
agricultural productions developed into agro-industries, having both an agricultural and an 
industrial end. The industrial component of these productions were the sugar mills–fewer sugar 
refineries–the tobacco factories, and a reduced number of coffee roasters. For example, the 
                                                 
39 There is an 11% (55 individuals) marked as “other” because their categories were not explicit, or they had none. 
This includes, unfortunately, the membership of a whole club, the Rotary Club of Sancti Spíritus, whose categories 
were not recorded.  
Graphic 1. Rotarian Census, Cuba 1930. Source: “Censo del distrito,” 
La Nota Rotaria 8, no. 90 (March, 1930): 21-33. 
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business leaders whose fortunes originated in the sugar agro-industry were the hacendados (the 
owners of sugar mills), and the colonos (sugar cane cultivators); this was the case for Ángel 
González del Valle, Julio Lobo Olavarria, Alejo Carreño, and José Miguel Tarafa Govin.40 They 
were all included in that low percentage of businessmen who declared occupations related to the 
sugar industry, such as merchants and the owners of shipping facilities. Those agricultural 
entrepreneurs in the club were relevant figures within that sector of the economy, who also 
developed the same sense of national responsibility as their mostly urban counterparts aspiring to 
reshape the economic destiny of Cuba.  
In the Rotarian Census, the manufacturers constituted 17 percent of the total and they 
could be further sub-grouped into twelve business interests: (1) textile industry; (2) saddleries 
and shoe industry; (3) factories of ice, soft drinks, beer, rum and other alcoholic beverages; (4) 
food industry, conserves, and basic products such as bread, oil, dairies, among others; (5) 
sawmills and furniture factories; (6) factories of candles, soaps, perfumes, and other hygiene 
products; (7) pharmaceutical industry; (8) electrical industry; (9) paper industry; (10) glass 
producers and bottlers; (11) construction industry, subdivided into cement factories and other 
construction materials; (12) and other industries: rubber, shipyard, metal crafters and blacksmiths 
among others. This list of business occupations is not ordered hierarchically, it only represents 
the available avenues of entrepreneurship in manufacturing. 
Commercial activities on the island comprised one or more mercantile operations, such as 
wholesaling, retailing, storing, and the transportations of goods (shipping & distribution). Some 
of those dedicated to providing transportation and distribution services of goods also developed 
                                                 
40 For José Miguel Tarafa Govin see: Guillermo Jiménez, Los propietarios de Cuba 1958, 540; For Ángel González 
del Valle see: Libro de Cuba, 951-952; For Julio Lobo Olavarria and Alejo Carreño see: “Censo del distrito,” La 
Nota Rotaria 8, no. 90 (March 1930): 21-33. 
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the capital and the infrastructures to profit from the transportation of passengers. Retail and 
wholesale operations were not quite distinct in Cuba, and the same businesses could do both. 
Consider, for example, the retail, wholesale, and distribution of hardware, cars and auto-parts, 
groceries and foodstuffs.  
The service sector of the economy has a long tradition in Cuba, and many businessmen 
invested in the (1) tourism industry: owners of hotels & casinos, restaurants, cafes, and night 
clubs. Another important sub-group transformed into (2) urban developers, which could be 
further subdivided into (a) contractors, and (b) proprietors: real estate agents and renting 
businesses. There were also a good number of entrepreneurs invested in (3) printing businesses: 
press, publishing, advertising and photography. A few others focused on (4) the entertainment 
industry: music, radio, tv, cinema, theaters, performers, artists who were very active within urban 
spaces. Among Rotarians in Cuba, there were relatively fewer providers of (5) basic services: 
funerary, plumbing, dry cleaning, tailoring, hair dressing, repair shops; suggesting that these 
occupations were more in the hands the working classes. For its significance, financial services, 
composed mainly of bankers and insurers, were considered apart in the graphic, and they made 
up 6 percent; which, if added to the rest of services makes up 16 percent of the total.  
Therefore, businessmen on the island can be characterized mainly as urban entrepreneurs 
whose economic interests were concentrated in manufacturing, trading, and the service industry. 
Prominent university graduates and a reduced number of agricultural and mining interests joined 
their ranks. The analysis of the membership of the Rotary Clubs across the island allow us to 
define the composition of the upper and middle classes in a more detailed manner. The 
traditional use of scholarly terms such as oligarchy, bourgeoisie, or defining the republic as one 
commanded by Generals and Doctors is rather misinforming. Taking into consideration business 
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occupation helps to view their profiles as a careers (not as status given at birth), their social 
position as heads or administrators of enterprises, and their capacity to command or influence 
others with their decisions. This decision-making capacity is central to understand who they were 
in society, but the power reach that these individuals had was not identical in every region.  
 
The socioeconomic patterns and the composition of the Rotary Clubs were different in 
each of the six provinces that subdivided the island at the time. This perspective is helpful to 
debunk the idea that the economic classes in Cuba (as they preferred to think of themselves) had 
the same composition and ambitions. There were significant gradations within these individuals: 
their positions and aspirations were correlated to their status, business occupation, and business 
locale. Graphic 2 shows that most merchant operations were controlled from the capital; that the 
manufacturing sector in the central province of Santa Clara was as strong as that of Havana, the 
same city that had an overwhelming concentration of the services in the nation; and that the 
number of professionals in the Eastern-most province of Cuba suggests an interesting imbalance. 
Graphic 2. Business Sectors by Province. Source: “Censo del distrito,” La Nota Rotaria 8, no. 90 (March 1930): 
21-33. The number of Rotary Clubs in each province is shown in between parenthesis. The order of the provinces 
in the subtitle, from left to right, is the identical for the data shown in the graphic. Thus, the first number on each 
bar refers to Pinar del Rio, the second to Havana, and so on. 
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That disparity will be discussed below as we analyze the racial composition of the Santiago de 
Cuba Rotary Club. 
The most notable aspect revealed by the graphic is the wealth and large concentration of 
businesses in the Havana province. Its principal urban center, Havana City alone had more 
entrepreneurial potential than any cluster of cities and towns from any other province combined. 
The Havana Rotary Club had the largest membership at the time with 143 individuals, and its 
four closest followers (Holguín, Cienfuegos, Güines and Camagüey) had each less than three 
dozen members. The capital city was the seat of the national government, the main import-export 
harbor, the most dynamic center of the national economy, the largest urban setting in Cuba, and 
the model of urban development that inner cities aspired to reach. Havana dominated every 
aspect of the national economy and directed the patterns that would be followed by the inner 
cities. When local businesses within the interior of Cuba expanded to a level in which they could 
reach the entire island–or beyond–they moved to Havana or opened offices within the capital 
city.  
The Bacardí corporation, a Santiago de Cuba company with a large national network of 
vendors, represents a useful model for this pattern. The decision to bring the headquarters of the 
company to Havana City is by no means a casual one. This pattern continuously developed and 
enhanced the wealth of the capital city while contributing to the impoverishment of inner Cuban 
provinces. The same occurred among professionals: by the time they reached a peak in their 
careers they moved to Havana, or were given a position in the big city. For example, Eduardo 
Justo Chibás reached a point in his career that made him decide to change his address to Havana, 
and he joined the local Rotary Club in both cities.41  
                                                 
41 Chibás married in Camaguey in 1906 with Gloria de Ribas Agramonte, and his two children Eduardo René (Eddy) 
and Raúl became politicians who developed their careers in Havana. John William Leonard, Who's Who in 
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The membership of these organizations changed continuously, and it is not unsound to 
consider that the complexity of their business dealings forced entrepreneurs to abandon the 
organization. This meant that businessmen did not join the organization for life, as they did in 
their recreational clubs; they participated as Rotarians for a few years, some more and some less. 
However, when they left in good standing and continued to be prominent businessmen locally, 
they could easily be readmitted to the institution, or invited to partake in the decision-making 
process. For example, Enrique Schueg, the head of Bacardí Corporation, was a member of the 
Santiago de Cuba RC only in 1918–his name does not show up in any other roster from that 
club–and yet, by 1940, he is in the presidency of the club when the organization is having a 
session dedicated to improving the transit in the city of Santiago de Cuba.42 Other businessmen 
participated for larger periods of time in the Rotarian world, and the best example was Julio 
Blanco Herrera, a descendant of the Spanish aristocracy and a member of the Havana Rotary 
Club from 1922 to 1935.43  
The legacies of slavery and indenture servitude in Cuba marked the membership of the 
Santiago de Cuba Rotary Club, more so than any other club on the island.44 The city of Santiago 
                                                 
Engineering…, 260. For his membership in the RC Santiago de Cuba see: Carlos Alzugaray, abogado y notario, 
presidente del Habana Rotary Club, “Roster of el club Rotario de Santiago. Charter members, June-18, 1918” Box 
26, Folder 7, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: Santiago de Cuba vol. 1, Rotary International Archives. For his 
membership in the Havana RC see: “Censo del distrito,” La Nota Rotaria 8, no. 90 (March 1930): 21-33. 
42 “Presidiendo una sesión rotaria dedicada al mejoramiento del tránsito de Santiago (1940),” Box 1, Folder 3, Luis 
Casero Guillen Papers AC0090, Rotary International Archives. Picture of “Don Enrique Schueg, Don Pepe Fleury, 
Don Prisciliano Espinosa, Julio Hernández Miyares, Don Pepe Acosta, Luis Sánchez, Lorenzo Vidal, J. J. Toman, 
Pablo Milá, Ricardo Ros.” “Presidiendo una sesión rotaria dedicada al mejoramiento del tránsito de Santiago, 1940.”  
43 His name shows up in many rosters from 1922-35, but it is quite possible that not yet found rosters could have his 
name too, for earlier or later periods. See these rosters: “Lista general de Socios del Rotary Club de la Habana, en 1 
de septiembre de 1922,” La Nota Rotaria 1, no. 1 (November 1922): 16-17; “Censo del distrito,” La Nota Rotaria 8, 
no. 90 (March 1930): 21-33; Rotary Club de La Habana. “Socios Activos 1 (junio 30, 1931),” “Socios Activos 2 
(June 30, 1933),” “Socios Activos 3 (July 30, 1935),” Legajo 697, Expediente 18104, Fondo Registro de 
Asociaciones, Archivo Nacional de Cuba;  
44 It is important to note that Chinese people who were brought to the island as indenture servants, and their Cuban 
descendants (Cubans of Chinese ancestry), appeared to receive the same discrimination as Afro-Cubans, and mixed-
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de Cuba was typically the second largest economic center on the island, but the number of 
Rotarians in that urban center was not as large as it could be expected. Blacks and mestizos were 
not accepted as members of the Rotary Club. Still, it appears that many economic activities in 
Santiago de Cuba were undertaken by nonwhites. In a report assessing the advancement of 
Rotarian goals, one observer noted in 1930: “though I have listed this [Santiago de Cuba Rotary] 
club as a ‘good’ club, it is too exclusive in my judgment.” 45 It appears the criticism was 
objecting to marked class distinctions, because of differences with other Rotarians: “they do not 
went (sic) to get new members. District Governor Pina told them not to be so aristocratic (…) 
[but] they had a dislike for Pina, so did not pay attention to him.”46 But, aside from the 
interpersonal differences, racial discrimination was the main factor for the lack of members and 
the disinterest to get new ones. This situation was more noted in Santiago de Cuba than in any 
other city in the country.  
In his 1934 evaluation of the local Rotary Club, Felipe Silva, then governor of District 
25, thought that the number of club members was not in correlation to the importance of 
Santiago de Cuba, “which is the second [largest city] in Cuba and has about 80,000 
                                                 
race people. There are no surnames that suggest having a Chinese ancestry in any of the Cuban Rotary Clubs. There 
are some notable Jewish surnames, and a few Arabic surnames, but they did not have their ethnic origin stigmatized 
because of a past of slavery or indenture servitude. The investigation on the forms of entrepreneurship of these 
ethnic groups is scarce, but notable incursions into these research arenas do exist. For example: Pedro Deschamps 
Chapeaux, “El funerario Félix Barbosa y la burguesía de color,” in Contribución a la historia de la gente sin 
historia, 5-15; Mario Castillo Santana and Miriam Herrera Jerez, “Los lavanderos chinos en La Habana del siglo 
XX: paisajes urbanos, sociabilidades y memoria colectiva.” Catauro: Revista Cubana de Antropología no. 17 
(2008): 99-109.  
45 Juan Roger, “Excerpt Report (April 29, 1930),” Box 27, Folder 1, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: Santiago de 
Cuba vol. 2 (1922-1936), Rotary International Archives. 
46 Ibid. 
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inhabitants.”47 Silva explained: “the province of Oriente, due to the proximity of Jamaica and 
Haiti (...) is the darkest in Cuba, and especially in the area that extends from Santiago to San Luis 
and Guantánamo.”48 It is clear that race discrimination was the critical issue affecting the 
composition of that local club. Silva continued in his analysis of Santiago: “this means that, 
while it is true that the city is very important, for the purposes of the Rotary Club composed 
entirely of pure whites, it turns out that the [eligible] population is much smaller[,] and Santiago 
cannot be considered the second city of the Republic. Probably 60% of the population is black or 
mixed, which does not happen in the rest of the island, where it drops to 30% and in some places 
to less.”49 Rotarians discarded Santiago de Cuba as the second city in the country because of its 
sociodemographic characteristics.  
In Havana, the equestrian statue to mayor General Antonio Maceo Grajales was 
paramount in the background of the great parade back in 1921, and patriotic inspiration was 
drawn from a mulatto man who gave his life for independence. Afro-Cubans were relegated to 
the symbolism of bronze, as inanimate figures, and therefore they were not regarded as equals to 
                                                 
47 Felipe Silva, Gobernador del Distrito 25, “Informe de la visita oficial del gobernador del distrito (noviembre 17, 
1934),” Box 27, Folder 1, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: Santiago de Cuba vol. 2 (1922-1936), Rotary 
International Archives. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Original in Spanish: “El punto débil indicado [en este análisis del Club Rotario de Santiago de Cuba] tiene una 
explicación, que yo solo acepto parcialmente. La provincia de Oriente, debido a la proximidad de Jamaica y Haití 
(…) es la más negra de Cuba, y especialmente en la zona que se extiende desde Santiago a San Luis y Guantánamo. 
Esto hace que, si bien es cierto que la ciudad tiene mucha importancia, a los efectos del Rotary Club compuesto en 
su totalidad por blancos puros, resulta que la población [elegible] es mucho más reducida y no puede considerarse a 
Santiago como la segunda ciudad de la República. Probablemente el 60 % de la población es negra o mixta, la cual 
no sucede en el resto de la Isla, donde baja al 30 % y en algunos lugares hasta menos.” See: Felipe Silva, 
Gobernador del Distrito 25, “Informe de la visita oficial del gobernador del distrito (noviembre 17, 1934),” Box 27, 
Folder 1, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: Santiago de Cuba vol. 2 (1922-1936), Rotary International Archives. 
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those decision-makers destined to drive the nation. However, there is evidence that as the years 
passed by, they ended up accepting individuals who were “quite dark-skinned,” but not blacks.50 
Politics “In the Higher Sense:” The Emergence of Civic Nationalism  
Rotarians eventually transformed their ideal of service into a device for civic engagement 
and for businesspeople to advance their agenda in the public sphere. Such conceptions coincided 
with the development of nationalist sentiments in the early twentieth century and business 
leaders participated in these processes. Thus, the manifestations of civic preoccupation and 
economic nationalism attracted many more businessmen into the club.  This helps to explain the 
rapid expansion and adaptability of Rotarian principles internationally, and Cuba was not an 
exception to those developments (Figures 3 and 4).  
On the other hand, by the end of the second decade of the twentieth century in Cuba, 
public officials had a reputation as incompetent and immoral people. The disdain for those men 
occupying government positions, who “have not been of a high moral or mental level,” extended 
beyond partisan lines, a recurrent issue since the organization of the republic.51 The negative 
impression offered pattern of “mediocrity that has filled practically all public positions.”52 Aside 
from a few exceptions, “the best men, best from a moral or mental standpoint, have remained in 
                                                 
50 Luis Felipe Rosell, a former member of the Santiago Rotary Club, remembered that there were no backs in the 
club, but some were “quite dark-skinned.” In Spanish: “Es cierto que entre los miembros no había ningún negro, 
aunque hubo algunos que eran bastante oscuros de piel.” Luis Felipe Rosell was quoted in Jorge Abdala Franco, “El 
club rotario de Santiago de Cuba, 1950-1960,” 24. Rosell also mentioned that blacks could be invited to the sessions 
of the club as guests. A photographic evidence from the Club Rotario de Santa Clara corroborates that blacks were 
guests and presumably on rare occasions they could be honored guests as the musicians from the municipal band. 
See also: Club Rotario de Santa Clara, “Sesión Homenaje a la Banda Municipal (November 22, 1941),” B 1, F 3, 
Collection AC0090 Luis Casero Guillen, Rotary International Archives.  
51 “Mario A. Macbeath to Chesley R. Perry (August 14, 1919),” Box 20, Folder 6, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: 
Habana vol. 1 (1914-1923), AC0033, Rotary International Archives. 
52 Ibid. 
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the background,”53 and businessmen praised them for “taking no direct interest in the 
government.”54 This severe criticism came from the Rotarians on the island, who regarded 
themselves as the stark opposite. There were indeed a “few cases” in which businessmen “joined 
hands with some politicians to defraud the people,” but it was regarded as a deviation from the 
norm.55  
The moneyed interests in Cuba, merchants and manufacturers principally, wanted to 
mark distance from the world of politics and their own. Obviously, businessmen did not inhabit a 
separate, apolitical realm; but they continuously drew a line in the sand to indicate detachment 
from politics. It was certainly a misrepresentation of reality, but a story they liked to tell about 
themselves. Still in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the fact that “most of them [the 
businessmen, were] foreigners”56 denotes disdain for Cubans who used the structures of the 
national government as an industry to produce themselves as middle-class individuals. But there 
was also a so-called “better class of Cubans” who also avoided getting involved in politics, 
especially if it became a realm shared with the lower classes seeking to climb the social ladder.57 
These upper-class Cubans kept “away from any contact with the government, even to the extent 
of not voting.”58 The lack of interest among foreign-born businessmen, representing “financial, 
commercial, and manufacturing interests on the one hand, and the better class of Cubans on the 








other,” is thus evidence that their involvement in the direction of national affairs was not 
undertaken using the ballot box.59 However, this isolationist mindset changed dramatically by the 
1920s, as a new generation of Cubans of Spanish ancestry succeeded their patents in business 
administrative positions.  
The emergence of a new generation of Cuban business leaders for whom the direction of 
the national economy was crucial produced identity changes that have not been investigated in 
the scholarship. These individuals aspired to control the national economy and outcompete 
North-American business interests on the island. Many foreigners were members of the Rotary 
Club in the first years, especially in Havana and Santiago de Cuba, but their presence dimmed as 
the years passed by. The number of Cubans who joined these clubs overwhelmed the voices of 
foreigners in the early 1920s.60 Therefore, the Rotary Club transformed into a space where 
Cuban urban entrepreneurs could voice their aspirations for change, and they did so by 
appropriating the same language and networking structures used by North-Americans. At all 
times, however, they tried to remain above partisan politics, but these emerging business classes 
were all but apolitical.  
The fraudulent elections in November of 1918, were considered “a disgrace to Cuba,” and 
the members of the Havana Rotary Club thought that if scenes like these were to be repeated 
“Cuba would see many black days.”61 Based on this stark perception for the future of the nation, 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 “By the late 1920S the Havana club consisted almost entirely of Cuban members. ‘I expected to speak in English,’ 
U.S. ambassador Noble Brandon Judah wrote in his diary of his speech to the Havana Rotary in 1928, ‘but as all the 
members of the Club were Cubans, I spoke in Spanish’.” Louis A. Pérez, On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, 
and Culture, 557. 
61 “Mario A. Macbeath to [Chesley R.] Perry (August 14, 1919),” Box 20, Folder 6, Cuban Clubs Collection 
AC0033: Habana vol. 1 (1914-1923), AC0033, Rotary International Archives. 
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“right after the election,” the businessmen gathered in the Havana Rotary Club “passed a 
resolution condemning it and asking all Cubans, without regard to parties; to get together and 
insist on a change in the electoral law.”62 They expressed the need “to put a stop to the 
immorality that had taken place on November first.”63 This incursion into in the life of the nation 
provoked a discordant debate inside the organization because “some members thought that to ask 
for a better electoral law was introducing politics in the Club.”64 The reluctance was quite normal 
within the civil society on the island, as many voluntary organizations that were not created for 
specific political or religious purposes avoided any debate in those directions.  
The members of the Havana Rotary Club clearly expressed “we are all opposed” to 
bringing politics into the club, but they always found a way around it.65 Thus, it became a pattern 
in which Rotarians continuously intervened in the public life of the nation under the guise that it 
was not partisan politics. This is what I have identified as civic nationalism: an interpretation of 
politics avoiding partisan alignments, a systematic encouragement of civic participation, and a 
perennial concern for the advancement of the nation, or a specific region within the national 
space. Evidences of civic nationalism could be found across social sectors, but businessmen were 
able to strike a singular tone with it.  
Business leaders in the Rotary club gained a collective voice with this interpretation of 
what constituted an incursion into politics. It gave them the freedom to express their individual 
interests as identical to those of the nation. In the case of the 1918 elections, they passed a 






resolution approved by “a majority of the members who did not think that (…) [promoting a 
change in the electoral law] was a political question.”66 As they found a way to express a 
political opinion that was “at least not in the sense politics is understood by most people,”67  they 
advanced this ideology of sorts in which their business interests were equal to those of the 
nation.68  
Therefore, civic nationalism became an undercurrent in Cuban politics for decades 
throughout the republican period. Businessmen actively participated and promoted this ideology 
as they regarded their business endeavors as relevant of the self-interests of the nation. Yet, at 
every turn in their attempt to change the political economy, they came face to face with the 
interests of the United States on the island.69  
The demand to change the electoral law provoked another US intrusion on the island. 
This time it was not a military intervention, but the threat of it was anchored in Havana’s harbor 
in the form of a battleship. Enoch Crowder was invested in overarching powers and sent to Cuba 
to draw up a new electoral law, which was then submitted and approved by Congress or face the 
possibility of a military intervention. Since many Rotarians joined other associations to “to revise 
the electoral law,” the club members understood they “did a great benefit to the country” 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 “Mario A. Macbeath to [Chesley R.] Perry (August 14, 1919),” Box 20, Folder 6, Cuban Clubs Collection 
AC0033: Habana vol. 1 (1914-1923), AC0033, Rotary International Archives. 
69 Under the Platt Amendment there were limitations to a full nationalism and the histography has selected examples 
that describe the disproval of the working classes and the leaders of leftist organizations. There were other 
expressions of discontent that emanated from the Cuban professional class and the business sectors, which have 
been understudied. For example, Luis Machado Ortega sought to explain how Cubans had internalized the Platt 
Amendment and have not looked into the legal arguments that could be made to undercut that law turned into a 
permanent treaty. See Luis Machado Ortega, La enmienda Platt: Estudio de su alcance e interpretación y doctrina 
de su aplicación. The author was a member of the Havana Rotary Club. 
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considering that their ideas for the new law “were adopted by Mr. Crowder.”70 This appearance 
of not taking issue with the presence of the United States, and its interventions in Cuba, changed 
too in the 1920s. In the third decade of the twentieth century, civic nationalism expanded 
throughout the nation and it radicalized up to the revolutionary transformations of the 1930s.  
The discrepancies in the Havana Rotary Club as to what constituted politics continued, 
and they were still trying to find the fine line they wanted to walk. In August 1919, the president 
of the Club, “Gónzalez del Valle (…) recommended that the Club [should] adopt a resolution 
asking the other Rotary Clubs of the Island to start a movement of education so as to obtain the 
producing classes (all those who earn an honest livelihood) to take an interest in politics and in 
the formation of political parties and their platforms.”71  The reaction was immediate, and some 
members were opposed “not to Gonzalez del Valle’s idea, but to having the matter discussed at 
all in the Club” precisely because it looked too much like partisan politics.72  
Mario A. Macbeath, writing to the secretary of Rotary International Chesley R. Perry, 
remembered “that sometime ago one of the Rotary Clubs in the [United] States started a 
campaign to have all citizens vote on election day; another Club, a campaign to Americanize the 
people of their city, to have the foreigners become American citizens. So [,] it seems to me [he 
continued] that what Gónzalez del Valle wants the Club to do is not outside the province of 
Rotary Clubs.”73 Macbeath consulted the matter with Carlos Alzugaray, the former president of 
the club, and summited the inquiry to the headquarters of IARC. The three of them agreed 
                                                 
70 “Mario A. Macbeath to [Chesley R.] Perry (August 14, 1919),” Box 20, Folder 6, Cuban Clubs Collection 





“Alzugaray, Gónzalez del Valle and myself, believe that it is used in the narrower sense, that is, 
politics in a party sense, not in the higher sense, that is as ‘the branch of civics that treats the 
principles of civil government and the conduct of state affairs.’”74 Gónzalez del Valle, despite 
being the proponent of the motion, came to understand that the proposition was too close to 
partisan politics. This is further evidence of how civic nationalism bordered the political realm. 
Chesley R. Perry responded from RI that “party or partisan politics is politics forbidden” within 
the Rotary Club. Therefore, civic engagement actions were acceptable, as they were within the 
realm of what Rotary envisioned as one its societal roles: the “unselfish betterment of public 
welfare.”75 Thus, the improvement of public welfare was adapted into a civic nationalism 
strategy, and that is precisely what they considered as politics “in the higher sense.”76  
By 1923, the members of the Rotary Club undertook an unabashedly political approach, 
and they disregarded the principles of their own constitution and by-laws. According to the 
Rotarian Juan Marinello Vidaurreta, a criminal lawyer (who later joined the socialist party and 
became an iconic intellectual for the Cuban revolution),77 “no one can deny that Rotary clubs in 
the Republic [of Cuba] work with a certain originality, if compared to other countries, our clubs 
have dedicated themselves with a special focus to political action with a heightened nationalist 
consciousness.”78 The club moved from a position of hesitation to one of direct intervention in 




77 The work of Alina López Hernández discusses Marinello’s life and his involvement in politics before embracing 
socialist ideas. See: Alina López Hernández, Segundas lecturas: intelectualidad, política y cultura en la república 
burguesa. 
78 Juan Marinello, “Influencia del rotarismo en el progreso de la humanidad”, La Nota Rotaria 1, no. 9 (junio de 
1923): 5-7. 
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politics with their newly discovered ideology: civic nationalism. They always avoided to look 
partial or favoring one political organization over the another. Therefore, they focused on 
nationalist politics, with the understanding that what they were doing was not standard practice; 
and yet it was necessity rather than a casual result of the local political culture. They believed 
that the national crisis was so urgent, that they could not “keep their mouths shut cowardly,” 
before the “disorderly public administration” that they were facing.79  
Much had changed since the times of the great parade in which the President of the 
Rotary Club marched alongside the President of the Republic. Now, the members of the 
organization regarded the administration as the cause of all their problems and they went on 
criticizing the government publicly. Alfredo Zayas, the president of the republic, had never been 
a member of the club. There were attempts to make Mario G. Menocal Deop (the previous 
President) an honorary member, but there is no evidence that Zayas ever received such 
appreciation. But it is important to note the man who won the presidential elections in 1924 and 
succeeded Zayas: a former member of the Havana Rotary Club, and man connected to the 
electric industry, General Gerardo Machado Morales. He was the man to the right of president 
Zayas in the monster parade of 1921 (Figure 6).  
The negative consequences of a public political engagement for businessmen were 
described by Hebert P. Coates, the past director of Rotary International visiting Havana, in a 
1924 private letter to Chesley R. Perry. Coates explained, “I know five prominent merchants 
who have quit[ted] to get away from the trouble it might be causing them in their business being 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
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identified with Havana Rotary!!”80 Even when the club-members avoided engaging in partisan 
politics openly, their condemnation to the government and its policies apparently had an impact 
in the monthly statements of these businessmen. The identity of these merchants affected by the 
actions of the club is still unknown, and the same applies to those who perceived a recognizable 
political voice was bad for business.81  
To the past director of Rotary International, the Rotary Club in Cuba’s capital was an 
outstanding organization: “Havana is a great club (…) The best I have seen thus far outside of 
U.S.A.” 82 But his main reproach was that this club had “been drifting into a center of adverse 
criticism to the Government.”83 The previous year, 1923, the club became one of the institutions 
that supported the Junta de Renovación Nacional, an organization that demanded more 
government intervention in the destines of the country, but a type of involvement that would 
prioritize national interests.  
The collective decision of businessmen to get involved in politics reveals the extent to 
which the spread of nationalism permeated these individuals. They participated in the interest to 
redirect the course of the country in the pursuit of economic nationalism and reacted with a 
heightened nationalist spirit to the crisis as all other sectors in the country. Nationalism 
                                                 
80 “Hebert P. Coates to Chesley Perry (April 24, 1924),” Box 20, Folder 6, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: 
Habana vol. 1 (1914-1923), AC0033, Rotary International Archives. 
81 It is possible that a strong political stance could affect their dealings with other businessmen who had a contrary 
opinion to those merchants and industrialists in the Rotary Club who became more and more vociferous against the 
government. In addition, ordinary people could react adversely to their position and decide to do their shopping 
elsewhere. If regular clients opted to change their consumption patterns to remark a political choice, the businesses 
targeted could see an impact in the profits. The historiography has tended to ignore that Cuban citizens were also 
consumers, who could or not express a political opinion at the counter. 
82 “Hebert P. Coates to Chesley Perry (April 24, 1924),” Box 20, Folder 6, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: 
Habana vol. 1 (1914-1923), AC0033, Rotary International Archives. 
83 Ibid. 
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permeated Cuban society in its entirety, not just the working classes as the histography has 
claimed for decades. Having numerous business leaders in their ranks, the Rotarian local 
organization gives us a window into mindset of entrepreneurs operating on the island, and what 
they envisioned for themselves, their family-business, the city in which they lived, and the whole 
nation.  
The political activism developed during these years in Havana was not initially echoed in 
the rest of the country. This open form of engagement developed in Havana in the early 1920s, 
transformed later into a defense of regional interests across Cuba. The goal of advancing local 
interests became a pattern for the rest of Cuban Rotary Clubs in the provinces from the 1930s 
and on, and thus the, the same principle applies. The Rotary clubs offer a window into the 
thinking of the middle classes across the island.  
Rotary Clubs are known for their boosterism, but their actions could be also characterized 
as a manifestation of local, and regional patriotism.84 That became a perfect recourse for those 
aspiring to occupy government office; membership in such well-connected voluntary association 
could boost the possibilities of obtaining a ticket to congress, the Senate, or the presidency. The 
events in Havana in the early 1920s could help to explain why some of these members used the 
organization as a jumping board to enter the world of politics.   
In the early 1920s, there were “one or two would-be politicians” in he ranks of the 
Havana Rotary Club.85 According to Hebert P. Coates, these individuals were “desirous of 
advancing their chances, making use of the Rotary circle (which is quite influential)” on the 
                                                 
84 For the boosterism of the Rotary Club, see Jeffrey A. Charles, Service Clubs in American Society: Rotary, 
Kiwanis, and Lions (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 3, 58-59, 72-75, 104, 131. 
85 “Hebert P. Coates to Chesley Perry (April 24, 1924),” Box 20, Folder 6, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: 
Habana vol. 1 (1914-1923), AC0033, Rotary International Archives. 
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island.86 It became evident that some of these businessmen also had political ambitions and that 
they used the club affiliation “as a jumping-off board” to their political careers.87 In a previous 
investigation, I pointed out that for those who aspired for a political post it was necessary to 
establish a solid network to advance their political careers. To that end, they joined many 
organizations whose purposes were not necessarily political but could be used as social spaces to 
establish connections beyond partisan lines. For example, both Cuban presidents Mario García 
Menocal Deop (1913-1921) and Gerardo Machado Morales (1925-1933) became members of the 
preferred social club where Havana’s elites gathered: Unión Club de La Habana, Habana Yacht 
Club, Vedado Tennis Club, Country Club de La Habana, Miramar Yacht Club (Figure 4 contains 
the imagery of some of these institutions).88 Hoverer, it was only Gerardo Machado Morales who 
had been a member of the Havana Rotary Club. 
Little after his 1925 inauguration into office, president Machado was exalted by the 
Havana Rotary Club as one of its former members, and he was given honorary membership. The 
president, the vice-president, and good number of cabinet members attended this “solemn 
session,” considered “a definite consecration of Cuban Rotarians before the public opinion.”89 
Within the deliberations to confer the honorific title, the members of the club in Havana 
considered that Machado was “taking into practice from its high position, the purposes that have 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Maikel Fariñas Borrego, Sociabilidad y cultura del ocio, 123. Alfredo Zayas was a counterexample to this type of 
behavior. 
89 Original in Spanish: “una definitiva consagración del rotarismo (sic) cubano ante la opinión pública.” The text can 
be found in: “Brillante sesión solemne en el Club de La Habana” La Nota Rotaria 4 no. 36 (septiembre 1925): 3-4. 
In addition to the cabinet members, among guests and visitors were: Dr. Julio H. Smith and Julio Hernández 
Miyares, governor and former governor of the Rotarian district, respectively; Pedro Pablo Kohly as the president of 
the Federación Nacional de Corporaciones Económicas; the retired colonel Eugenio Silva, and the illustrious 
engineer Enrique J. Montoulieu; and other individuals representing the clubs from the interior.   
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moved to Cuban Rotarian-activism continuously.”90 In the act, “General Machado sat between 
the president and the vice-president of the [Havana Rotary] Club, Mr. Alberto González Shelton 
and Dr. Juan Marinello, respectively.”91 The two main speeches in this gathering, delivered by 
Machado and Marinello, addressing the political nature of Rotarian activities on the island.92 
In his address, President Machado recalled his times as an active Rotarian: “we would 
concern ourselves with the state of our roads, the parks, urban improvements, and we never had 
the joy of being heard by our government officials.”93 He then expressed his willingness to work 
with his former club members: “Here I come … to listen [to] the claims made by Rotarians … I 
come to say to Rotarians that they can ask, because there is a government ready to listen.”94 Still 
                                                 
90 Original in Spanish: “está llevando a la práctica desde su alto puesto, los propósitos que han movido de continuo 
al rotarismo cubano.” See: “Brillante sesión solemne en el Club de La Habana” La Nota Rotaria 4 no. 36 
(septiembre 1925): 3-4. There is no indication that the two previous Cuban presidents, Menocal and Zayas, ever 
became members of the Havana Rotary Club, not even honorary members, but as soon as Machado reached the 
presidency he was honored as a former member of the Havana Rotary Club. Machado abandoned the club at some 
point before 1922, and Marinello abandoned the organization sometime later, but before 1930. 
91 Original in Spanish: “General Machado tomó asiento entre el presidente y el vice-presidente del Club, Sr. Alberto 
González Shelton y Dr. Juan Marinello, respectivamente.” The text can be found in: “Brillante sesión solemne en el 
Club de La Habana” La Nota Rotaria 4 no. 36 (septiembre 1925): 3-6. 
92 There is no indication that the two previous Cuban presidents, Menocal and Zayas, ever became members of the 
Havana Rotary Club, not even honorary members, but as soon as Machado reached the presidency he was honored 
as a former member of the Havana Rotary Club. Machado abandoned the club at some point before 1922, and 
Marinello abandoned the organization sometime later, before 1930. For this occasion, and under the direction of 
Urbano del Castillo, another club member, the speeches were radio transmitted by the PWX, owned by the Cuban 
Telephone Company, and these was one of the first uses of radio waves in Cuba for political purposes. “Brillante 
sesión solemne en el Club de La Habana” La Nota Rotaria 4 no. 36 (septiembre 1925): 3-4.  
93 Original in Spanish. Machado expressed: “yo recuerdo que en mis tiempos de rotario activo, nos ocupábamos del 
estado de las calles, de los parques, de las mejoras urbanas, y nunca teníamos la dicha de ser oídos por nuestros 
gobernantes. Ahora yo vengo (…) a oír los clamores de los rotarios (…) Vengo a decir a los rotarios que pueden 
pedir, porque hay un gobierno dispuesto a escucharles.” “Brillante sesión solemne en el Club de La Habana” La 
Nota Rotaria 4 no. 36 (septiembre 1925): 3-4.  
94 Ibid.  
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in campaign mode, he insisted that the promises he made would be accomplished swiftly, and 
listed examples on how he would execute them.95 
For Marinello, Machado was a man who did not reach power for his own vanity and 
personal benefit, but because he wanted to conquer for all Cubans a dignifying patria.96 The 
criminal lawyer emphasized the need to reestablish the respect for the law, and remembered the 
actions undertaken by the club to highlight the need for alphabetization, the necessity to create a 
proper road system, and the importance embellishing the cities across the nation for the 
development of tourism.  
Marinello used this public palatiform to remember the words of a former president of the 
Club, Carlos Alzugaray, who in the preceding session argued that Rotarians were called to 
develop actions of “direct administration,” demanding for more direct actions and civic 
intervention in the public sphere.97 But, because of the ascension to the presidency of a former 
club member, Rotarians considered that they would “be able to carry out from now [their desired 
aspirations] not by the protest, but by the cooperation to the high powers of the State.”98 
However, the friendliness with Machado lasted mostly in his first presidential term. A couple of 
                                                 
95 Machado said in his speech: “No pasarán treinta días sin que se anuncie la subasta de las obras del acueducto de 
Santiago de Cuba, pedidas intensamente por la opinión pública y por el ‘club rotario’ de aquella ciudad. 
Inmediatamente después se acometerá la obra del alcantarillado de Camagüey, el de santa clara, la carretera de la 
Habana a Matanzas (…) la carretera de la Habana a Guanajay. Esta tarde salgo para la Isla de Pinos () en aquel 
territorio abandonado por todos los gobiernos se comenzarán obras cuyo valor ascenderá a la suma de 800 000 
pesos.” See: “Brillante sesión solemne en el Club de La Habana” La Nota Rotaria 4 no. 36 (septiembre 1925): 3-4.  
96 Machado no buscó el poder “por vanidad y para su provecho, sino quien ha demostrado con pasos firmes y 
actuación decidida su anhelo ferviente de conquistarnos la patria digna.” See: “Brillante sesión solemne en el Club 
de La Habana” La Nota Rotaria 4 no. 36 (septiembre 1925): 3-4.  
97 “Brillante sesión solemne en el Club de La Habana” La Nota Rotaria IV no. 36 (septiembre 1925): 3-4.  
98 MFB translation, and this is the original in Spanish: “podrá[n] efectuar desde ahora no por la protesta, sino por la 
cooperación a los altos poderes del Estado.” See: “Brillante sesión solemne en el Club de La Habana” La Nota 
Rotaria IV no. 36 (septiembre 1925): 3-4.  
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years after his reelection, and because of the authoritarianism shown by Machado many 
Rotarians turned against Machado just as they had done with Zayas previously. Many Rotarians 
suffered imprisonment, went into exile, or joined the opposition groups who fought Machado’s 




CHAPTER 3. ENVISIONING CAPITALIST ALTERNATIVES: REFORM ROADMAPS 
FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE 
In 1922, a young attorney and a member of the Havana Rotary Club explained that 
Cubans had internalized the Platt Amendment too deeply and that such acquiescent behavior had 
to change. Luis Machado Ortega published a book discussing the legislation that had been 
transformed into a Permanent Treaty between Cuba and the United States.1 Under the Platt 
Amendment the island had been transformed into a US protectorate, but Luis Machado argued 
that Cubans should know their “obligations and … demand strict adherence to our rights.”2 
According to the young professional, the Platt Amendment had become “a dangerous weapon 
that serves as pretext … for foreign meddling in our internal affairs.”3 Thus, Luis Machado 
explained the legal arguments by which such interpretations were not in accordance to the letter 
of the law. In his view, that was not “the intention of those who drafted and voted for it [in the 
United Sates], nor of the Cuban patricians who accepted it.”4 The clearest expression of 
                                                 
1 Luis Machado Ortega, La enmienda Platt: Estudio de su alcance e interpretación y doctrina de su aplicación. 
2 Original in Spanish: “Los cubanos sepamos exactamente cuáles son nuestras obligaciones y podamos exigir 
siempre el estricto cumplimiento de nuestros derechos.” Luis Machado Ortega, La enmienda Platt…, 19.  
3 Original in Spanish: “Se ha convertido, por la interpretación caprichosa de algunos de los funcionarios americanos 
que periódicamente desfilan por el poder y gracias a la débil condescendencia de nuestros gobernantes, en un arma 
peligrosa que sirve de pretexto para dar visos de legalidad a la intromisión extranjera en nuestros asuntos internos.” 
Luis Machado Ortega, La enmienda Platt…, 24-25. 
4 Original in Spanish: “Esta interpretación que hace vejaminoso el Tratado Permanente, no es, por supuesto, la 
significación verdadera de la Enmienda Platt, ni fue esa la intención de los que la redactaron y votaron, ni de los 
patricios cubanos que la aceptaron.” Luis Machado Ortega, La enmienda Platt…, 26. 
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nationalism in his writings was that “no matter who comes from that [interventionist] 
interpretation, we Cubans should not consent to it in any way.”5 
By 1934, the Platt Amendment had lost its usefulness as a hegemonic instrument to 
dominate Cuba because of the opposition to the Government of Gerardo Machado (1925-1933). 
From 1902 to 1935, 79 percent of Cuba’ exports were directed to the United States. Thus, the 
effects of any crisis in the neighboring nation would be multiplied many times on the island. The 
Wall Street Crash of 1929 produced a major socioeconomic ruin in Cuba. The country had never 
fully recovered from the sugar crash, the economy had not yet reached the pre-1920 crisis levels. 
Then, starting in 1929, the Cuban economy contracted for four consecutive years, and the worst 
effects of crisis were felt in 1932 and 1933. The discontent with the second government of 
Gerardo Machado sparked a popular uprising and his government was ousted in 1933.6 The 
political opposition to Gerardo Machado saw the United States supporting an unpopular 
                                                 
5 Original in Spanish: “Pero venga de quien venga esa interpretación, no la debemos consentir de modo alguno los 
cubanos.” Luis Machado Ortega, La enmienda Platt…, 27. However, Luis Machado Ortega, also expressed in his 
book that “Cuba debe su independencia a los Estados Unidos (29).” To which his friend Roig de Leuchsenring 
responded years later by publishing a book using that phrase in the title and adding the word “no.” See: Emilio Roig 
de Leuchsenring, Cuba no debe su independencia a los Estados Unidos. The evidence of their friendship is noted in 
a dedication from Luis Machado to “mi querido amigo y compañero Emilito Roig,” in the pages of another book 
published by Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior. El plan Hoover. 
Conferencia leída en la Sociedad Cubana de Ingenieros. These were times in which expressions of nationalism 
came from all sides of the political spectrum, and individuals with different opinions had warm feelings for each 
other. The expressions of nationalism during the republican period were not–and could have never been–identical as 
those expressed after 1959. 
6 To demonstrate the economic decline, we considered a year of reference 1929 to show the deterioration of the 
economy from bad to worse (Cuban exports in that year were the lowest in the past thirteen years). The value of 
national exports in 1930 was 61 percent compared to the previous year. In 1931, the economy was reduced to 44 
percent of that of 1929. By 1932-33, the economy collapsed to 30 percent of the 1929 levels, when Cuban exports 
reached only 80 million. This means that the value of the islands exports in 1932-33 deteriorated to the point in 
which the economy was reduced to nearly the same levels of 1903.  The crisis was devastating because the 
population in the island could not be sustained on the same economic levels that Cuba had three decades earlier. 
See: “Balanza Comercial de Cuba desde el establecimiento de la República en 1902 hasta el 31 de diciembre de 
1935,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 11, no. 122 (May 1936), 17; “Resumen estadístico del comercio exterior de 
Cuba, por países desde la fundación de la república de Cuba en 1902 hasta diciembre de 1935,” Cuba Importadora e 
Industrial 11, no. 122 (May 1936), 21. 
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president and moving to remove him when US interests in Cuba believed he was not useful. 
From that moment, the abrogation of the Platt Amendment became a necessity to safeguard US 
businesses and properties in Cuba.7  
Luis Machado’s perspective on the Platt Amendment over a decade earlier was not 
isolated among the members of the Rotary Club and the business interests represented in it. In 
May 1934, almost a year after the fall of Gerardo Machado, Havana Rotarians held a plenary 
session where they acknowledged the abolition of the Platt Amendment. Gathered in their 
headquarters at the Hotel Nacional, business leaders expressed their collective delight at the 
news and sent a commending message to the president of the republic. “The president [of the 
Havana Rotary Club] reminds his fellow colleagues of the pleasant and joyous news of the 
abolition of the Platt Amendment, which signifies our complete independence without any form 
of limitation.”8 The development was a positive one for businesses on the island as they had 
seemingly obtained complete freedom to advance their interests, without needing to consider the 
possible reaction from Washington. The realities of US hegemony proved more pervasive than 
they had thought, and historians have argued that the Platt Amendment was removed because the 
United States had already developed financial and diplomatic mechanisms to dominate the island 
without the need of an instrument of coercion. Still, the evidence of such nationalist thinking 
revealed the character of many business leaders in the country. 
                                                 
7 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934, 339-340. 
8 Original in Spanish: “El presidente [del Club Rotario de La Habana] recuerda a los compañeros la grata y alegre 
nueva de la abolición de la enmienda Platt, que significa nuestra total independencia sin cortapisas de ninguna 
clase.” See: Estanislao S. Crespo and Sergio Herrera, presidente y secretario del Club Rotario de La Habana, “Acta 
número cuarenta y cuatro (31 de mayo de 1934),” Legajo 697, Número 18104, Fondo Registro de Asociaciones, 
Archivo Nacional de Cuba.  
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In this chapter, I argue that many businessmen from the island were in fact supporters of 
the national interest because their business ambitions compelled them to develop a nationalist 
position. Cuban business leaders envisioned capitalist alternatives to solve the two major 
economic problems affecting the nation: sugar monoculture and the overconcentration of the 
nation’s export into a single market, the United States. Some of those business leaders 
challenged US companies on the island, developed policy papers to foster discussion of 
economic ideas, designed roadmaps for reforming the country, and sought to disrupt US control 
over the island’s economy. Economic thinkers among business leaders or supported by them 
envisioned the economic independence of Cuba from the United States and within the margins of 
capitalism.  
The first expressions of nationalism discussed in this chapter were voiced by the mining 
engineer Eduardo I. Montolieu de la Torre–a Harvard graduate, as was his brother Enrique–who 
stubbornly claimed that Cuban territory “should be exclusively ours;”9 that is, for the profit of 
Cuban businesses and not US companies. This vision did not contain a plan to change the 
country but offered specific steps to fight against the advances of US corporations in Cuba 
within a single company, La Papelera Cubana. Eduardo I. Montolieu was the manager of the 
Cuban paper industry, one the oldest nonagricultural industries on the island. This economic 
undertaking on the island has not been investigated, and it reveals the importance of 
investigating Cuba beyond sugar and tobacco.  
Just as important as revealing a country beyond agrarian endeavors, it is essential to 
investigate how Cuban economic thinkers sought to solve the nations’ socioeconomic problems. 
                                                 
9 Original in Spanish: “Estamos en nuestro país y este territorio es y debe ser exclusivamente nuestro.” Eduardo I. 
Montoulieu. Papelera Cubana, 37. 
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These were not solutions announced at a political rally or in the spirit of a revolutionary 
proclamation, but rather elaborate plans for reforming the country on multiple aspects and 
focusing on the economy. There were many propositions to reform the country and to address the 
nation’s most pressing problems, but I argue that the two most glaring reform platforms were 
engineered by José Comallonga Mena and Luis Machado Ortega.  
José Comallonga was an agrarian engineer who was invited to the Havana Rotary Club to 
make a presentation and the club members embraced his ideas. He developed a plan to produce 
an economic self-sufficiency and Luis Machado designed a nationalist commercial diplomacy. 
These two plans addressed the two most important economic problems that the Republic faced. 
More specifically, the first one focused on the lack of diversification and proposed a detailed 
plan to reach economic self-sufficiency. The second addressed the problem of the 
overconcentration of Cuba’s foreign trade into a single market and proposed a nationalist 
commercial diplomacy for Cuba to eliminate its dependence on the US consumption market. 
Cuban business interests developed business quarrels with US companies on the island and 
supported debates to find reform plans in their aspirations for economic independence from the 
United States.   
Business Quarrels: “This Territory is and Should be Exclusively Ours”  
In 1917, shortly before the increased value of sugar caused a great deal of price 
speculation in Havana, the largest paper factory in the country transformed into a stock 
corporation. This new enterprise emerged from the transformation of the old paper mill, initially 
established in Havana in the first half of the nineteenth century and one of the oldest 
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manufacturing industries in Cuba.10 Located in Puentes Grandes, where other industries later 
emerged to benefit from the proximity to the Almendares river, the factory produced paper and 
paper bags. The factory changed hands on several occasions since its foundation, but the firm 
Fernández de Castro y Compañía, owned it from 1870 to 1917.11 Armando Godoy purchased the 
company in 1917; within days he transferred his rights to a stock corporation for 600 000 pesos, 
a new enterprise that he named Papelera Cubana.12 The shares of the company were offered at a 
hundred pesos each, and 20 000 of those shares were made available for purchase, possibly 
reaching $2 million in value. The factory underwent a major modernization of the machinery and 
facilities and was relaunched in 1922.13  
The Papelera Cubana hired the engineer Eduardo I. Montoulieu de la Torre as the 
company manager in 1924, and he sought to change the public perception about the factory.14 
                                                 
10 According to the engineer Eduardo I. Montoulieu, director of the factory from 1924-25, the origins of the mill can 
be traced back to 1837. See: Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 21. Other authors indicated that the factory 
had been founded ten years later in 1847. See: Guillermo Jiménez, Las empresas de Cuba 1958, 37.  
11 Fernández de Castro y Compañía, S. en C. was founded by the Asturian José García de Castro and other family 
members. Guillermo Jiménez, Las empresas de Cuba 1958, 299. 
12 On September 11, 1917, Fernández de Castro y Cía. sold the factory and its possessions to Armando Godoy for an 
undisclosed amount. Nine days later, Armando Godoy transferred his rights to a stock corporation named Papelera 
Cubana, S. A. for $600,000.00. However, it appears that the factory had been structured as a stock corporation for a 
period before being sold to the Fernández de Castro y Cía. Montoulieu mentioned that the factory was sold in 1857 
by D. Gabriel de Osma “como presidente de la Sociedad Anónima Fábrica de Papel de La Habana’.” See: Eduardo I. 
Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 21-23. See: María Antonia Marqués Dolz, “Capital interno e industrias menores en 
Cuba (1880-1920),” Tiempos de América: Revista de historia, cultura y territorio no. 7 (2000): 85-97. 
13 The relaunching of the factory made the news in the United States: “The Papelera Cubana, a new paper factory, 
covering an area of 11,300 square meters, has been opened in Puentes Grandes. The machinery in the new plant 
consists of engines, cutters, rollers and other equipment of the most modern type.” See the unsigned article: 
“Agriculture, Industry and Commerce: Cuba,” The Bulletin of the Pan American Union 55, no. 1 (July 1922): 75. 
14 Eduardo I. Montoulieu was born in Camagüey from a very traditional family in the region of Spanish and French 
ancestry. He and his younger brother Enrique were sent to study in the United States, and both obtained degrees in 
engineering from Harvard in 1904; Eduardo graduated as mining and metallurgical engineer, and his brother 
Enrique as a civil engineer with a specialization in hydraulics. Upon returning to Cuba, these brothers established 
long careers working for the private sector, but also in the public service in many different capacities. In 1914, 
Eduardo I. Montoulieu was named Chief of Coining Bureau, Treasury Dept of Govt of Cuba, in charge of all 
coinage of Cuban money at U.S. Mints. He also worked prospecting and examining of mining properties in Cuba for 
years. In 1940, president Laredo Bru named him Secretary of the Treasury and by 1944 was appointed Chairman to 
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The manager was keenly interested in publicizing the significance of the Papelera for the nation, 
its relevance within an emerging manufacturing sector, and its production capacities to provoke 
the concern of international competitors. Montoulieu claimed that it was “a rooted industry, 
which has a life of its own, and which must make proud, not only its shareholders, but that the 
country must see in this paper mill the senior member of its manufacturing industries, and 
perhaps the only one whose production concerns foreign producers of similar products.”15  
The professional career of the Montoulieu brothers in the private sector was closely 
connected to factories built in the proximity of the Almendares river in Havana. Several 
industrial units had emerged along the river, and although some ceded space to the soaring prices 
of the urban properties, the formation of this industrial landscape in Havana remains 
understudied. In addition to the paper factory, many other production plants were built in the 
area by the first half of the twentieth century, for example: a large ice plant, the breweries La 
Polar and La Tropical, the peanut oil factory El Cocinero, and a Portland cement factory. Except 
for the cement factory, these manufacturing centers were among the largest of their kind in the 
country, and they were easily identifiable among Cuban brands. Lesser known production plants 
                                                 
the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods. See: John William Leonard (Editor), 
Who's who in Engineering: A Biographical Dictionary of Contemporaries 1922-1923, Vol. 1, 892; “Cuban Treasury 
Head Resigns,” The New York Times (May 19, 1940), 23; Kurt Schuler and Mark Bernkopf, “Who Was at Bretton 
Woods?” Center for Financial Stability, Paper in Financial History (2014); Guillermo Jiménez, Los propietarios de 
Cuba 1958, 398-400. Enrique J. Montoulieu, in 1906, was put in charge of the construction of the Stewart sugar mill 
in Camagüey province. He worked for the Secretary of Public works for many years, and in that capacity, he 
projected and directed the works for improving the Acueducto de Albear, the water supply system for Havana city. 
Enrique also drafted the project for the Plano Regulador (Master Plan) for Havana in 1922, and in the early 1950s he 
collaborated with Pedro Martínez Inclán in the design of the civic plaza, today’s Revolution Square. See: “Enrique 
Montoulieu: Arquitectura e Ingeniería, Cuba” EnCaribe. Enciclopedia de Historia y Cultura del Caribe, 
https://www.encaribe.org/es/article/enrique-montoulieu/1550 ; Gabino Ponce Herrero, “Urban renewal plans for 
havana: The modernisation of a bourgeois city (1898-1959)” Boletín de la A.G.E. no. 45 (2007): 435-438. 
15 Original in Spanish: “Se trata de una industria de arraigo, que tiene vida propia, y de la que deben estar 
orgullosos, no solo sus accionistas, sino que el país debe ver en esta Fábrica de Papel la decana de sus industrias 
manufactureras, y quizás la única cuya producción preocupe a los productores extranjeros de productos similares.” 
Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 25.  
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in this area included: a crude oil refinery, a power plant, a tannery, and factories of gin, 
fertilizers, bricks, lime, and mosaics.16 In 1925, The Cuba Review mentioned Enrique J. 
Montoulieu as the chief engineer for the New Ice Plant, which was owned by La Tropical beer 
factory,17 only one year after Eduardo I. Montoulieu had become the manager of the Papelera 
Cubana.18 These two brothers held managerial positions in Cuban alternative industries. 
The historiography has paid scant attention to those individuals who held managerial 
positions in the island, and the challenges they faced in making the Cuban industries competitive. 
The managers of Cuban alternative industries such as the Montoulieu brothers had to operate 
within an open economy, and, in their position, they were in the front line struggling against 
sugar monoculture and its effects on the rest of the national economy. The reciprocity treaty with 
the United States favored the exportation of raw materials, especially sugar, and facilitated the 
importation of almost everything else. Therefore, any Cuban industry had an uphill battle to gain 
a footing in its own market. The paper industry, for example, suffered from the foreign 
competition acutely. A memoir published by the Papelera Cubana when the factory was under 
                                                 
16 María Victoria Zardoya Loureda, “Ciudad, imagen y memoria: El río Almendares y la Ciudad de la Habana,” 
Revista Urbano 17 (mayo 2008): 63-75. 
17 A note published in 1923 by The Cuba Review describes the connection between the ice plant and the breweries: 
“The ice plant is a part of the La Tropical Brewery, which is the largest brewery in Cuba; in fact, one of the largest 
breweries in the world. The ice plant will be a 600-ton raw water electrically driven installation. The first half of the 
plant was designed in 1923 and installed in 1924.” It was also mentioned that “The company operate[d] in addition 
the Tivoli Brewery. The officers of the company are: Narciso Gelats, president; Julio Blanco Herrera, inspector 
general; Enrique J. Montoulieu, chief engineer.” See: “Largest Ice Plant in Cuba” The Cuba Review 23, no. 2 
(January 1925): 24-25. 
18 It is unclear if one of the brothers opened employment opportunities for the other networking with the owners and 
shareholders, for example, Julio Blanco Herrera was in the Directive Board for both factories. In some capacity 
these two brothers were connected to Julio Blanco Herrera, Enrique worked for him in the design of los Jardines de 
la Tropical and Eduardo coauthored a book with him. Julio Blanco Herrera and Enrique J. Montoulieu, were 
Rotarians. Enrique J. Montoulieu was among the “individuals representing the [Rotary] clubs from the interior” at 
the ceremony where Gerardo Machado was given an honorary membership for the Havana Rotary Club. See: 
“Brillante sesión solemne en el Club de La Habana” La Nota Rotaria 4 no. 36 (septiembre 1925): 3-4. Julio Blanco 
Herrera was a long-time member of the Havana Rotary Club. There is no evidence suggesting that Eduardo I. 
Montoulieu was a Rotarian, but he was very closely connected to the network. 
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the direction of Eduardo I. Montoulieu offers a window into challenges Cuban managers faced 
when running any of the alternative industries established in the country.   
At the head of the company, Eduardo I. Montoulieu realized that the Papelera Cubana 
was an underappreciated powerhouse within the national economy. He explained that “we have 
seen that neither the people, the merchants, nor the authorities realize the magnitude, importance 
or production of this factory.”19 For the manager-director it was “one of the great industries of 
Cuba.”20 The factory paper output was 110 inches wide by 450 feet per minute, to make 60,000 
kilometers a year, 850 tons of paper, 300 million paper bags.21 Such production capacity would 
suffice to cover 50 times the distance between the two ends of the island.22 The Papelera Cubana 
demonstrates the capacities of Cuban industries as major production centers, and the potential of 
nonagricultural enterprises to forge alternative economic paths for the nation beyond sugar 
monoculture. Yet, the operating challenges within this inhospitable economic environment were 
considerable. 
A paradigm shift, one in which Cuba would no longer be the producer of raw materials 
and transform itself into a producer outlet, required profound transformations. If that were to 
occur, the island would need to import raw materials to be elaborated in Cuban factories. Such 
profound change had already happened in the Papelera Cubana, but it was not a common 
development. This manufacturing industry imported raw materials from foreign markets, 
                                                 
19 Original in Spanish: “Hemos podido comprobar, que ni el pueblo, el comercio, o las autoridades, se dan cuenta de 
la magnitud, importancia o producción de esta fábrica.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 26. 
20 Original in Spanish: “La Papelera Cubana, S. A. es una de las grandes industrias de Cuba.” Eduardo I. 
Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 26. 
21 Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 25-26. 
22 “Con nuestra producción anual de papel podemos cubrir cincuenta veces la distancia del Cabo de San Antonio a 
Punta de Maisí” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 26. 
123 
especially Scandinavian countries.23 Given the expenses of such imports and the presence of 
foreign competitors inside the island, the national industries required protections from the Cuban 
government to achieve the wider transformation of the country. Therefore, Montoulieu sought 
the support of the board of directors and the National Association of Industrialists in Cuba to 
seek proper protections from the House of Representatives and defend the national industry from 
legal and illegal competition.24 He expressed the need to have “the right protection, and that in 
fact corresponds to us”25 as national producers. 
The first lobbying actions from the Papelera Cubana aimed to challenge the US tariff, but 
these efforts were unsuccessful.26 The next step was to seek protections for national industries 
with a more favorable Cuban tariff. Montoulieu did not explicitly say what failed in this second 
route of action, possibly to avoid a hostile confrontation with government officials with whom he 
would need to work further. However, the manager had other goals in mind, especially to prevent 
all paper imports into the national territory.27 Even though that was not fully accomplished, the 
                                                 
23 A great deal of the imports originated in Sweden, which covered a good portion of the annual 17,000 tons of 
timber pulp consumed by the factory. “Toda la materia prima que empleamos en nuestra fábrica es importada de 
mercados extranjeros, algunos tan remotos como Suecia, Noruega, y Finlandia de las que, y preferiblemente de la 
primera, importamos anualmente unas siete mil toneladas de pasta de madera, que constituye una parte importante 
de las 17,000 toneladas que … manejamos.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 26. 
24 “Con la autorización de la presidencia de la compañía, se iniciaron gestiones a través de la Asociación Nacional 
de Industriales de Cuba ante la Cámara de Representantes para obtener aquellos “derechos que nos concederán una 
eficaz protección contra la competencia, lícita e ilícita.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 35. 
25 Original in Spanish: Montoulieu explicaba la necesidad de que “contemos con la protección debida, y que de 
hecho nos corresponde.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 35. 
26 “Se trató … de modificar el repertorio y las especificaciones de las partidas del Arancel Hord, en forma de 
eliminar la posibilidad de caprichosas interpretaciones de las partidas, y su redacción, suprimiendo aquellas 
especificaciones que son hoy motivo de ambigüedades, pero no pudo lograrse por insistir los elementos oficiales con 
quienes se discutió el punto que nada que alterara fundamentalmente el Arancel Hord, podría considerarse viable.” 
Por consiguiente “se desistió de obtener esta eliminación de partidas o la modificación de aquellas que afectaban a 
nuestra industria.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 35. 
27 Montoulieu explicó que “constituyó un especial interés … recabar una mayor protección para [disminuir] todos 
los tipos de papel que se importan en el país, no ya solamente los de embalaje que atañen a nuestro problema actual 
de una manera fundamental, sino que también a los otros tipos de papel que podemos llegar a fabricar a medida que 
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Papelera was able to obtain protections from the importation of a few specific types of papers to 
the benefit of local producers.28  
Based on the analysis of Montoulieu’s difficulties, the central problem for the Cuban 
economy was the lack of a tariff to protect the national industries, because up to that point the 
national tariff protected American rather than Cuban interests. The manager of the paper factory 
condemned the inaction of Cuban elected representatives. He decried the damaging economic 
policies under which he, as the manager of a national industry, had to operate and produce profits 
for Cuban shareholders. He emphatically pointed to the disadvantages that prevented Cuban 
industry to take off, precisely because the tariff did not favor Cuban manufactures. Instead, the 
current tariff protected US exports to the island and systematically undermined Cuban national 
industries. It “constitutes a great injustice for them [the national industries] since until 1899 the 
tariffs protected the products of the old metropolis [Spain], and since then the tariffs currently in 
effect have been protectionist for the products of the American industry,”29 and not Cuba’s 
industries. 
                                                 
alcance un mayor desarrollo esta industria.” Sin embargo, Montoulieu fue expresamente opaco al señalar que 
“circunstancias que no son el caso explicar, cohibieron nuestra actuación.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera 
Cubana, 35. 
28 The paper factory obtained protections under the classification 159 in the tariff, under which US Kraft papers had 
been brought into the country. These imports had been affecting the local industry and avoiding the proper Cuban 
tax contribution. Montoulieu also obtained an increase in the fees charged for papers classified under the 153 
category, and other products elaborated with these types of paper. “En definitiva se obtuvo una mayor protección en 
los papeles que hoy se aforan por la partida 159, en forma que, en ningún caso puedan incluirse en su clasificación 
los papeles Kraft y sus similares sin que tributen en forma que pueda afectar nuestros intereses o los del fisco, se 
aumentó la [partida] 153, y se recabó una mayor protección, o recargo, para los productos elaborados con estos 
papeles.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 35-36.  
29 Original in Spanish: “Desgraciadamente el Congreso no actuó a este respecto con la actividad necesaria y hemos 
llegado a 1925 sin aranceles que protejan las industrias nacionales, lo que constituye una gran injusticia para las 
mismas ya que hasta 1899 los aranceles protegían los productos de la antigua metrópoli, y de entonces acá los 
aranceles hoy vigentes han resultado proteccionistas para los productos de la industria americana.” Eduardo I. 
Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 35-36. 
125 
In addition to a tariff schedule that benefited the importation of US goods, American 
export interests sought to influence the interpretation of specific Cuban tariff lines and further 
penetrate the economy.30 Montoulieu understood this maneuvering as a “corruption of the 
tariff,”31 one which competitors would inundate the island with US goods and further reduce the 
opportunities for Cuban producers to make a profit on their own market.  
To further highlight the characteristics of the Cuban economy, it is important to note that 
the Cuban customs house in Havana was the major point of entry for imports and the only one in 
which controls were more in accordance with the law. However, large sugar estates developed 
their own railroads, harbors, import and export facilities from where US exporters could avoid 
customs controls.32 In addition, foreign producers were able to send unspecified amounts of 
paper by corrupting customs officers in the interior, that is “obtaining illegal gauges or avoiding 
the payment of the 1% [by] pretending that they send their products on commission and not as 
what it really and technically is: an effective sale.”33 However, Montoulieu indicated that in 
recent times, presumably after the crisis in 1921, custom officers had been performing much 
                                                 
30 “En 1909 lograron los exportadores americanos, determinada interpretación de las partidas del arancel que 
permitieron aforar por la partida 159, papeles que correspondía aforar exclusivamente por la 153.” Eduardo I. 
Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 36. 
31 “En 1913 se ratificó la anterior corrupción del arancel” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 36. 
32 “En 1913 se ratificó la anterior corrupción del arancel…pero últimamente venía aplicándose el arancel con 
bastante justeza en lo que a las partidas 159 y 153 respecta, al menos en la Aduana de la Habana” Eduardo I. 
Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 36. 
33 Original in Spanish: “Fabricantes extranjeros … [logran] … la importación por aduanas del interior en que 
obtienen aforos ilegales o eludiendo el pago del 1% pretendiendo que envían su mercancía en comisión y no como 
lo que técnica y realmente es una venta efectiva.” To be able to compete they offer their cooperation and expertise to 
the authorities: “Para combatir el primero de estos procedimientos nos proponemos someter a la Sección de Aduna 
de la Secretaría de Hacienda un muestrario completo de nuestros productos y los de importación con la clasificación 
que a nuestro juicio debe dársele a esos productos, y una vez resuelto el asunto definitivamente, interesar de dicho 
organismo el número de muestrarios que necesite para enviar, por ese conducto oficial, uno a cada Aduana de la 
República, a fin de lograr, en cuanto sea posible, uniformidad en la aplicación del arancel.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, 
Papelera Cubana, 37. 
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better and observing the letter of the law as they should. Yet they received complaints from US 
companies which expressed their grievances to the US embassy in Havana. The US ambassador 
would then pressure the Cuban government. Amid the strong nationalist spirit of the 1920s, these 
objections were rejected.34 
US companies responded to these reactions from Cuban government officials waging a 
“price war” on Cuban paper industrial production. The management of the Papelera remarked the 
need for preparation: “for some months now, the competition that these American manufacturers 
have been making to our products has intensified in such a way that we thought it was 
appropriate to prepare ourselves for a real price war.”35 Montoulieu then accused three US 
companies of using trade dumping practices to eliminate the competition from the Papelera 
Cubana. 
American manufacturers reduced the price of their products under the cost of production 
to gain control of a foreign market, undermining local producers. Montoulieu singled out three 
US companies: the Union Bag & Paper Corporation, Continental, and Republic, which were 
“practicing dumping in Cuba [by] selling paper bags at prices lower than the cost of the paper 
                                                 
34 “Recientemente, y en vista de la recta aplicación de los aranceles, las compañías productoras de papeles y 
cartuchos ha presentado una protesta, por conducto de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, contra la aplicación de 
las partidas 153 y 159, que viene efectuando la Aduana de la Habana… es motivo de gran satisfacción para nosotros 
… que la administración ha constado [a esas protestas] que la aplicación de determinadas a determinados productos 
es función privativa de ese departamento y que los importadores tienen … [otras] vías … para protestar.. habiéndose 
basado la Administración de la Aduana en la propia declaración jurada de los fabricantes … para aforar los 
productos.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 36.  
35 Original in Spanish: “Desde hace algunos meses la competencia que venían haciendo estos fabricantes americanos 
a nuestros productos, se ha intensificado de modo tal que hemos creído oportuno prepararnos para una verdadera 
guerra de precios.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 36. 
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they are made from.”36 The anger of Montoulieu–who was very familiar with American ways37–
was precisely because he knew that these illicit practices were “not tolerated in their country, 
[and] they should not be tolerated in Cuba by our authorities since it is directed against the large 
[Cuban] national industries.”38 The paper industry sought to channel the complaint through 
diplomatic channels via the Cuban embassy in Washington.39  
The next initiative developed by the company was to produce new types of paper bags to 
fight the competition of American companies. Still, it was a very difficult task because US 
merchant ships could introduce the paper in different areas of the country. There was no unified 
market in the island and most internal trading in Cuba was done via cabotage trade, and they did 
their best “despite not having [the advantage of any] freight abatement.”40 The fact that the 
import-export trade was being controlled by US companies made it difficult to compete 
internationally as well. They acknowledged that “the only obstacle to compete, [were] the types 
of freight that are … burdensome for national industries.” 41 To circumvent these difficulties as 
much as possible, the Papelera Cubana reached out to railroad companies and the Empresa 
Naviera de Cuba. Both shipping enterprises offered to help and they probably assisted the 
                                                 
36 Original in Spanish: “están practicando el ‘dumping’ en Cuba vendiendo cartuchos a precios más bajos que el 
costo del papel de que están fabricados.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 36-37. 
37 “Que la competencia americana es un peligro pasajero, no ofrece duda para quien conoce los procedimientos 
mercantiles de aquel país. Las ventajas a consignación, los cobros a largo plazo, y los precios por debajo del costo 
de fabricación, no son característicos del comercio americano, que ha logrado que se impongan severas penas a los 
que practiquen esta ilícita competencia conocida por ‘dumping.’” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 36-37. 
38 Original in Spanish: “no es tolerada en su país, no debe ser permitida en Cuba por nuestras autoridades ya que va 
dirigida contra las grandes industrias nacionales.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 37.  
39 “Estamos en contacto con nuestra embajada en Washington para formular por la vía diplomática la procedente 
queja en defensa de nuestros más elementales derechos.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 37. 
40 Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 37. 
41 Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana S. A., 37. 
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Papelera Cubana to begin the conquest of the national market and challenge foreign 
competition.42 However, these two shipping companies faced limits to what they could 
accomplish since they lacked the capability to take national industries successfully beyond the 
maritime frontiers of the nation.  
The dispute over the control of the market showed the nationalist mindset of Cuban 
business leaders and their willingness to put up a fight for the defense of the national interest. It 
appears that the preparations for a price war on the side of Cuban paper industry rendered results, 
because a representative of the three companies, Bernard Sharp, was sent to negotiate with the 
Papelera Cubana. Sharp proposed an agreement for the Cuban industry to hold only a percentage 
                                                 
42 “Nuestras gestiones cerca de la Empresa Naviera de Cuba no han podido ser más satisfactorias y los ferrocarriles 
nos han prestado la mayor atención ofreciéndonos grandes facilidades, con lo que tenemos asegurado el éxito de la 
campaña que hemos iniciado en defensa de la ilegítima competencia establecida por dichos fabricantes.” Eduardo I. 
Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 37. 
Figure 7. Looking Busy for a Photo. At the center, engineer Eduardo I. Montoulieu demonstrating 
his abilities as manager with the assistance of two aides. Regardless of the montage–staging a busy 
workday–it was evident that Montoulieu wanted to show that they were all for business. Source: 
Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 37. 
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of the market “of national consumption, leaving them [the US companies] the rest.”43 The 
irritation of Montoulieu surfaced once more as he pointed to the envoy of US corporations that 
“such a condition of inferiority” 44 for the Papelera Cubana was not going to be acceptable.  
Montoulieu’s choice of words represents the most clear example of the economic 
nationalism expressed by many business leaders in the island: “we are in our country and this 
territory is and should be exclusively ours.”45 Montoulieu went as far as to boast before those US 
competitors: “we warn them that we had not begun [yet] to dispute the territory and that we 
would not consent to such an agreement.”46 The intended audience of his report was the 
Papelera’s Board of Directors, its shareholders, and the general public, meaning that Montoulieu 
was using a nationalist language as expected from him as a manager.  
The Papelera Cubana reached the benchmark of a million pesos in sales in 1924 due to 
many changes adopted to increase profits. The management celebrated numerous meetings with 
the company’s salesmen and studied the paper consumption market across the island and how to 
augment the sales in the interior of the Republic. The management created new strategies to 
reach consumers directly, although by offering products at a higher price to avoid affecting bulk 
                                                 
43 “Que a pesar de estos reprobables procedimientos, esta campaña de competencia va al fracaso lo demuestra las 
conversaciones que Mr. Bernard Sharp representante de la Republic & Bag Paper Co., por sí y en representación de 
las tres compañías citadas ha sostenido con nosotros para establecer un ‘modus vivendi’ a base de que 
circunscribiésemos nuestra venta a un porcentaje determinado del consumo nacional, dejándoles a ellos el resto.” 
Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 37. 
44 Original in Spanish: “Lejos de aceptar semejante condición de inferioridad.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera 
Cubana, 37. 
45 Original in Spanish: “Estamos en nuestro país y este territorio es y debe ser exclusivamente nuestro.” Eduardo I. 
Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 37. 
46 Original in Spanish: “Les prevenimos que no habíamos comenzado a disputarles el terreno y que no 
consentiríamos semejante concierto.” Eduardo I. Montoulieu, Papelera Cubana, 37. 
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buyers and national distributors. Despite the complaints of those retailers, the company created 
new types of paper to reach consumers directly.  
The fight for the control of the national market reveals the struggles of Cuban industries 
to shield Cuban economy form the US penetration. This evidence of discord between Cuban and 
US business interests within a single company demonstrate the need to further investigate 
expressions of nationalism within the margins of Cuban capitalist society rather than to confirm 
teleological narratives. A few years later, after Montoulieu stubbornly claimed the national 
territory for Cuban businesses, Luis Machado criticized traditional consumption patterns and 
export strategies while Comallonga addressed the lack of diversification in the nation’s 
economy. 
The Economic Problem: Envisioning Capitalist Alternatives 
In 1931, Gustavo Gutiérrez Sánchez published a collection of policy papers titled El 
problema económico de Cuba. The book was edited by the Havana Rotary Club, and the author 
was an attorney and a club member.47 The economic problem tackled was sugar monoculture and 
overconcentration’s of the nation’s export into a single market, the United States. This volume 
contained the work of Rotarians and non-club-members discussing the nation’s most pressing 
economic problems. Some of these materials had been previously published separately, such as 
the work of José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, which was the 
outcome of a presentation before the Havana Rotary Club by an author who was not a Rotarian.48 
                                                 
47 Gustavo Gutiérrez Sánchez, El problema económico de Cuba. Sus causas: sus posibles soluciones. This is 
supposedly a three-volume work, but only volume 2 has been found. In an introductory note, the author-compiler 
Gustavo Gutiérrez Sánchez indicates that vol. 1 was the most important part of his work, and that vols 2 and 3 
contained the materials he used to base his writings. However, there is no evidence that vols. 1 and 3 were ever 
published. A book reviewer in 1932 referred only to vol 2. Jones, Robert C. “Reviewed Work: El problema 
económico de Cuba: Sus posibles soluciones by Gutavo Gutiérrez, Books Abroad 6, no. 1 (January 1932): 24.  
48 The front cover of the book indicated that a shorter version had been presented in the Havana Rotary Club: 
“trabajo cuyo extracto fue leído en Club Rotario de la Habana.” See: José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía 
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The other important text in the collection had 
been published previously by Luis Machado 
Ortega, who wrote about the Necesidad de 
adoptar una política de comercio exterior (the 
need to adopt a foreign trade policy).49 Luis 
Machado was a Rotarian whose career 
advanced notably after making public his 
nationalist ideas. José Comallonga died in the 
1930s, but Luis Machado was elected to the 
presidency of the Havana Rotary Club the 
following year, then appointed as governor of 
District 25. Years later in his career he was 
named Cuban Ambassador to the United States 
and became a founding member of the World 
Bank in exile.50  
                                                 
agraria de Cuba, front cover. For additional context about La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, the text was 
completed by August 1929, a few months before the financial crash unfolded in the United States and Cuba began to 
suffer the consequences of the crisis. 
49 Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior. El plan Hoover. Conferencia 
leída en la Sociedad Cubana de Ingenieros. 
50 Luis Machado Ortega represented Cuba in several international conferences such as the Versailles Peace 
Conference in 1919 and Bretton Woods in 1944. He was appointed as the Cuban ambassador to the United States 
from 1946 to 1952, resigned after Fulgencio Batista took power, and he remained in exile after the triumph of the 
Cuban revolution. He was one of the executive directors of the World Bank from 1946 to 1948, and for the period 
1954 to 1970. Luis Machado Ortega authored several books centered on legislation and economic aspects and none 
of them has been investigated. Luis Machado Ortega’s name is shown in several documents as a member of the 
Havana Rotary Club, from 1922 to 1946. See: “Lista general de Socios del Rotary Club de la Habana, en 1 de 
septiembre de 1922,” La Nota Rotaria 1, no. 1 (noviembre, 1922): 16-17; Rotary Club de La Habana, “Socios 
Activos 1 (junio 30, 1931),” “Socios Activos 2 (junio 30, 1933),” “Socios Activos 3 (julio 30, 1935),” Legajo 697, 
Expediente 18104, Fondo Registro de Asociaciones, Archivo Nacional de Cuba; Rotary International, Proceedings: 
Thirty-Seventh Annual Convention, 176. Luis Machado Ortega was elected president of the Havana Rotary Club in 
1929 and then Governor of the District 25 for the period 1930-31. See: Luis Machado Ortega, Informe del Dr. Luis 
Figure 8. The Image of the Republic in Rotarian 
Garments. Source: Front Cover, La Nota Rotaria 5, no. 
55 (April 1927). This is a drawing by Conrado 
Massaguer, a Rotarian, depicting the image of the 
republic associated with the patriotism of Rotarians in 
the 25th District, Cuba. 
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These materials revealed the envisioning of capitalist alternatives and the ideas that 
business leaders supported for addressing the economic problems of the nation. These essays 
were presented in various public forums and pertain to an old intellectual tradition on the island 
of publishing policy papers to influence decision makers.51 Occasionally, the Havana Rotary 
Club transformed into a platform for these individuals to present and diffuse their ideas to 
improve conditions on the island, regardless of their affiliation to the organization. The members 
of the club delivered speeches to other organizations or voiced their concerns through their 
membership in other institutions; they were not only Rotarians. The set of ideas expressed in 
those policy papers sought to find roadmaps to reform the nation within the margins of 
capitalism.  
These economic thinkers were presenting their ideas to get the attention of the public and 
national politicians about the most pressing problems on the island. On many occasions, they 
wrote their papers addressing the leading political figures of the nation, hoping to get their 
attention. Other times their work had no apparent recipient, but they expected that a potential 
reformer would reach political office and would focus on the problems they were tackling. Thus, 
these policy papers were expressions of nationalism among businessmen and professionals, and 
they could even serve as job applications for future political appointments.  
The only Cuban politician who sought to transform the nation up to that point was 
Gerardo Machado. During his first presidential term, he developed several initiatives to defend 
                                                 
Machado, and Rotary International [Distrito 25], Vigésimo octava conferencia, 6. To learn more about Machado 
Ortega and his career representing Cuba in international events see: Richard Pearson, “Luis Machado, 79, Ex-Envoy 
of Cuba,” The Washington Post (February 10, 1979). The bibliography contains several of the books authored by 
Luis Machado Ortega. 
51 These texts pertains to the same intellectual tradition that started with Francisco de Arango y Parreño in his 
“Discurso sobre la agricultura de La Habana y medios de fomentarla (1792).” 
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the national interest–these will be discussed in the next chapter. However, his second term 
coincided with the Wall Street Crash and the development of many student and working-class 
organizations reacting to the crisis. A popular uprising overthrew him from power in 1933. 
Gerardo Machado left a country that continued immersed in political instability into the 1940s, 
when a new constitutional order was established. The Machadato was then remembered as a 
dictatorship by contemporaries, including Rotarians who opposed him fiercely during his last 
two years in office. Some Rotarians tried to erase the memory of his previous membership to the 
organization. In any case, Gerardo Machado was not the political leader that business leaders 
aspired to see in office, and they continued to promote a nationalist economic thinking. 
It is possible to trace a genealogy of Cuban economic thinking that emerges after the 
times of Gerardo Machado’s first presidential term. From that point forward, Cuban economic 
thinkers published policy papers as if aspiring to write the final original piece that would open 
the path for the transformation of the nation. These essays did not engage with each other and 
transformed into independent efforts to address national problems. In the end, the papers that 
they produced became part of an intellectual tradition in its own right and the expression of 
nationalism in print.  
The authors conducted research on specific sectors of the economy, discussed the need 
for specific legislations, addressed foreign relations issues, and made recommendations for 
policy makers and the public. These papers were either released to wider audiences in the form 
of a book or presented in a speech format and later sent to the presses. They all had in common 
the envisioning of capitalist alternatives for the nation. Economic thinkers were backed by 
business leaders in the Havana Rotary Club, which remained a center of diffusion for reformist 
ideas because of the superior capacity to move resources compared to the clubs in the nation. 
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The commonality was the support for those economic proposals that aspired to achieve reforms 
progressively and within the margins of a capitalist society. 
Discussing the Need for Economic Self-Sufficiency  
José Comallonga Mena’s La nueva economía agraria de Cuba (1929) explored the 
economic deformations developed in Cuba throughout the republican period and indicated viable 
solutions.52 The book establishes that the country was in dire need of developing alternate 
sources of wealth and that it was crucial to reach an economic self-sufficiency. The author was 
an expert in agriculture for several administrations and a professor of economy and rural 
legislation at the University of Havana.53  
Envisioning capitalist alternatives required discussing Cuban economic problems, and the 
clearest route to find a solution was to change the sugar-monoculture “economic regime.”54 The 
island had a “suicidal economy,” and Comallonga explained the structural nature of the 
                                                 
52 Few historians have used Comallonga’s text to study the history of the nation’s economy and Cuban economic 
thinking, and yet his contributions to envisioning a capitalist alternative for Cuba has not been established. Pedro 
Pablo Rodríguez, “Pensamiento nacional burgués: El caso de José Comallonga,” in Nación e independencia 
económica (La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2012), 112-137 (Pedro Pablo Rodríguez’s essay was first 
published in Economía y desarrollo, no. 64 septiembre-octubre 1981); Ernesto Molina Molina, El pensamiento 
económico en la nación cubana, 78-84; Leida Fernández Prieto, Cuba agrícola: Mito y tradición, 1878-1920. 
53 José Comallonga Mena earned a degree in agronomical engineering at the University of Havana in 1888 and 
became a sugar-making master chemist for many sugar mills in the island. After the war of independence started, he 
presented to a competition for a professorship at the School of Agronomy at the University of Havana and failed to 
obtain the position. Little after, he got a position as the chair of agriculture in the Provincial Institute for Oriente 
province, then at the Institute of Santa Clara, and from 1907 he entered a competition for a professorship of rural 
economy at the University of Havana and obtained the position. He devoted many years of his life to teaching, but 
also received several appointments from different administrations to use his expertise. Under the administration of 
José Miguel Gómez, he was “appointed Commissioner of the Cuban Government to study agricultural instruction in 
France, Belgium, Switzerland, and the United States, publishing a report on his return.” He also held an appointment 
as an expert in agriculture for the administration of Mario García Menocal. Comallonga also published several 
books dedicated to Cuban agrarian economy. William Belmont Parker, Cubans of today, 411-415. See also: José 
Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, front cover.  
54 José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 8. 
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economic problem of the nation.55 In his own words: “what is in crisis is not only the sugar 
[economy], but the total economic regime that we have developed [sugar monoculture], no 
matter how much it flatters some to have the possibility of accumulating millions [it comes] at 
the expense of national misery.”56 Indeed, a few individuals benefited greatly from sugar 
production, because it had the capacity to generate immense fortunes, but it was in direct 
correlation to the making of such “national misery.”   
The structure of the Cuban economy had a dependency problem.57 Business leaders 
understood that “economic slavery engenders political slavery. Today [Comallonga, indicated to 
the members of the Havana Rotary Club] we are not unequivocally independent: our national 
economy is not practically ours.”58 The businessmen gathered in the club demonstrated their 
approval of such interpretations by consenting to publish a second edition of Comallonga’s 
speech before the club. This time compiled into a volume dedicated to addressing Cuban 
economic problems, which were obviously political as well.  
                                                 
55 “Cada vez que me enfrasco en estos estudios comprendo menos la dislocada política de nuestra colonia de 
plantación. No he visto economía más suicida.” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 36. 
56 “Lo que está crisis no es sólo el azúcar, sino el régimen total económico que hemos desenvuelto, por mucho que 
halague a unos cuanta tener las posibilidades de acumular millones a costa de la miseria nacional.” José Comallonga 
Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 8. 
57 The notion of “dependency” is used frequently in the book, referring in some cases to the subordinate relation of 
the Cuban economy with the United States and in other instances to the lack of diversification of the nation’s 
economy as depending on a single product to produce wealth: sugar. Exhibit A “Cuba … no puede ni debe seguir 
dependiendo para su propia vida, de la voluntad de otro país. Esa es nuestra actual economía desgraciadamente.” 
Exhibit B “Sea cual fuere el porvenir de la caña, Cuba no puede depender de ella únicamente. La garantía de nuestra 
condición republicana, tiene que descansar en una sólida base de economía nacional. See: José Comallonga Mena, 
La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 3 and 5. It is worth mentioning that these early notions of dependency 
appeared eighteenth years earlier than Prebisch classic work on dependency and the historiography on Cuba has not 
studied how Cuban economic thinkers approached this subject in their lifetimes. Raúl Prebisch, “El desarrollo 
económico de la América Latina y algunos de sus principales problemas,” Revista de economía política no. 17 
(1957): 296-314.  
58 “La esclavitud económica, engendra la esclavitud política. Nosotros hoy no somos absolutamente independientes: 
nuestra economía nacional no es prácticamente nuestra.” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de 
Cuba, 5. 
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The negative consequences of having a single major source of wealth for the nation were 
demonstrated in La nueva economía agraria.59 However, the author went further by pointing out 
that the United States had a part in creating this economic problem: “the United States brought 
its capital here, and that government demanded that Cuba increased its sugar production.”60 
Thus, it was important for them to underscore the responsibility of the United States in the 
creation of the problem. At the same time, the capital invested in Cuba originated 
overwhelmingly in the United States, which provoked uneasiness. It was preferable to have 
funds invested from many more nations, and to have them as individualized as possible. In terms 
of capital, the nation needed a “nationalist approach” that would not discard foreign investments. 
Those contribute to the economy with capitals and expand economic activities, but corporate 
domination as occurred with the sugar mills should be “avoid[ed] at all cost.”61 Therefore, it was 
necessary to limit the capacity of those foreign corporations in the country and emphasize the 
importance of diversifying foreign investment.  
                                                 
59 These are three examples on how the problem was viewed. First: “Todo país, cuya riqueza dependa de una sola 
riqueza [se refiere a la producción de azúcar], dependerá siempre de la riqueza de los demás (5).” Second: “No es 
posible, en lo adelante, basar nuestra economía nacional únicamente en la caña, no sólo porque es anticientífico el 
método de una sola producción, sino porque cada día más, la caña será una riqueza inestable para nosotros (10),” 
Third: “O la República derriba a la caña, o la caña derriba a la república (10)”  José Comallonga Mena, La nueva 
economía agraria de Cuba, 5 and 10. 
60 “Si la economía nacional cubana, se ha desenvuelto dentro de esta deplorable condición de caña, caña y más caña, 
y los Estados Unidos trajeron aquí sus capitales, y aquel Gobierno le exigió a Cuba que aumentase su producción 
azucarera; si el gobierno americano sabe mejor que nosotros que toda la riqueza cubana y todas sus rentas han 
descansado en el factor azúcar, y sabe bien, que contando con esas rentas del azúcar Cuba ha concertado 
compromisos de empréstitos con la Banca Americana. ¿Con qué derecho si ahora se decreta por ese país la ruina de 
Cuba, se nos puede exigir que cumplamos obligaciones quitándonos los recursos con que los cubrimos? ¿Como, si 
nos matan las fuentes de ingreso (sabiendo que nos las matan) se puede exigir que cumplamos como Cuba siempre 
ha cumplido esas obligaciones?” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 14. 
61 “Pero todo esto dentro de un sentido nacionalista que no excluya de modo agudo la acción extraña que nos pueda 
aportar dinero y actividades; pero sí evitando a toda costa que el dominio corporativo, siga el mismo sendero que el 
de los centrales azucareros, y que no sea no, de un solo país de donde nos venga el dinero, porque debemos querer 
capitales y estimular a que vengan de todas partes, y cuanto más individualizado mejor.” José Comallonga Mena, La 
nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 19. 
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Another major problem for the Cuban economy was the protectionism in the United 
States, and the opening of the US sugar consumption market to the Philippines in detriment of 
Cuba.62 By setting limits to Cuban sugar imports while bringing in sugar from the Philippines, 
US protectionism raised suspicions among business leaders on the island.63 These policies on the 
part of the United States produced a growing dissatisfaction among all sectors of the Cuban 
economic classes, precisely because the whole economy was based on sugar monoculture. José 
Comallonga expressed a serious concern for the ruin of Cuba: “if the American government 
knows better than us that all Cuban wealth and all its revenues have rested on the sugar factor, 
and it knows well that, counting on those sugar revenues, Cuba has taken loan commitments with 
US Banks. With what right if the ruin of Cuba is now decreed by that country, can we be 
required to fulfill obligations by taking away the resources with which we cover them?”64 This is 
part of the same understanding later expressed by Montoulieu de la Torre and Blanco Herrera: 
Cuba was on its way to be completely ruined because of sugar monoculture, and the United 
States was responsible for the economic destruction of the island.  
Therefore, it was decisive to envision capitalist alternatives for the nation by developing a 
reform plan for abandoning monoculture. The projection of such goals required forsaking sugar 
                                                 
62 This situation sparked a strong resentment towards the Unites States among the Cuban economic classes of all 
stripes. “El invencible y feroz proteccionismo americano, quiere a todo trance y cueste lo que cueste, no necesitar de 
nuestro azúcar.” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 21. 
63 “De ahí que no acabe de comprender y me haga a veces pensar mal, esa política arancelaria de los Estados Unidos 
contra nuestro azúcar, que es como si la tuvieran en su casa, y aliente la importación de Filipinas. ¡Si ellos defienden 
egoístamente su remolacha, no podrán en la paz, tolerar la invasión filipina!” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva 
economía agraria de Cuba, 79. 
64 “Si el gobierno americano sabe mejor que nosotros que toda la riqueza cubana y todas sus rentas han descansado 
en el factor azúcar, y sabe bien, que contando con esas rentas del azúcar Cuba ha concertado compromisos de 
empréstitos con la Banca Americana. ¿Con qué derecho si ahora se decreta por ese país la ruina de Cuba, se nos 
puede exigir que cumplamos obligaciones quitándonos los recursos con que los cubrimos? ¿Como, si nos matan las 
fuentes de ingreso (sabiendo que nos las matan) se puede exigir que cumplamos como Cuba siempre ha cumplido 
esas obligaciones?” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 14. 
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as the preponderant industry and establishing “that henceforth Cuba will not promote a single 
more sugar mill.”65 It was essential for the nation to change its economic regime: “we have a 
deeply dislocated economy and as far as we can it is our duty to adjust [it] ... defending national 
interests.”66 By making the national interest a priority, the need to change the economic direction 
became self-evident because of the “the crisis of this system where sugar acts as the first 
factor.”67 The clearest recommendation was for expanding the acreage dedicated to alternate 
agricultural productions and progressively decrease the economic significance of sugarcane. 
Such proposition was at the center the vision on the necessary means to diversify the economy, 
which would eventually become the path to achieve economic self-sufficiency. 
An important part of the conversation was on how to substitute imports and develop the 
local production. The plan developed for Comallonga was focused on retaining the wealth 
already earned with sugar exports and reinvesting it to expand the productive capacity of the 
country. For example, with the cattle industry “we can avoid the exit of all or part of the ... 
twenty million pesos [we spend yearly] on animal products ... [that] might not make us exporters 
of meat; but keepers of much of what we currently spend buying abroad.”68 Cattle ranching 
endeavors would incentivize several derivative industries such as: fine hides, shoe industry, 
                                                 
65 “Y como resumen de este estudio que vengo haciendo del problema azucarero deduzco: (1) Que Cuba dejará de 
ser en lo sucesivo país preponderante en la industria azucarera … (2) Que su producción irá reduciéndose cada año 
… y (3) Que en lo adelante Cuba no fomentará un solo central azucarero más.” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva 
economía agraria de Cuba, 16. 
66 “Tenernos una economía profundamente dislocada y hasta donde podamos es nuestro deber ajustar … 
defendiendo los intereses nacionales.” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 90. 
67 “La crisis que estamos sufriendo, es la crisis de este sistema donde el azúcar actúa como primer factor.” José 
Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 90. 
68 “Podemos evitar la salida de todo o parte de … veinte millones de pesos de productos animales … Debemos, 
pues, lentamente, reconquistar esos valores, y esa conquista que … podrán no hacernos quizás exportadores de 
carnes; pero sí conservadores de mucho de lo que hoy gastamos comprando fuera.” José Comallonga Mena, La 
nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 35-36. 
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condensed milk, butter, cheeses, hams, bacon, and jerked beef (tasajo).69 The same concepts 
apply to the potential for a Cuban canning industry precisely because it would serve both ends, to 
develop new industries and substitute importations, while covering the needs of the domestic 
consumer market.70 
The island was overtly focused on producing raw materials for the international market 
but covering the needs of the domestic market had the potential to develop many more economic 
undertakings.71 Consider for example the production of vegetable oils, “Cuba is a country of oils. 
We have many good oleaginous plants ... I will not get tire of repeating [this is Comallonga to 
the members of Havana Rotary Club], that … [we should] start modestly to cover domestic 
needs first, and then think about exporting.”72 This proposition contained an important paradigm 
shift in the economic thinking in the island because Cuba had been producing for the 
international market since colonial times. Thus, the proposition was to focus first on the domestic 
market, to grow from there, and then conquer the international markets. New economic 
undertakings “ought to emerge from the size of our internal market and [then] grow at the 
                                                 
69 “Con la caña cada día Cuba es menos cubana.” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 29. 
70 “Debiendo … intensificar o crear la industria en conserva de múltiples frutas cubanas y dulces que también 
exportamos, pudiendo además exportar las frescas, tanto más si sabemos que en bien acomodados refrigeradores 
llegan a cualquier parte. Actualmente la industria de conservas en lata está tomando vuelos.” José Comallonga 
Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 36. 
71 Comallonga proposed to develop or further expand industries such as tasajo, canning industry, honey and 
beeswax, fibers to produce binder twine or textiles (such as henequén, yute, sanseviera, ramie and even banana tree 
plant), oil industries to be extracted from various agricultural products (cacao, coconuts, higuereta, and peanuts). 
José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 30, 32, 39, 43, 46-50, 50-51. 
72 “Como he dicho Cuba es país de aceites. Tenemos muchas y buenas plantas oleaginosas … no me cansaré de 
repetir, que se empiecen todas ellas modestamente para cubrir primero las necesidades domésticas, y después pensar 
en la exportación.” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 51.  
140 
expense of the foreign market.”73 An economic program emphasizing the significance of the 
domestic market for economic development was a major novelty among economic thinkers in 
the island.  
The difficulties faced by the paper industry, as studied in the first segment of this chapter, 
were not an exceptional case; rather, it was the norm.74 The economic penetration of the island 
deeply affected the pockets of Cuban businessmen, and their aspirations to move the economy 
forward, even as they considered strategies for abandoning monoculture. It was a pattern 
observed in the behavior of foreign capitalists who sought the control of those alternate 
industries that Cuban capitalists had proven economically viable. That was notable with “the 
tendency of US capitalist [interests], to conquer certain manufactures with an already guaranteed 
[rate] of success such as soaps, beer and others.”75 Thus, an everyday aspect of running a 
business in Cuba included facing a fierce competition to force buy ups, which had the potential 
to further denationalize the country. 
The chief concern for Cuban businessmen was that such “conquering” was developed by 
foreign corporations, because those powerful institutions had the ability to denationalize the 
economy.76 If this trend continued as it had happened “with the sugarcane,” in the near future, 
                                                 
73 “Toda nueva industria o nuevo cultivo (…) deben nacer del tamaño de nuestro mercado interior y crecer a 
expensas del mercado exterior.” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 18. 
74 “Se observa la tendencia capitalista de Norte América, a conquistar determinadas manufacturas ya garantizadas de 
éxito como los jabones, la cerveza y otras; y se observa la tendencia a establecer otras manufacturas que el arancel 
actual garantiza para su éxito. Ya he dicho que todo capital individualizado que venga a Cuba, es una suerte; pero en 
las formas corporativas que viene es una desgracia. El gobierno de algún modo debe tener en cuenta este aspecto y 
creo que en la Comisión de Defensa Nacional hay algún proyecto a este respecto. Si no queremos seguir 
desnacionalizando a Cuba como ha hecho la caña, este problema debe abordarse discreta y firmemente.” José 
Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 45. 
75 “Se observa la tendencia capitalista de Norte América, a conquistar determinadas manufacturas ya garantizadas de 
éxito como los jabones, la cerveza y otras,” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 45. 
76 “Todas nuestras industrias, deben nacer del tamaño que Cuba tiene y aquellas, cuya exportación sea viable, deben 
ser auxiliadas … Muchas de estas industrias, pueden nacer con capitales cubanos y seguramente prosperarán; pero 
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and because of “these new corporations [Cuba would end up] … being a country of 
employees.”77 The fact was that the country had not yet developed the ability to offer any 
“resistance to stop” the advance of such powerful institutions.78 For Comallonga: “any 
individualized capital that comes to Cuba is a blessing; but in the corporate forms that comes it is 
a disgrace… If we do not want to continue denationalizing Cuba as sugarcane has done, this 
problem must be approached discreetly and firmly”79 This fragment encapsulates important 
challenges faced by those who aspired to solid economic development, as well as the vision held 
by the economic classes that it was crucial to subvert the current status quo and regain the 
control of the nation for themselves.80  
One of the possibilities to address these problems was to use the natural resources of the 
island to develop nonagricultural industries that would emanate from local resources. The use of 
accessible raw materials for various productions would guarantee the potential growth of local 
industries, reduce importations, and provide employment for Cuban nationals. Within the same 
approach it was important to protect renewable resources by, for example, reforesting Cuba with 
                                                 
deben nacer prevenidas de competencias extranjeras que ahogando al industrial nativo, crezcan a expensas de ese 
desastre, porque acabaríamos (ya lo he dicho) ahora con la caña, y mañana con esas nuevas corporaciones por ser un 
país de asalariados. No debemos negar el concurso de su esfuerzo a ningún extranjero; pero sí debemos prevenirnos 
contra la invasión de esas corporaciones porque Cuba no tiene resistencia para detener su impulso.” José 
Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 45. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 “Ya he dicho que todo capital individualizado que venga a Cuba, es una suerte; pero en las formas corporativas 
que viene es una desgracia … Si no queremos seguir desnacionalizando a Cuba como ha hecho la caña, este 
problema debe abordarse discreta y firmemente.” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 45. 
80 “cuando cambiemos de régimen económico (y esto es lo que aquí deseo estudiar) cuando cambiemos de economía 
nacional podremos … vivir felices.” José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 19-20. 
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many fine woods that were natural to the country, such as cedar and mahogany.81 Other 
economic undertakings he endorsed, based on the same reasoning, was the using of available raw 
materials such as alcohols, sponges, beverages (rum, liqueurs, and beer), extractive industries 
(iron, cooper, manganese, asphalt), and construction materials (tiles and flooring).82 These 
options could also offer a path for economic self-sufficiency, focusing on the domestic market 
and finding new avenues for economic growth internally.  
A Plan for a Nationalist Commercial Diplomacy 
A Cuban attorney with a specialization on international law and a longtime member of 
the Havana Rotary Club, Luis Machado Ortega, published a book essential to investigating the 
political economy of Cuba during the republican period. His work was entitled: Necesidad de 
adoptar una política de comercio exterior (the need to adopt a foreign trade policy) and was 
released in 1929.83 The author proposed a plan to build a nationalist commercial diplomacy as 
the means to obtain the economic independence from the United States. The material contained a 
proposition to diversify Cuban foreign trade and renegotiate the treaty of commerce with the 
United States. The expectation was to “diversify our clientele, making us independent in the long 
run, from [the] economic and political subordination [to the United States].”84   
                                                 
81 José Comallonga Mena, La nueva economía agraria de Cuba, 55. 
82 Ibid., 56-59. 
83 Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior. El plan Hoover. Conferencia 
leída en la Sociedad Cubana de Ingenieros. 
84 “Diversificaría nuestra clientela, independizándonos a la larga, de la subordinación económica y política.” Luis 
Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 56. 
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From a different angle, this approach showed Cuba’s economic problems and the serious 
consequences of the socioeconomic stagnation in the island produced by sugar monoculture.85 
Such overreliance on the sugar industry was considered a national disgrace and an existential 
problem for the country.86 If Comallonga envisioned a possible solution to Cuban economic 
problems by promoting economic diversification and self-sufficiency, Luis Machado created a 
platform for reforming the nation that was focused on building a nationalist commercial 
diplomacy.87  
The plan for developing a nationalist commercial diplomacy centered on transforming the 
nation’s foreign trade by gaining access to new export markets for Cuban production. The 
foreign trade economic deformation in the country was marked by the overconcentration of the 
islands’ export to the United States primarily, and to the UK secondly.88 It was evident that “with 
only two clients, our prosperity is subjected to the economic and political swings of those two 
clients, especially the most important, the United States; and our political sovereignty will 
                                                 
85 “Nuestros ingenios azucareros no ganan lo suficiente para pagar los intereses de sus vencimientos hipotecarios. 
Nuestras industrias nacientes luchan entre la vida y la muerte, sin obtener utilidades. Las antiguas casas de comercio 
van desapareciendo por no poder sufragar sus gastos corrientes. La propiedad inmueble sólo tiene un valor nominal 
al no existir compradores. Las transacciones se reducen hoy en su mayoría a simples préstamos sobre hipotecas.”  
Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 9. 
86 “La causa primordial de esta situación puede atribuirse a la crisis formidable que viene atravesando la industria 
azucarera desde hace tres años. Pagamos las consecuencias de la mono-producción [azucarera] y, especialmente, de 
la imprevisión en que siempre hemos vivido en el orden económico.” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar 
una política de comercio exterior, 10. 
87 Unfortunately, the name he selected for his program, “the Hoover Plan,” was ineffective because it did not reveal 
the nationalist nature of his proposals. This is what Machado Ortega had in mind: “voy a exponer un plan que yo 
denomino ‘Plan Hoover’, porque, en realidad, es sólo una adaptación a nuestro problema económico del plan que 
desarrolló el presidente Hoover cuando fue nombrado Secretario de Comercio de los Estados Unidos en 1921 para 
resolver la situación, análoga a la nuestra, en que se encontraban entonces las industrias americanas.” Luis Machado 
Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 11. 
88 “Nuestro azúcar, que constituye el 85% de la riqueza cubana, no cuenta más que con dos clientes seguros: Estados 
Unidos e Inglaterra. Cuba compra a cuarenta naciones, pero prácticamente solo vende a dos.” Luis Machado Ortega, 
Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 14-15. 
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always be subjected to its decisive economic influence”89 Therefore, the United States’ economic 
influence over the island was considered a perennial threat for Cuban sovereignty. To achieve 
economic independence, Cuba had first to gain a footing in other markets and control a larger 
clientele because “only the economic independence will provide us with true political 
independence,” from the United Sates.90 Thus, by developing a nationalist commercial 
diplomacy he believed Cuba could achieve its economic independence and gain a definitive 
political freedom from the United States. 
Many Cuban businessmen reached the conclusion that the United States was ruining the 
island, even as they had a giant surplus with their neighbor to the North, which compensated the 
losses in other markets. Business leaders were outraged not only because they were having 
considerable losses, but because in comparison with other important trading partners of the 
United States, Cuba was being economically exploited. At the time, “Cuban productions [had to] 
pay an average of 56 percent [entry fee to US customs], that is, more than the UK, Germany, 
Japan, and Canada combined.”91 Such a difference in the “treatment” that Cuban products 
received was noted as a “tariff difference,”92 that affected Cuban interest and it built-up an 
undercurrent of resentment towards the United States.  
                                                 
89 “Con sólo dos clientes, nuestra prosperidad está sujeta a los vaivenes económicos y políticos de esos dos clientes, 
especialmente del más importante: los Estados Unidos; y nuestra soberanía política estará siempre supeditada a su 
decisiva influencia económica.” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 15. 
90 “Solo la independencia económica nos proporcionará la verdadera independencia política.” Luis Machado Ortega, 
Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 16. 
91 “Inglaterra paga en la aduana americana un promedio de derechos ascendente al 18%; Francia, el 31%; Alemania, 
el 25%; Japón, el 4%; y Canadá, el 6%. Los productos de Cuba pagan en total un promedio del 56%, o sea, más que 
Inglaterra, Alemania, Japón, y Canadá en conjunto.” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de 
comercio exterior, 51. 
92 Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 51. 
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The trade balance between Cuba and the United States was favorable to the island 
“despite the enormous disproportion that exists between the US tariffs to our products and ours 
to theirs.”93 Thus, the core idea was not to eliminate a trading relationship that was still providing 
financial gains for the island, but rather expand Cuba’s trading networks and to keep the 
economy growing from there. It was a matter of prioritizing to solve the nation’s economic 
problems. Luis Machado appreciated the margins of benefits Cuba enjoyed when trading with its 
northern neighbor, but he concluded that the treaty with the United States needed a revision. This 
member of the Rotary Club expressed that “the current treaty of reciprocity is inadequate for the 
importance that commercial relations between Cuba and the United States have attained in recent 
years.” 94 Luis Machado was very supportive of the recent steps taken by the Cuban government 
“for the revision of said treaty on a more equitable basis,”95 and in his opinion those actions were 
“very well directed.”96 Thus, trading with the United States was still advantageous for Cuba if 
managed appropriately, therefore the need to revise the commercial treaty.  
To solve Cuba’s foreign trade imbalances, Machado Ortega proposed a tariff reciprocity 
and a commercial reciprocity with every nation. In terms of tariff reciprocity, the nation should 
apply a tariff equivalent to what other countries charged to Cuban products. In terms of 
commercial reciprocity, Cuba should consider spending abroad according to what other nations 
                                                 
93 “A pesar de la enorme desproporción que existe entre los aranceles americanos a nuestros productos y los nuestros 
a los suyos.” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 51. 
94 “El actual tratado de reciprocidad es inadecuado para la importancia que han alcanzado en los últimos años las 
relaciones comerciales entre Cuba y los Estados Unidos.”  Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política 
de comercio exterior, 51. 
95 “Activas gestiones muy bien encaminadas.” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de 
comercio exterior, 52. 
96 “Muy bien encaminadas” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 52. 
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purchased from the island. This reciprocity was the basis for the foreign policy paper, and it was 
a new trade philosophy for the nation.97 The goal was to “be able to open those markets to our 
exports,”98 and not to initiate a tariff war.99 This strategy sought to reposition Cuban foreign 
trade in a manner that would allow the island to develop a more diversified foreign trade. Cuba 
had to develop two basic principles: “Tariff reciprocity: treat each nation as we are treated;”100 
and “commercial reciprocity: buy from whoever buys from us”101 And these two ideas should 
then sustain the entire framework of Cuba’s new foreign trade policy. 
Cuban business leaders developed a growing dissatisfaction with US interests on the 
island, and these sentiments fueled aspirations for economic independence among Cuban 
businessmen. Thus, the fulfillment of Cuba’s role in the international trade, was crucial “to reach 
the ambitioned economic independence,”102 from the United States. Therefore, Cuba’s 
fulfillment as a nation could be reached within the margins of capitalism. The country did not 
require a path for a revolution as the only route to achieve economic independence. For the 
                                                 
97 “Cuál debe ser la política económica de Cuba? (1) Cuba debe aplicar en sus aduanas a los productos de cada 
nación un arancel equivalente al que dicha nación aplique a nuestro azúcar o a nuestro tabaco elaborado. Ese es el 
principio de la Reciprocidad Arancelaria. (2) . Cuba debe gastar su dinero en el exterior entre aquellas naciones que, 
a su vez, compren a Cuba, es la misma medida que éstas lo hagan. Ese es el principio de la Reciprocidad 
Comercial.” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 28.  
98 “En otras palabras, mientras Cuba no aplique a los países con quienes comercia una medida arancelaria que les 
haga sentir … [un] maltrato [similar al] que reciben nuestros productos al atravesar sus aduanas, Cuba no logrará 
abrir esos mercadas a nuestra exportación y vivirá languideciendo económicamente.” Luis Machado Ortega, 
Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio exterior, 29. 
99 “yo no predico la guerra de tarifas.” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política de comercio 
exterior, 30. 
100 “La reciprocidad arancelaria: tratar a cada nación como nos trate.” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar 
una política de comercio exterior, 28. 
101 “La reciprocidad comercial: comprar a quien nos compre.” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una 
política de comercio exterior, 30. 
102 “Alcanzar la ambicionada independencia económica.” Luis Machado Ortega, Necesidad de adoptar una política 
de comercio exterior, 54. 
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standard bearers of capitalism in the island, Cuba needed a sound plan of reforms and persistence 
to change the country over a period of time. Thus, envisioning capitalist alternatives asserted that 
Cuba could achieve a full economic and political independence gradually. 
Luis Machado Ortega and José Comallonga Mena envisioned reforms and proposed plans 
to develop an alternative capitalist society, one in which Cuba could gain its definitive political 
independence from the United States. They were not alone in these efforts and from the times of 
Gerardo Machado’s first presidential term, many new papers were published addressing national 
economic problems. Consider for example another paper published by Luis Machado Ortega 
addressing consumption patterns, La isla de corcho. Ensayo de economía cubana; José María 
Pérez Cubillas, another Rotarian, focusing on illegal trade practices that negatively impacted 
businesses on the island: El clandestinaje mercantil y la competencia desleal; Juan Sabatés, a 
Figure 9. Rotarians Visiting the Presidential Palace. Source: Ora E. Chapin, “Across 
Boundary Lines. Rotarians of Cuba and Florida adopt Rotary’s good-will formula,” 
The Rotarian 36 no. 1 (Jan 1930), 26-27, 48. At the center, Gerardo Machado Morales, 
president of the Republic; and Luis Machado Ortega, President of the Havana Rotary 
Club. To the left the Rotarian Governor for Florida, Howard W. Selby; and to the right, 
Luis Piña from the Rotary Club of Colón in Matanzas--he was the Cuban Rotarian 
Governor and the head of the 25th District of Rotary International. The following year 
Luis Machado Ortega was elected to Piña’s the position. 
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Rotarian, and the head of one the most well-established soap industries in the country presented a 
paper to the leaders of the nation discussing taxation problems; José María Pérez Cubillas 
(Rotarian) and his student Felipe Pazos Roque, addressing Cuban monetary problem, Felipe 
Pazos Roque tackling Cuban banking problems, or Eugenio Valmaña Alberti on Cuba’s lack of a 
merchant marine.103 Thus, many more people on the island envisioned capitalist alternatives for 
their country and presented policy papers for debating among decision makers, and Cuban 
politicians who ignored these publications apparently. Regardless, these authors hoped to get the 
attention of a would-be reformer and contribute to their nation.  
 
                                                 
103 Luis Machado Ortega, La isla de corcho. Ensayo de economía cubana; José María Pérez Cubillas, El 
clandestinaje mercantil y la competencia desleal; Cámara de Comercio de la República de Cuba [Juan Sabatés]. El 
problema económico de Cuba; José María Pérez Cubillas and Felipe Pazos Roque, El problema monetario de Cuba; 
Felipe Pazos Roque, La banca: El presente económico de Cuba; Eugenio Valmaña Alberti, Marina mercante 
cubana, una necesidad nacional. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE POLITICS OF INFLUENCE: UNSWEETENED NATIONALIST 
ASPIRATIONS 
Urban entrepreneurs represented in the Havana Rotary Club were keenly aware of the 
importance of a good public image for any type of business endeavor. In 1917, many of these 
businessmen rejoiced in the prospect of developing Cuba as a tourist destination, an industry for 
which strong public relations management skills were essential. The focus groups promoting 
tourism and its institutional backing were still in their infancy; therefore, whenever a crisis 
emerged, prominent businessmen from other sectors of the economy had to intervene to 
safeguard Cuba’s prestige. For example, Julio Blanco Herrera, one of the most renown 
industrialists in the island, was not willing to accept a derailment of this new economic sector—
which would cut short the opportunity to diversify the Cuban economy. 
Newspaper reports from the United States incorrectly divulged that a yellow fever viral 
infection was affecting Cuba, and that the country was inhospitable in its treatment of tourists. 
Members of the Rotary Club in Havana launched a campaign to counter such perceptions by 
sending letters to various Rotary Clubs in the United States and asking them to rectify the 
situation in their locales. The campaign received positive results, and clubs in the United States 
eventually sent their Cuban counterparts clippings from US newspapers that retracted the false 
information.1 Still, not every US Club was willing to accommodate the demands from Havana 
and quell the complaints: “the [Rotary] club of Colorado makes it clear [in their letter] that only 
the information that concerns the existence of yellow fever in Cuba was rectified. Stories having 
                                                 
1 “El Club Rotario de La Habana”, Diario de la Marina (5 de enero de 1917): 1. 
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to do with various abuses committed by hoteliers were not retracted, since victims of these had 
been several Rotarians from this area.”2 Havana Rotarians responded to this out of concern for 
the country’s reputation and to ensure that the nascent Cuban tourism industry would not be 
affected. On the recommendation of the prominent industrialist Julio Blanco Herrera, “it was 
agreed upon that we [the members of the Havana Rotary Club] would respond to that US Rotary 
Club in order to indicate that isolated instances of abuse should not give motivation for 
generalizations (…) and to inform them that the Rotary Club of Havana has already established 
an information bureau with the objective of avoiding further isolated cases.”3 This is an 
illustrative scene depicting the behavior of the business leaders on the island. It shows that they 
read US newspapers with concern about Cuba’s portrayal, discussed strategies for improving the 
island’s image, and used their Rotary Club networks to try to influence portrayals of Cuba in US 
media. In doing so, they revealed methods of exerting pressure, the potential uses of civic clubs, 
and especially their expressions of nationalism defending the image of Cuba. 
In 1920, the Rotary Club of Havana, under the auspices of the National Association for 
the Promotion of Tourism, published a large book of images to advertise Cuba as a tourist 
destination. The back cover offered a graphic suggestion of the markets in which they intended 
to present the island for potential vacationers: New Orleans, Key West, Savannah, New York, 
                                                 
2 Ibid. Original in Spanish: “El club [Rotario] de Pueblo Colorado [en su misiva] hace la salvedad de que sólo 
rectificó lo concerniente a la existencia de la fiebre amarilla en Cuba, y no así lo que se refería a los abusos 
cometidos pod (sic) algunos hoteleros con turistas, porque víctimas de ellos habían sido varios rotarios de la 
localidad.”  
3 Ibid. Original in Spanish: “A propuesta del señor Julio Blanco Herrera, se acordó contestar a dicho club haciéndole 
ver que el hecho de que se cometan abusos aislados no debe dar motivo a un juicio genérico (…) y manifestándole 
que ya el Club Rotario de La Habana había establecido una oficina de informes con el objeto de evitar casos 
aislados.”  
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Quebec, Liverpool, Plymouth, Gibraltar, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Veracruz.4 However, 
the main goal was to capture the attention of travelers coming from the north. They expressed it 
clearly: “what the Mediterranean is to millions in Europe, Cuba is to millions in the United 
States and Canada–their vacation playground. Thousands of Americans who have spent their 
vacation in the delightful climate of its environs come again, because Cuba’s conditions” entice 
the visitor.5 The phrase “vacation playground” was not implying any negative connotation to the 
development of tourism in the island, or its capacity to promote prostitution, illegal gambling, 
and other societal evils. The offerings, graphics, and general information for the traveler in 
tourist package promoted by the book depicted the island as a typical southern European 
environment, as if the tourists from North America would be traveling to a Mediterranean 
destination in Italy or Spain, but in a location much closer to them. The publication bolstered 
typical characteristics that visitors could experience: the lofty constructions for good ventilation, 
the colonnades in the main arteries designed to facilitate pedestrians’ shady promenades, plazas 
and monuments, colonial fortifications, the many palaces built by the sugar planters, as well as 
churches and relevant industries. The book did not portray a country where alcohol consumption 
was accessible at every corner, where partying and dancing would go on at all hours, where 
beaches abounded, or where Afro-Cubans and their contribution to the country’s culture was a 
factor worth mentioning. This was a touristic boosterism sanitized to market to white, North 
Americans visitors; the development of the Caribbean as a destination combining all the more 
hedonistic cultural elements would be develop in later periods.   
                                                 
4 Club Rotario de La Habana and Asociación Nacional de Fomento del Turismo. Cuba, back cover. 
5 Ibid., 17. 
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The boosterism typical in Rotary Clubs in the United States was similar or more 
pronounced in Cuba. Local businessmen would sign up for any project offering a boost to the 
local commerce: these businessmen’s ambitions included bringing to Havana the International 
Convention of Rotary Clubs, a World’s International Fair, and the 1920 Olympic Games. 
Initially, these entrepreneurs hoped “that in 1920 it might be possible for the International 
Association of Rotary Clubs to hold its convention in Havana.”6 But their excited expectations 
went far beyond, with Hoffman revealing that “President Menocal has told me that the Cuban 
government has hopes of being able to arrange to have the Olympic games held in Havana in that 
year, and there will also probably be a World's Fair, or International Exposition.”7 Carlos Reig 
has shown the veracity of the intentions to bring the Olympic games to Havana, and the close 
involvement of the local Rotary Club in such endeavors.8 In the end, these projects were all 
interrupted because of the 1920 sugar market crash, but they do offer a window into the thinking 
of local businessmen. The intentions of the urban entrepreneurs from their civic clubs were 
twofold: to develop economic alternatives for the nation and to have a strong voice in 
redesigning the economy of the island.  
Historians have not addressed the manifestations of civic engagement that helped 
businessmen find avenues for collective political participation. This chapter focuses on the role 
of the urban entrepreneurs who aspired to achieve socioeconomic change, their incursions into 
the realm of politics, and the development of economic diversification initiatives. I argue that 
Cuban businessmen continuously participated in the public life of the nation and even beyond the 
                                                 
6 Albert W. Hoffman, “Havana, Cuba,” in “Activities of Rotary Clubs: Reports from Correspondents,” The Rotarian 
vol. 9, no. 6 (December 1916): 571.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Carlos E. Reig Romero, VII Juegos Olímpicos aspiración cubana (La Habana: Unicornio, 2001).  
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island. Under the guise of non-partisan politics, they used their civic clubs and the networks 
organized from within to advance nationalist collective goals. Business leaders sought to turn the 
Cuban economy away from sugar monoculture by promoting economic nationalism and civic 
pride prior to the 1920s, but it was the collapse of the sugar market that imbued their actions with 
a sense of urgency and developed into a heightened nationalism. These individuals became the 
main proponents of capitalist alternatives for the island by seeking to invest in regional 
infrastructures, achieve economic diversification, and reach an economic development that 
mirrored industrialized nations. 
I further argue that the process of envisioning an alternative capitalist model, distant from 
the cash crop design of colonial or a neocolonial imposition, facilitated the formation of 
nationalist economic sentiments in Cuba. The more local capitalist forces sought to and failed to 
diversify the nation’s economy, the more dissatisfied they grew with a status quo that prevented 
an alternative economic development. These economic classes had contradictory feelings about 
foreign domination over the Cuban economy: the United States was both a political, social and 
economic model to aspire to, but also an oppressive force that they sought to undercut.  
Civic Nationalism: From Political Grievances to Supporting Infrastructure 
In 1917, as two factories were inaugurated, the mercantile publication Avisador 
Comercial campaigned for the protection of national industries.9 These two factories, one 
associated with the pulp and paper industry and the second with the rubber industry, would 
reduce Cuba’s dependence on imports and generate employment on the island. For example, the 
Cuba Automobile Tire & Rubber Company expected to produce tires for automobiles that cost 
                                                 
9 One of the factories was to produce envelopes and the second rubber tires. León Primelles, Crónica cubana, 1915-
1918, 370. 
154 
three quarters of the price of imported tires.10 This company was “composed entirely of Cuban 
stockholders;” however, “Capt. C. W. Talbott, an American and former head of the Cuban 
Telephone Company, [was named] as its President.”11 This strategic choice had its advantages in 
a US-dominated Cuban economy. Every other industry composed of Cuban businessmen, and 
some had foreign entrepreneurs associated with them, were represented in the local Rotary 
Club.12 The expressions of economic nationalism, and the need to safeguard alternative 
industries, existed prior to the 1920s, but it was only after the bank crash that those aspirations 
coalesced into a collective understanding. The crisis transformed into a more pressing issue 
because it stressed the urgency of rearranging priorities for the interests of the nation.  
In September 1921, the Rotary Club of Havana published a leaflet proposing austerity 
measures to face the economic crisis. Mixing the wording of a religious prayer with the need to 
observe civic duties, Rotarians asked citizens for cooperation and demanded caution from the 
government in using public funds.13 The club started by declaring itself a nonpartisan 
organization to point to the need for support from all social classes. It pledged, “that every good 
citizen helps with his civic cooperation, to the restoration of normality; and employer and 
                                                 
10 Ibid. “Se funda la Cuban Tire and Rubber Co. [que fue creada] para fabricar gomas para automóviles, [y] esperan 
venderlas un 25% más barato que las importadas.”  
11 “Cuban Tire & Rubber Company,” The Cuba Review 15, no. 3 (February 1917): 32. 
12 Guillermo Veranes, the principal director of the new national factory of envelopes and became a member of the 
Havana Rotary Club from 1922 to 1935. See: “Lista general de Socios del Rotary Club de la Habana, en 1 de 
septiembre de 1922,” La Nota Rotaria T. 1, no. 1 (noviembre, 1922): 16-17; “Censo del distrito,” La Nota Rotaria 
VIII, no. 90 (March, 1930): 21-33; Rotary Club de La Habana. “Socios Activos 1 (junio 30, 1931),” “Socios Activos 
2 (junio 30, 1933),” “Socios Activos 3 (julio 30, 1935),” Legajo 697, Número 18104, Expediente del Club Rotario 
de La Habana (1918-39), Fondo Registro de Asociaciones, Archivo Nacional de Cuba. 
13 Rotary Club de La Habana, “En vista de la situación financiera tan crítica porque atraviesa el país (septiembre 13, 
1921),” Legajo 697, Número 18104, Expediente del Club Rotario de La Habana (1918-39), Fondo Registro de 
Asociaciones, Archivo Nacional de Cuba.  
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employee, capitalist and worker, give each other the necessary assistance to reach this end.”14 It 
asked every citizen to shorten personal expenditures, to pay debts progressively, and to cooperate 
with the government “in order to lessen public expenses, reducing them to the minimum.”15 It 
also proposed a reduced budget for the nation to avoid “throwing on top of merchants and 
working classes additional burdens based on the interests that amortizations would produce, as a 
… consequence of new loans.”16 
The economic classes had been severely battered by the sugar crisis, but in a spirit of 
national unity they understood the need to protect the working classes. To that effect, they 
proposed three measures which entrepreneurs in the club were expected to follow to mitigate the 
pain for their workers and clients. The first was “to reduce the price of the articles of first 
necessity to lower [the cost of] living of the worker.”17 The second, was to make public “the 
prices of retail items, comparing them with the wholesale price, and with the price of the 
previous year, to demonstrate … adherence to this program of general readjustment.”18 Finally, 
they suggested that “every Rotarian owner of rental properties carefully study the situation, and 
voluntarily make the reductions in the rental pricing of said properties so that they are adjusted to 
the current situation.”19 Rotarians from outside of Havana developed their own initiatives. For 
example, the Rotary Club of the city of Cienfuegos supported a community kitchen “where five 








hundred people are being fed daily and lodging [was] provided for an average of one hundred 
persons each night.”20 The effects of this crisis have not been studied by the historiography and 
the outburst of patriotism that sparked from 1923 and onwards is presented in complete 
disconnection from its origins in the crisis, precisely because what these businessmen did was 
not enough to contain the need for change in Cuba. 
Cuban businessmen became more outspoken in the 1920s about the need to protect 
national industries and they found a platform to express their aspirations from their gatherings in 
the local rotary club. Urban entrepreneurs were a majority of the club’s members and they were 
interested in making public their opposing views to some members of the House of 
Representatives in debates on protectionism and free trade.21 Rotarians identified themselves 
with the former and asked for the implementation of tariffs that would serve these interests. It 
was publicly known that “the Rotary Club [of Havana] continues to be the stronghold of 
protectionist ideals and in a session, attended by Ferrara, notions of free trade were vehemently 
fought for” by Alberto Crusellas, Julio Blanco Herrera, Carlos Alzugaray, and Charles C. 
Dufau.22 The Rotarian businessmen were well acquainted with the economic and political stance 
of some members of the House of Representatives. These club members were eager to debate 
them and express the need to defend their own interests as equal to those of the nation. Orestes 
Ferrara was invited to a weekly session in September 1922 where he debated the principal 
                                                 
20 “A Community Kitchen,” The Rotarian 19, no. 6 (December 1921): 340. 
21 “The matter was discussed in the House of Representatives… [where Orestes] Ferrara advocated free trade, and 
Santiago Rey and Germán López defended protectionism.” See: León Primelles, Crónica cubana, 1919-1922, 544. 
22 Ibid. Original in Spanish: “En la Cámara [de Representantes] se discutió el asunto … [donde Orestes] Ferrara 
propugnado el librecambio, y Santiago Rey, y Germán López defendiendo el proteccionismo. El Club Rotario [de 
La Habana] sigue siendo el foco de la tendencia proteccionista y en una sesión (…) a la que asistió Ferrara, las ideas 
librecambistas fueron combatidas por Crusellas, Blanco Herrera, Alzugaray y Dufau.”  
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champions of protectionism, who were also the proprietors of many alternative industries in the 
country. This debate gained Rotarians public recognition as the fundamental center of 
protectionist ideals to the extent that their voices conflicted with the House of Representatives.  
Thus, the Havana Rotary Club had the capacity to challenge public officials and the most 
emblematic institutions of the government in the island. The incident was not an isolated event, 
and it serves to illustrate how businessmen engaged in politics. The entrepreneurs comprising the 
economic classes have been overlooked as mere profit seekers, whose actions developed mainly 
in the worlds of economy and business. Therefore, it is crucial to stress that the economic classes 
devised singular mechanisms for collective political participation using their civic clubs. 
Businessmen used the civic space in society to inject their goals into the public and make them 
rational for national interest. If churchmen used notions of moral duty to compel people to mold 
their behavior in accordance to a religious worldview, businessmen used civic duty to compel 
individuals to adopt a civic attitude towards the nation and its components. Using the discourse 
of civic virtue, businessmen promoted their interests and created a new socioeconomic rationale 
to support the status quo or alter it when it was advantageous for their interests. The crisis of the 
1920s injected politics into these ideals of civic participation and, since businessmen were hit 
hard by the new economic constraints, they became much more vocal against the government.  
In the early 1920s, the members of the Rotary Club of Havana maintained a critical 
stance towards the government of Alfredo Zayas and its corruption. Battered by strains of the 
economic crisis and responding to it through public emphasis on personal austerity and 
moderation, the Cubans across the island remained particularly sensitive to any case of 
corruption. In that environment, any misuse of public funds would spark a flame. A 1923 
presidential decree to purchase an overpriced convent to house public offices in times of 
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austerity provoked national upheaval.23 In March 1923, a small group of young intellectuals 
began a public protest criticizing the misuse of the funds, and the scandal turned into a crisis of 
legitimacy for Zayas. The “Protest of the Thirteen” is usually portrayed as the birthright moment 
of the so-called critical decade–a period of heightened national sentiment from 1923 to 1933. 
One of the protesters was a member of the Havana Rotary Club, the young attorney Juan 
Marinello Vidaurreta, and his public protest was condoned by his fellow Rotarians when, the 
following year, they elected him as the vice president of the club.24 
Less than a month later, in April 1923, a large coalition of voluntary associations 
organized to condemn the gravity of the national situation. The heavyweights within the civil 
society in the island organized themselves as the Cuban Council for National Renovation 
(CCNR), stating that “no Cuban conscious of his civic duties can feel indifferent to the national 
pains.”25 The cluster of organizations “considers a primordial duty the civic propaganda, that 
constitutes the purpose of its organization, to expose without ambiguities or euphemisms, what 
are the causes of the national discontent.”26 The movement chose a former congressman and an 
attorney to preside over the council, Fernando Ortiz, who later became an eminent Cuban 
anthropologist.27  
                                                 
23 Hortensia Pichardo, Documentos para la historia de Cuba, vol. 3, 116-118.  
24 María Luisa Antuña and Josefina García Carranza, Bibliografía de Juan Marinello; Alina López Hernández, El 
desconocido Juan Marinello: Estudio de su pensamiento político; and Segundas lecturas: Intelectualidad, política y 
cultura en la republica burguesa. 
25 Original in Spanish: “ningún cubano consciente de sus deberes cívicos puede sentirse indiferente ante el dolor 
patrio,” See: “Manifiesto a los cubanos por la Junta Cubana de Renovación Nacional,” Revista Bimestre Cubana 18, 
no. 2 (March-April 1923): 85-99. 
26 Original in Spanish: “La «Junta Cubana de Renovación Nacional» estima como deber primordial de la 
propaganda cívica que constituye la finalidad de su organización, exponer sin ambages ni eufemismos, cuáles son 
las causas del descontento nacional.” Hortensia Pichardo, Documentos para la historia de Cuba, vol. 3, 140-150. 
27 Ibid.  
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The Cuban Council for National Renovation objected to the perceived squandering of 
resources and government mismanagement. To proclaim the strength of their civic moral latitude 
as opposed to government maladministration, they stressed that “the economic classes and the 
people in general,” had not forgotten their duties in paying taxes.28 These institutions united to 
proclaim the need for reforming Cuba with tariffs to protect national interests, revising the treaty 
with the United States, focusing on public works (especially roads and water supply systems for 
urban centers), protecting Cuban agricultural production from imports, increasing state 
regulation on the national economy, among other demands. They wanted “a republican life, 
[with] new public ideas, new governmental practices, new legislative orientations, new schools, 
new riches, new codes, in short, a new civic spirit that enlivens ... the energies of the Cuban 
people, to consolidate the republic.”29 
These organizations’ greatest fear was to see the whole country transformed into “a large 
batey [a sugar workers’ town] run by a company that would not be ours, and we Cubans could 
not survive on the land ... of our parents as anything but humble office workers or simple cutters 
of foreign-owned sugar cane.”30 In other words, the CCNR and its constituent organizations 
feared that Cuba would become a workplace owned by foreign companies, where Cubans would 
have no other recourse than to take the lowest job positions in their own soil. In addition to the 
president of the council, the manifesto was signed by the presidents and/or vice-presidents of a 
                                                 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid. Original in Spanish: “Los cubanos, en fin, queremos una vida republicana, [con] nuevas ideas públicas, 
nuevas prácticas gubernamentales, nuevas orientaciones legislativas, nuevas escuelas, nuevas riquezas, nuevos 
códigos, en fin, un nuevo espíritu cívico que avive (…) las energías del pueblo cubano, para consolidar la 
república.”  
30 Ibid. Original in Spanish: “Cuba vendría a ser como un gran batey de una empresa que entonces no sería nuestra, 
y los cubanos no podríamos ser en el suelo (…) de nuestros padres, sino humildes oficinistas o simples cortadores de 
la caña ajena.”  
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long list of organizations representing the economic classes, including the Havana Rotary Club, 
the Trade Center, the Chamber of Commerce, the Center for Urban Proprietors, the Association 
of Hacendados and Colonos, and the venerable Grand Master of the Grand Lodge, among many 
others. Many national professional organizations signed the document as well, including the 
Society for Cuban Engineers, and the most important voluntary associations grouping 
professionals by their respective fields: physicians, educators, historians, architects, notaries, and 
attorneys, among others. Cuban civil-society actors aspired to achieve change and redirect the 
course of the nation within the realm of capitalism. 
The economic classes’ campaigns for austerity launched from the Rotarian platform were 
well received by the public, and some individual citizens went on to make government officials 
accountable for their actions. A printout from July 1923, dedicated to the Havana Rotary Club, 
denounced the illegalities committed by the Havana City municipality mayor. In a crusade to 
bring down a corrupt public officer and “obtain the cooperation” of club members, the document 
compiled the legal case presented in court against the Havana municipal mayor José María de la 
Cuesta Cárdenas.31 The authorship of the printout is unclear, but it was probably produced by the 
plaintiff Augusto Figueroa Abreu and his attorney Carmelo Urquiaga. The mayor had allegedly 
created scholarships for imaginary individuals to then take these public funds for himself. The 
deception was exposed by an initial complaint from Herminia González after her son was denied 
a similar scholarship, and she then discovered in the municipality budget several scholarships for 
individuals listed as the sons of Cuesta Cárdenas. Cárdenas, however, had no sons. 32 
                                                 
31 “Recopilación de los documentos presentados al Sr. Fiscal de la Audiencia de La Habana y Sr. Juez de Instrucción 
de la sección primera denunciando irregularidades realizadas por el actual alcalde municipal de La Habana (Julio 4 




Addressing the printout to the Havana Rotary Club was a maneuver to elevate the profile 
of the case, and to obtain support from a powerful institution which had publicly advocated for 
austerity and demanded honesty from public officers during a severe economic crisis. Still, it is 
important to take note of Figueroa Abreu’s perceptions about the importance of these 
proceedings. The plaintiff addressed other personalities and institutions revealing that he was 
hoping to obtain support for “this work of moral cleansing and encouraging government 
authorities, so that ... we avoid another intervention by the US ambassador to Cuba, in our 
affairs.”33 Abreu’s warning reveals the extent to which foreign intervention affected the everyday 
life of ordinary citizens, and how corrosive and embarrassing it was for them to have an 
intervention. Despite their lack of formal power, Rotarians had become an important part of 
nationalist statements of integrity and honesty. 
The civic effervescence of these years brought yet another social movement objecting to 
the behavior of the national government regarding the payments to veterans of the war of 
independence. The delayed salary payments to the veterans provoked a difficult situation and 
sparked yet another civic mobilization against the government. The Rotarians supported the civic 
stance of the Veterans and Patriots Movement in their effort to reform what they already 
considered a corrupt political system. In that same year, 1923, Rotarians declared that “... only an 
honest public life and the honesty in the administration will make us ... prosperous, and 
understanding that the program of legislative reforms presented to the Public Powers by the 
National Association of Veterans and Patriots, embodies in all its parts the aspiration of this 
                                                 
33 Original in Spanish: “esperando [recibir apoyo en] (…) Esta obra de saneamiento moral y estimule a las 
autoridades gubernativas, para que (…) nos eviten un nuevo sonrojo con la intervención del Sr. Ministro Americano, 
en nuestros asuntos [nacionales].” See: “Recopilación de los documentos presentados al Sr. Fiscal de la Audiencia 
de La Habana y Sr. Juez de Instrucción de la sección primera denunciando irregularidades realizadas por el actual 
alcalde municipal de La Habana (Julio 4 de 1923)” Caja 12, Número 52, Comunicación dirigida al Club Rotario 
1923, Fondo Especial, Archivo Nacional de Cuba. 
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Rotary Club, [the Club] publicly declares its sympathies with the principles of moral and good 
governance that” the National Association of Veterans and Patriots proposes.34 The discord 
caused after the Zaya’s administration’s mismanagement drew criticism from numerous 
collective actors in the civil society, and they expressed support for each other. 
Throughout 1923, the involvement of Havana Rotarians in these reactions to the 
government called the attention of Rotary International. A former president of Rotary 
International was visiting Cuba and sought to curb Havana Rotarians’ political involvement. The 
former president, Hebert P. Coates, sent a telegram to Chesley Perry in April 1924 stating that 
Cubans had truly adopted the principles of the organization, and that they needed to work more 
on the membership. However, he emphatically pointed out that Cuban Rotarians must “above 
everything else … cut this line of attack on the government.”35 There are no written records to 
date revealing how Coates approached the subject to the enraged members of the Havana Rotary 
Club, but what is evident is that the behavior of club members changed following Coates’ visit. 
The economic classes of Cuba stopped using of their civic clubs to openly criticize the 
government and adopted a new strategy. Instead of continuously and publicly discrediting 
national authorities, they became the proponents of capitalist alternatives for the nation.  
Instead of criticizing politicians, business leaders embraced reform as their preferred 
method for promoting change. They moved to design programs, call for conferences, invite 
                                                 
34 Original in Spanish: El Club Rotario de La Habana afirmaba que “…solo una vida pública honesta y la acrisolada 
honradez en la administración nos harán (…) prósperos y estimando que el programa de reformas legislativas 
presentado a los Poderes Públicos por la Asociación Nacional de Veteranos y Patriotas, encarna en todas sus partes 
la aspiración de este Rotary Club, declara manifestar públicamente sus simpatías con los principios moralizadores y 
de buen gobierno que sostiene en su programa de reformas esta asociación.” See: “Aclaración del Rotary Club de la 
Habana”, La Nota Rotaria 2, no. 14 (noviembre de 1923), 15. 
35 “Hebert P. Coates to Chesley Perry (April 24, 1924),” Box 20, Folder 6, Cuban Clubs Collection AC0033: 
Habana vol. 1 (1914-1923), AC0033, Rotary International Archives. 
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speakers, promote deliberations, and launch initiatives for the national interest. The same 
happened at the provincial and municipal level, and the local rotary club became the arena to 
defend regional interests, in many occasions above national ones. After 1924-1925, when 
Rotarians in the capital had adopted a different approach, the Rotary clubs in the provinces began 
to stand up for local interest and advanced a vocal platform for regional patriotism. The 
behavioral spectrum for civic associations had been created: they would define themselves as the 
defenders of national and regional interests, and refrain from direct political participation, 
although occasionally would allow themselves to let loose their rage in a public campaign.  
However, a more cautious public stance did not limit the capacity of these urban 
entrepreneurs to continue affecting the life of the nation. They also moved to conceal their 
interventions in the public arena and create mechanisms to transform the society in ways they 
could have plausible deniability. For example, there is no direct evidence that club members 
intervened in electoral processes, but it is noteworthy that Alfredo Zayas was replaced in the 
presidency of the Republic by a former member of the Havana Rotary Club, Gerardo Machado. 
As proponents of alternatives, businessmen from the Havana Rotary Club launched several 
campaigns to promote infrastructures for the nation. They called for several conferences and 
developed many other initiatives, but the coincidence with their initiatives and the presidential 
program of Gerardo Machado was strikingly similar. The slogan of Machado’s presidential 
campaign was “water, roads, schools,” and each of these themes were broadly discussed and 
promoted from the Rotary Clubs as urgent needs for the country. Rotarians started by demanding 
a central highway.   
The economic classes in the island used their Rotary Clubs to participate in the decision-
making process for mapping out Cuba’s first highway, which later became one of the most 
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important public works projects during the Machado presidential era.36 The proposal for the 
design of the much-needed central road was launched in the third Rotarian District Conference in 
1923–a conference that included all Cuban Rotary Clubs. These civic clubs coordinated how to 
contribute to the blueprint design of what would be the principal road system in the country. 
During the 1923 conference, “[Mario] Macbeath suggested that each municipality and each 
provincial council should study the sections of road layout that corresponded to their respective 
locale demarcations in order to coordinate their own findings with the government’s overall 
plans for the principal highway.”37 This coordination of “their own findings” expressed the need 
to provide local entrepreneurs with mechanisms to make the layout design closer to their 
business interests, and to facilitate a collective engagement with public authorities. 
Any business placed in proximity to the central highway would develop a competitive 
edge above the rest in the country, and Cuban businessmen understood this quite well. The push 
to obtain a business-friendly blueprint layout encouraged various business sectors to make their 
ideal design closer to reality, even if they ended up with road layout capricious at times. To make 
their visions a reality, “García Vidal proposes that … these studies, once completed, should be 
submitted [for discussion] to their respective clubs and subject [thereafter to further discussion] 
among the Senators and Representatives of each province in similar club sessions so that the 
                                                 
36 The discussions for establishing a central highway in Cuba started after the passing of the Federal Aid Highway 
Act of 1921 in the United States. The number of automobiles in Cuba was significant and the conditions of the roads 
too poor. It necessary to develop a national highway system based on a central highway connecting east and west 
portions of the island. Gerardo Machado’s administration made the central road a reality. 
37 Original in Spanish: “[Mario] Macbeath recomendó que cada Municipio y cada Consejo Provincial debía estudiar 
los tramos que correspondiesen a sus respectivas demarcaciones para coordinar esos estudios con el plan general de 
la Carretera Central que tiene el Gobierno.” See: “Tercera conferencia del distrito 25º de Rotary Internacional 
celebrada en Santiago de Cuba los días 2, 3 y 4 de marzo de 1923”, La Nota Rotaria. 1, no. 7 (abril de 1923): 9.  
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project becomes of interest to the nation.”38 Thus, the idea was to bring those legislators who 
represented the province in Congress to participate in club meetings; this was to help ensure the 
success of club members in producing a national road system that would be as amenable as 
possible to the vision and the interests of Rotarians. For example, the Rotary Club of Matanzas 
developed studies as requested, and then invited the engineer from the province’s Department of 
Public Works and other members of the provincial government into their weekly sessions, to 
understand what was needed to finish the incomplete stretches of highway from Unión to 
Bolondrón, Cidra to Sabanilla, and Güira to Navajas.39 The goal of developing the central 
highway was paramount for the members of Havana Rotary Club, and especially for its 
president, the engineer Adolfo R. Arellano, who was at the head of the organization and leading 
a campaign for the Central Highway.40 If roads were essential for business development in the 
urban centers across the country, access to drinking water was no less important. 
In 1924, a cluster of organizations in Havana combined their efforts in a management 
committee to facilitate the enlargement of the city aqueduct given the continuous urban growth. 
The Economic Society of Friends of the Country, the Association of Good Government, the 
Rotary Club of Havana, the National Association of Industrialists of Cuba, and the Cuban 
Society of Engineers “have been working intensively to solve the serious problem of water 
                                                 
38 Original in Spanish: “García Vidal, propone que (…) esos estudios una vez hechos y sometidos [al debate] a los 
respectivos Clubs, se sometan [posteriormente a discusión junto] a los Senadores y Representantes de cada 
Provincia en sesiones de los mismos Clubs y de ese modo se irá interesando a la Nación en esa obra…” See: 
“Tercera conferencia del distrito 25º de Rotary Internacional celebrada en Santiago de Cuba los días 2, 3 y 4 de 
marzo de 1923”, La nota rotaria. 1, no. 7 (abril de 1923): 9. 
39 “Por los clubs del distrito. La labor del rotarismo”, La Nota Rotaria 2, no. 14 (noviembre de 1923), 17. 
40 “La Carretera Central: Hermoso, viable y oportuno proyecto de construcción, debido al competente ingeniero Sr. 
Adolfo R. Arellano, presidente del Club de la Habana (leído en la sesión del día 2 de mayo de 1924),” La Nota 
Rotaria 2, no. 21 (junio 1924): 10-13. 
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[supply].”41 It was a recurring situation that sprang up again decades later in Marianao, –a suburb 
of Havana which had opened its own Rotary Club chartered. Marianao still needed to build an 
aqueduct for the localities of Arroyo Arenas and Cano. The businessmen gathered at the 
Marianao Rotary Club acted “as intermediaries with the administration of the Marianao 
Aqueduct Company, [and] got the promise to extend the good water service … if the 
Municipality cooperates.”42 Water supply was a systemic problem all over Cuba, and, if Havana 
faced difficulties in getting access to the precious liquid, the rest of the country was in much 
worse conditions. The Santiago de Cuba Rotary Club throughout its existence “worked with 
determination, in solving the pressing problems ... such as the paving of the streets, the sewage 
system, the water supply, the desiccation of the swampy regions surrounding the city”43 among 
many other issues. For example, the engineer Eduardo J. Chibás, representing the club from 
Oriente province, described the lengths to which the citizens of Santiago de Cuba went to have 
an aqueduct in the city, and their struggles with Public Works officials to deliver results.44 The 
businessmen and white-collar professionals in these organizations understood the importance of 
                                                 
41 Original in Spanish: La Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, Asociación de Buen Gobierno, Club Rotario de 
La Habana, Asociación Nacional de Industriales de Cuba, la Sociedad Cubana de Ingenieros “han venido laborando 
intensamente para la solución del grave problema del [abasto de] agua.” See: Club Rotario de La Habana, 
Actividades desarrolladas durante el presente año por el Club Rotario de La Habana en conjunción con otras 
entidades para la solución del problema del abasto de agua a la ciudad, 5. 
42 En el caso del acueducto para Arroyo Arenas y Cano los hombres de negocio reunidos en el club rotario de 
Marianao actuaron “como intermediarios cerca de la Administración de la Cía. del Acueducto de Marianao, [y] 
conseguimos la promesa de extenderse el buen servicio de agua en 10 de Octubre entrante si el Municipio coopera.” 
See: Rotary Club de Mariano, El club y el municipio: Memoria 1938-1939, 2-3. 
43 Original in Spanish: “El Club [Rotario de Santiago de Cuba] había trabajado con tesón, en resolver los problemas 
apremiantes (…) como el pavimentado de las calles, el alcantarillado, el suministro de agua, la desecación de las 
regiones pantanosas aledañas a la ciudad.” See: Jorge Abdala Franco, “El club rotario de Santiago de Cuba, 1950-
1960,” 72. 
44 “Manifestaciones del ingeniero señor Eduardo J. Chibás, en la sesión del Club Rotario de La Habana, con relación 
al acueducto de Santiago de Cuba,” La Nota Rotaria 2, no. 21 (junio 1924): 14 and 19. 
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having running water for the expansion of commerce and their own companies, but in doing so 
they were rendering a social service to the wider community, and drawing the attention of the 
nation to these issues.  
These voluntary associations with community interests came to develop mechanisms to 
sway the various segments of public opinion, particularly through campaigns using the press. 
Civic organizations had limits to what they could accomplish, and they worked closely with the 
press to advance their “propagandistic” goals, as they defined them. For example, in the efforts 
to solve the problem of water supply, the Rotarians complained:  
More than once it has been done with great injustice, to the Rotary Club of Havana, as 
well as to other civic institutions, the charge of not bringing to a happy conclusion the 
generous initiatives that arise in its midst (...) It is not possible for civic institutions to 
bring to an end the movements they started, since they lack the executive force and the 
necessary faculties. The Rotary Club of Havana, always attentive to the most vital 
problems of collective interest, has been bringing to its podium the people it has deemed 
most competent in the matter raised. Counting fortunately with the favor and sympathy of 
our press.45 
In an effort to generate debate, Rotarians would bring speakers from any walk of life as 
subject-matter experts to give lectures in the club. In many occasions their speeches were 
published in the press or in the form of booklet. In only four years (1925-29), the Pinar del Río 
Rotary Club invited a considerable number of public figures such as the provincial governor, 
cabinet members such as the Secretaries of Public Works and Government, regional military 
chiefs, Cuban foreign officers–such as the nation’s minister in Norway, the Spanish consul, 
                                                 
45 Original in Spanish: “Más de una vez se ha hecho con harta injusticia, al Club Rotario de La Habana, al igual que 
a otras instituciones cívicas el cargo de no llevar a feliz término las generosas iniciativas que surgen en su seno (…) 
No es posible que las instituciones cívicas lleven a su término los movimientos que inician, ya que les faltan para 
ello, la fuerza ejecutiva y las facultades necesarias. El Club Rotario de La Habana, atento siempre a los más vitales 
problemas de interés colectivo, ha venido trayendo a su tribuna a las personas que ha estimado de mayor 
competencia en el asunto planteado. Contando por fortuna con el favor y las simpatías de nuestra prensa.” See: Club 
Rotario de La Habana, Actividades desarrolladas durante el presente año por el Club Rotario de La Habana en 
conjunción con otras entidades para la solución del problema del abasto de agua a la ciudad, 5. 
168 
Senators and Congressmen, professionals from various fields and the presidents of many other 
voluntary associations.46 On other occasions, the strategy of these civic clubs was to bring 
several experts on a single issue for a period of months to a year. This helped them further 
publicize their goals to have a larger and systematic impact in public opinion. 
In May 1924, after a motion promoted by fruit exporter Eusebio L. Dardet, the Havana 
Rotary Club adopted a program to discuss public education in the country and the improvements 
it needed.47 The proposition aimed to bring experts on education to give monthly presentations 
about public instruction. In one of the first appearances, in August 1924, Oswaldo Valdés de la 
Paz addressed the importance of promoting patriotism in Cuban educational institutions, creating 
more schools, and eliminating illiteracy especially in the countryside.48 A week later, Adolfo R. 
Arellano president of the Havana Rotary Club, and speaking on behalf of the entire club, 
addressed a letter to all members of the House of Representatives asking them to augment the 
number of schools and work to reduce illiteracy.49 The businessmen in the club not only asked 
                                                 
46 C. M. de la Rionda [Carlos Manuel de la Rionda Perdomo], El Club Rotario de Pinar del Río en sus 4 primeros 
años, 33-40. 
47 The motion was passed on May 22, 1924 and it proposed to bring experts on education in the island to talk about 
public instruction on the first Thursday of every month. See: “Sobre instrucción pública: Patriótica moción del Sr. 
Eusebio L. Dardet, presidente de la comisión de mejoramiento de la juventud, del club de La Habana,” La Nota 
Rotaria 2, no. 21 (junio 1924): 16-17. A year later, all the speeches presented were published in a single volume: 
Club Rotario de la Habana, Haciendo patria. Conferencias sobre nuestros problemas educacionales, pronunciadas 
en el Club Rotario de La Habana durante el período social de 1924 a 1925. 
48 Oswaldo Valdés de la Paz, presidente de la Junta de educación de La Habana, “Ahora la manigua está en el aula,” 
See: Club Rotario de la Habana, Haciendo patria. Conferencias sobre nuestros problemas educacionales, 
pronunciadas en el Club Rotario de La Habana durante el período social de 1924 a 1925 (, 27-28; See also: 
Síntesis del discurso pronunciado por el Sr. Oswaldo Valdés de la Paz, alrededor del tema: ‘La manigua está ahora 
en la Escuela,’ [there is slight change in the title] en la sesión del Rotary Club de La Habana el jueves 7 de agosto de 
1924,” La Nota Rotaria 3, no. 24 (septiembre 1924): 4. 
49 Adolfo R. Arellano, “Carta dirigida a todos los Representantes de la Cámara (15 de agosto de 1924),” La Nota 
Rotaria 3, no. 24 (septiembre 1924): 14. 
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for technical education to prepare the labor force for more industrial economic undertakings; 
they vowed to support the general educational needs of the country out of a sense of civic duty.   
Within a year, the monthly conferences brought the most prominent Cuban pedagogues 
to speak, including Alfredo M. Aguayo, Arturo Montori, Carolina Poncet, Ramiro Mañach, and 
Ramiro Mañalich, among others, to address the need to promote a patriotic education.50 There 
was an undeclared quarrel between those who defended public instruction and the teachers who 
advocated for private education, a competition of sorts regarding which educational method was 
more patriotic than the other. However, the last presentation developed by Eusebio L. Dardet in 
1925, reminded his fellow club members of the contributions of Gerardo Machado to education 
back when he had been a member of the club.51 The cycle of conferences began during the 
                                                 
50 These are the names of the experts, their occupations, and the title of their presentations: (1) Dr. Enrique 
Hernández Cartaya, rector de la Universidad Nacional, (2) Dr. Ramiro Mañach, profesor de la Escuela Normal para 
Maestros, “Parques de juegos para niños,” (3) Dr. Alfredo M. Aguayo, catedrático de pedagogía de la Universidad 
Nacional, “La reforma de la escuela popular en Cuba,” (4) Sr. José Heider, profesor de calistenia en el Colegio de 
Belén, “La educación física en las escuelas públicas,” (5) Oswaldo Valdés de la Paz, presidente de la Junta de 
educación de La Habana, “Ahora la manigua está en el aula,” (6) Dra. Julia Crespo de Aguado, directora del plantel, 
“Necesidad de la Escuela Normal para Maestras de La Habana,” (7) Dr. Arturo Montori, profesor de la Escuela 
Normal para Maestros, “Problemas educacionales,” (8) Dr. Gabriel García Galán, expresidente de la Junta de 
Educación de La Habana, “Necesidad de nacionalizar la enseñanza privada en Cuba,” (9) Dr. Ramiro Mañalich, 
inspector de las escuelas normales de la república, “Extremos que debe abarcar un moderno programa de enseñanza 
en materia de instrucción cívica,” (10) Dr. Alejandro Ruiz Cadalso, catedrático de la Facultad de Letras y Ciencias 
de la Universidad Nacional, “Cuestiones Universitarias,” (11) Dr. Carolina Poncet, profesora de la Escuela Normal 
para Maestras, “Algunos puntos relativos a la Escuela Primaria,” (12) Dr. Antonio L. Valverde, profesor de la 
Escuela de Comercio del Instituto de Segunda Enseñanza en La Habana, “La escuela de comercio en Cuba,” (13) 
Eusebio L. Dardet, presidente de la Comisión de Mejoramiento de la Juventud en el Club Rotario de La Habana, 
“Discurso resumen: Algo relativo a la veneración a la patria en las Escuelas Privadas” Club Rotario de la Habana, 
See: Club Rotario de la Habana, Haciendo patria. Conferencias sobre nuestros problemas educacionales, 
pronunciadas en el Club Rotario de La Habana durante el período social de 1924 a 1925. 
51 Eusebio L. Dardet defended the patriotic contributions of private schools in Cuba. To prove his point, he 
mentioned how the swearing of the flag, a patriotic initiative developed in the Colegio de Belén, was later embraced 
by and promoted Rotarians. Dardet expressed: “más tarde enamorado este club de tan patriótica iniciativa nombró 
una comisión compuesta por el ilustre general Machado, nuestro presidente electo, el señor Salmón [Lorenzo 
Salmón Collazo] y el que os habla, para que acercándonos a los poderes públicos tratáramos de conseguir se 
implantara el hermoso ceremonial de la jura de la bandera” See: Club Rotario de la Habana, Haciendo patria. 
Conferencias sobre nuestros problemas educacionales, pronunciadas en el Club Rotario de La Habana durante el 
período social de 1924 a 1925, 81-94. 
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election campaign of 1924 and concluded after General Machado had been elected president of 
the Republic. 
There was a considerable convergence of interests between the Rotary Club of Havana 
and the presidential campaign of Gerardo Machado in 1924. The popularized slogan of “water, 
roads, and schools” anchored the presidential campaign of the Liberal Party’s candidate and 
paved his way to the presidency. Machado’s political platform proposed to modify the permanent 
treaty with the United States, favor the creation of new industries, import raw materials free of 
duty, prevent strikes, repair the existing roads and build a central highway, supply the necessary 
water to Havana and Santiago de Cuba, and construct schools where needed.52 It was the first 
time a politician in the island launched a political program to get elected, and it was markedly 
designed to make the country ready for business by easing communications, enabling 
transportation structures, supplying water and sewer systems for the development of growing 
urban centers, and facilitating the education required to form skilled workers. Gerardo 
Machado’s program echoed the debates initiated by Rotarians over the previous years prior to the 
electoral race. It is noteworthy that Rotarians went from criticizing the government of Alfredo 
Zayas, to suggesting policies to a former fellow Rotarian and indirectly helping him in his 
journey to become president of the country.  
Promoting Change: Remodeling the Facade and the Foundation 
In the aftermath of the bank crash of 1920, the increase of bankruptcies and the number 
of properties changing hands deeply affected the economic classes and the ideas they had about 
themselves. After many years creating immense fortunes based principally on sugar, the crisis 
devoured the vast riches amassed by some of the wealthiest residents in the island. As the 
                                                 
52 Hortensia Pichardo, Documentos para la historia de Cuba, vol. 3, 262-265. 
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country emerged from the economic crisis, a new nationalist period emerged, one in which the 
economic classes sought to transform themselves into the principal promoters of change.  
A large body of the historiography has focused on the students’ movement, the formation 
of the Communist Party, and the rise of the labor movement, omitting the role of the economic 
classes that were part of the same nationalist movement. In fact, that body of scholarship focused 
on students and labor movements argued that the nationalist period emerged to counter the 
antinationalism of the economic classes and their weak position towards the United States. 
However, a closer look reveals that the economic classes in the island became promoters of 
change and devised numerous initiatives to increase nationalist awareness. In doing so, the 
economic classes decided that they had a role in remodeling the facade and the foundation of the 
national building. Showing a considerable degree of flexibility, they launched their own 
programs, aided other institutions in civil society in demanding national self-improvement, and 
supported the government when they deemed it to be moving in the right direction.    
A legacy of US occupation of Cuban national territory at the turn of the twentieth century 
created a patriotic surge among the economic classes in the island by 1924. It was a territorial 
dispute between the two countries over ownership of the Isle of Pines, the second largest island 
in the Cuban archipelago. Contrary to the belief that US territorial ambitions had ended after the 
nineteenth century, many North Americans migrated to the Isle of Pines, established a colony, 
and promoted an annexationist movement aspiring to join the United States.53 The presidency of 
Alfredo Zayas was continuously battered by charges of corruption and the prospects of a foreign 
policy victory could help to improve his image.54 In 1923, a Cuban attorney and a veteran of the 
                                                 
53 Michael E. Neagle, America's Forgotten Colony: Cuba's Isle of Pines, 10 and 97. 
54 Ibid, 185. 
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War of Independence, Cosme de la Torreinte, was appointed ambassador to the United States 
and assigned to lobby US senators into ratifying the Hay-Quesada treaty. In the end, the treaty 
was signed amid the growing anti-American sentiments arising across Cuba.55 Both US officials 
and Cuban businessmen understood that the isle had little economic value, but that it was central 
to ideas of Cuban nationalism and territorial integrity. 56   
Business leaders gathered in the Havana Rotary Club expressed their interest in seeing 
the Hay-Quesada Treaty ratified by the US senate to rectify a foundational question for the 
republic. These members of the economic classes sought to use the Rotarian network to obtain a 
prompt resolution to Cuban nationalist aspirations. Eusebio L. Dardet took the lead: “I propose to 
my fellow Rotarians that through the mediation of the Governor of our district, Rotary 
International be asked to use their diligent and good services so that the Congress of the United 
States, adopting the righteous rulings issued by the corresponding committees, [and] proceed to 
its prompt resolution.”57 With the intention of gaining official recognition of Cuba’s sovereignty 
over the Isle of Pines, these men sought to access US policymakers through a network of 
influence: from the Havana Rotary Club, to the Rotarian Governor for Cuba, to Rotary 
International, and finally to the doors of the US Congress.  
Rotary International’s representative in Cuba, the Governor for District 25, was certainly 
not expected to become a lobbyist advancing foreign interests in the United States. Thus, it is 
                                                 
55 Ibid, 184. 
56 Ibid, 188-189. 
57 Original in Spanish: “Próximo a fallarse de un modo definitivo, de conformidad con los criterios de justicia, del 
honor, asunto de tan gran trascendencia, propongo a mis compañeros rotarios que por mediación del Gobernador de 
nuestro distrito, se pida a Rotary Internacional, que use sus diligentes y buenos oficios para que el Congreso de los 
Estados Unidos, adoptando los justicieros dictámenes emitidos por las comisiones correspondientes, proceda a su 
pronta resolución.” See: Eusebio L. Dardet, “Sobre la Isla de Pinos (April 1924),” in René Acevedo Laborde, 
Manual Rotario, 438-439.  
173 
noteworthy that Cuban businessmen interpreted the Rotary Club, and the whole Rotarian 
network, as a means to advance a nationalist agenda. This was a subversion of US hegemony in 
the island by transforming a typical US model of voluntary association into a nationalist entity to 
counter the interest of the United Sates, or at least ensure the goals of the host nation. Similar to 
US corporate interests and evangelical religious diffusion, the Rotary Club was another form of 
US cultural and economic expansion. Yet, if these were used as the instruments of foreign 
domination, they were now being readapted by the Cuban economic classes to benefit the 
country it initially sought to dominate. 
Cuban government officials, knowing how sensitive this matter was for the economic 
classes, sought the support of Cuban businessmen and their networks to lobby the US senate for 
the ratification of the Hay-Quesada treaty. However, the initiative of the Rotary Club of Havana 
was rather an alliance between the Rotarians and the Cuban government to obtain the ratification 
of the treaty. In a note from April 1924, apparently written by Cosme de la Torriente to the 
Cuban Secretary of State for foreign affairs, and marked “confidential,” Rotary clubs were 
encouraged to intervene in the matter: “It would be advisable, without it seeming that I have 
suggested it, that the Rotary clubs of Cuba obtain assistance from this country [the United States] 
so that both [Cuban Rotarians and their counterparts in the United States] support the ratification 
of the Isle of Pines treaty before the American Senate.”58 It was a coordinated effort to counter 
the campaigns from US citizens residing on the Isle of Pines who portrayed themselves as 
victims of alleged abuses committed by the Cuban government, a strategy aimed at preventing 
ratification of the agreement.  
                                                 
58 Rolando Álvarez Estévez, Isla de Pinos y el tratado Hay-Quesada, 113.  
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Rotarians, who had previously criticized public officials relentlessly, closed ranks around 
government authorities because their nationalism had rearranged their priorities. The ratification 
of the Hay-Quesada Treaty in March 1925 fully relinquished the US claims to the island of 
Pines. US interest and investments in Cuba had far more of a bearing than a small American 
colony in a secondary island with little economic value on their decision to ratify the treaty. The 
contrary would have strained relations between Cuba and the United States, given the degree to 
which the theme of the Isla de Pinos was a sensitive matter within Cuban society. These events 
highlight the mechanisms used by the Cuban government in obtaining support from the civil 
society to attain nationalist goals. This is because Rotarians had already developed mechanisms 
to sway US public opinion and had worked to influence government authorities in the United 
States. 
The wave of patriotic sentiments in these years reached the field of medical sciences, 
leading to calls to acknowledge the Cuban authorship of a scientific discovery. Carlos J. Finlay, a 
Cuban epidemiologist of French and Scottish ancestry, had identified mosquitoes as the 
transmitting agent of yellow fever in 1881, but his ideas were ignored for decades. During the 
first US occupation of Cuba (1898-1902) the discovery was credited to Walter Reed, a 
bacteriologist who oversaw the US Army Yellow Fever Board in Havana. In 1924, Domingo F. 
Ramos, a Cuban obstetrician and a Rotarian, started a social movement to re-credit the scientific 
achievement back to the Cuban physician.59 In a different speech is was perceptible that Ramos 
                                                 
59 “Discurso del Dr. Carlos Finlay [Jr.]” in Domingo F. Ramos, Cuba en la higiene internacional y Finlaismo: 
Esquemas, informes, discursos, legislación, 198. See also the rest of the discourses and documents compiled by 
Ramos in the same book, pages: 181-249. Also: “A instancias de Ramos se organizaron un conjunto de conferencias 
en el Rotary Club de La Habana (…) Motivo por el cual se formó una Comisión Gestora del Finlaísmo, presidida 
por Juan Guiteras Gener e integrada por Diego Tamayo, José Antonio López del Valle, Domingo F Ramos, 
Francisco María Fernández, Enrique Porto, Federico Torralbas, Emilio Porto, Emilio Gómez Berzacuy, Gregorio 
Alonso, Eusebio Dardet, Conrado W. Massaguer, Gustavo Adolfo Bock y otros. Algunos de ellos dieron 
conferencias durante varios meses en el Club Rotario en 1924 y fueron recogidas por Ramos, como ya se dijo, en su 
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became interested in this project as he expressed that “for the honor and glory of all America, 
[Carlos Finlay] was born in Cuba.”60 The social movement reclaiming Finlay’s research findings 
for the nation was named “Finlaísmo,” a term coined by Dr. Federico Torralbas.61 Physicians and 
other professionals using the Rotarian platform turned Finlaísmo into one more nationalist 
pursuit in this period. The Havana Rotary Club promoted a cycle of conferences and a 
management commission to rectify the misconception established since the foundation of the 
republic. 
The effort to amend a wrong done to the nation since the foundation of the republic was 
intended to assert Cuban nationalism, and it provides yet another example of how the economic 
classes promoted change. The cycle of conferences in the Havana Rotary Club brought eminent 
medical science professionals and others who agreed to build a monument to Finlay. In the 
substance of their speeches, the breeding of patriotic pride was notable: “digamos: Cubanismo y 
Finlaismo.”62 Others stated that they were doing an “an act of justice”63 and even the Secretary 
of Health and Beneficence–also a declared Rotarian–agreed “to raise the flag of truth.”64 As a 
                                                 
libro.” Armando García González and Raquel Álvarez Peláez, Las trampas del poder: sanidad, eugenesia y 
migración: Cuba y Estados Unidos, 1900-1940, 66. 
60 Original in Spanish: “para honor y gloria de toda América, [Carlos Finlay] nació en Cuba” See: “A Finlay y 
Gorgas,” in Domingo F. Ramos, Cuba en la higiene internacional y Finlaismo: Esquemas, informes, discursos, 
legislación, 179. 
61 Domingo F. Ramos, “La internacionalidad del Finlaismo,” and “Discurso del Dr. Carlos Finlay [Jr.]” in Domingo 
F. Ramos, Cuba en la higiene internacional y Finlaismo: Esquemas, informes, discursos, legislación, 183 and 198. 
62 Adolfo Bock, “Discurso del Sr. Adolfo Bock,” in Domingo F. Ramos, Cuba en la higiene internacional y 
Finlaismo, 197. 
63 Dr. Lebredo, “Discurso del Dr. Lebredo,” in Domingo F. Ramos, Cuba en la higiene internacional y Finlaismo, 
195-196. 
64 “And today, at the call of this [Havana Rotary] Club, to which I am honored to belong, because I was, because I 
am and because I will continue to be [Rotarian], when I leave the position that I have [in the Cabinet], today (...) this 
Club , which gives us the lesson of wanting to raise the flag of truth and defend it and, carry it forward, here I am to 
help you with my soul and with all my feelings.” Original in Spanish: “Y hoy, al llamamiento de este Club [Rotario 
de La Habana], al que me honro pertenecer, porque fui, porque soy y porque seguiré siendo [rotario], cuando deje el 
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direct result of these collective aspirations, they created a Finlaísmo Management Commission, 
in which their nation-building efforts were expressed in comparison to Brazil and France. To 
accomplish their goal “of favoring the world knowledge of our great men,” they proposed to 
build a monument and research institute, and also a school carrying the name of the Cuban 
epidemiologist.65 They proposed the foundation “in Havana [of] an Institute and School of 
Hygiene, that taking the name of ‘Carlos Finlay’, like the one of France called ‘Luis Pasteur’ and 
the one of Brazil ‘Osvaldo Cruz’, can serve for the coming generations to learn this science and 
investigate new fields.”66 Nevertheless, this pride for Finlay still had the marks of a non-
inclusive nationalism, in the belief that “Finlay with his scientific discovery allowed to finish the 
conquest of this continent for the white race.”67 It was not a racially inclusive nationalism.  
In the role of promoters of economic change, the local and regional segments of the 
economic classes in the country were particularly active. Distant from Havana, these regional 
proprietors and local capitalists sought to bring to their provinces the same economic 
                                                 
puesto que tengo [en el gabinete], hoy (…) este Club, que nos da la lección de querer levantar la bandera de la 
verdad y defenderla y, llevarla adelante, aquí estoy yo para ayudarla con mi alma y con todos mis sentimientos.” 
See: Dr. Enrique M. Porto, “Discurso del Dr. Enrique M. Porto,” in Domingo F. Ramos, Cuba en la higiene 
internacional y Finlaismo, 201. 
65 Original in Spanish: “para el conocimiento mundial de nuestros grandes hombres” See: “Programa de la Comisión 
gestora del Finlaismo,” See: “Programa de la Comisión gestora del Finlaismo,” in Domingo F. Ramos, Cuba en la 
higiene internacional y Finlaismo: Esquemas, informes, discursos, legislación, 231. 
66 Original in Spanish: “Compenetrado el Rotary Club de la Habana, de lo que tan justa obra representaría para 
nuestra Patria: y para el conocimiento mundial de nuestros grandes hombres, estima, sin embargo que constituyendo 
los trabajos científicos de Finlay y sus discípulos, una de las bases de la Higiene Moderna, se completa la obra de 
honrarlos merecidamente, fundándose en la Habana un Instituto y Escuela de Higiene, que llevando el nombre de 
‘Carlos Finlay’, como el de Francia se llama ‘Luis Pasteur’ y el de Brasil ‘Osvaldo Cruz’, sirva para que las 
generaciones venideras aprendan esta ciencia e investiguen nuevos campos.” See: “Programa de la Comisión gestora 
del Finlaismo,” in Domingo F. Ramos, Cuba en la higiene internacional y Finlaismo: Esquemas, informes, 
discursos, legislación, 231. 
67 Original in Spanish: “Finlay con su descubrimiento científico permitiera terminar la conquista de este continente 
para la raza blanca.” See: Domingo F. Ramos, “La internacionalidad del Finlaismo,” in Domingo F. Ramos, Cuba 
en la higiene internacional y Finlaismo: Esquemas, informes, discursos, legislación, 184. 
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developments seen in the capital, and moved to do it themselves or demanded from the 
government their rightful share of the resources available. A closer examination of the activities 
developed in the Rotary Clubs of the interior reveal that they constituted themselves into active 
agents for change. Occasionally, the social gathering transformed into a regional lobby to defend 
the provincial interests above anything else. The number of motions proposing to have an impact 
in the provincial space was considerable, and at times the action thread went far beyond the 
limits of their provincial demarcations.   
The initiatives developed at the interior provide a window into the thinking of local 
proprietors and professionals in their concern for la patria chica–the area defined by their 
deeply-felt regional loyalties above national ones. For instance, they developed fundraising 
activities, supported other regional institutions and local economic initiatives, issued 
notifications to government agencies to defend their province, and proposed multiple 
solicitations to governmental authorities. Consider the examples of Sagua la Grande and Pinar 
del Río as evidence of these local developments.  
In May 1923, the Sagua la Grande Rotary Club declared to have focused “all its sessions 
on the improvement of local affairs.”68 Given that the local health department lacked the funds, 
these Rotarians organized a public performance in the Sagua Park Theatre to collect resources to 
buy a vehicle for the city, and the car was delivered to the local health establishment. 
Additionally, they acquired street lamps for Main Street (José Martí) and developed a project for 
a children’s park in collaboration with municipal authorities.69  
                                                 
68 El Club Rotario de Sagua la Grande “ha tratado en todas sus sesiones sobre el mejoramiento de los asuntos 
locales” See: “Por los clubs del distrito. La labor del rotarismo”, La nota rotaria 2, no. 9 (junio de 1923): 21. 
69 “Por los clubs del distrito. La labor del rotarismo”, La nota rotaria 2, no. 9 (junio de 1923): 21.  
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From Pinar del Río, the local economic classes developed a list of initiatives on a 
monthly basis focused on solving local issues. In August 1928, these Rotarians approached the 
mayor requesting the improvement of parks and streets, conducted fundraising for the 
construction of a local fire station, solicited the secretary of public works to send a chemical fire 
extinguisher and to repair a major road, requested the Health Department to clean the parks and 
avenues, expressed interest in the establishment of an issuing bank, and supported the economic 
classes from Camagüey, which from their Rotary Club, campaigned for the growth of Cuban 
livestock wealth.70  
The constant concern for the advancement of the patria chica, the interest in bringing 
modern infrastructures to every region, and the push for economic diversification resulted from a 
nationalist sentiment entangled with a growing resentment towards US economic penetration of 
the island. Cubans objected to US power over the island as they saw “their sugar industry 
dominated by Americans, their banking system controlled from the United States and vast areas 
of the national territory held in ‘latifundias’ by the foreigners.”71 In their new role as proponents 
of change, the economic classes of the country reached a point in which they “believe that the 
advantages of the Reciprocity Treaty are no longer reciprocal.”72 These business leaders 
accepted that the reciprocity treaty with the United States was once indispensable to save the 
                                                 
70 C. M. de la Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar del Río. En sus 4 primeros años, 68. This type of activism was also 
reflected on US publications. A couple of years later they continued with some of their demands and incorporated 
others: “El Rotary Club de Pinar del Rio, Cuba, está solicitando de la Secretaría de Obras Públicas el auxilio 
necesario para el arreglo de la carretera a la Colima. También pidieron a la Secretaría de Sanidad los medios 
necesarios para combatir el parasitismo que se encuentra bastante extendido en el campo, solicitando la cooperación 
de los Maestros de Escuelas. Además, el Rotary Club de Pinar del Rio ha emprendido una campaña para obtener 
agua potable en la ciudad.” See: “Diversas Actividades” The Rotarian 37, no. 5 (November 1930): 44. 
71 O, “Cuba and the United States,” Foreign Affairs 6, no. 2 (January 1928): 231-244. 
72 Ibid.  
179 
nation from economic collapse after the war of independence, but now “the original convention 
should be altered to meet the changed condition of the present, so that the balance of favors 
contemplated by the Treaty may be restored.”73 This was in reference to a breach in the contract 
from the part of the United States as “Cuba resents particularly the free admission of Philippine 
sugar into the United States, which she contends is in violation of the clause of the Reciprocity 
Treaty.”74 The clearest economic minds of the country were now “convinced of the antiquated 
nature of the Reciprocity arrangement,” and supported the Machado government efforts in 
asserting Cuban international presence and  dismantling Cuban dependence from the United 
States.75  
Promoting change was both economically and socially painful for the nation. Taking a 
different route produced inner enemies to those economic alterations among those whose 
livelihoods were dependent on the United States and the sugar economy. One of the Machado 
government’s initiatives to change the political economic model was an artificial regulation of 
the sugar production, which did not bring the expected results of raising the prices. Changing the 
economic order in the nation was more difficult than anticipated as “vast quantities of cane were 
left in the fields at the end of the crop, occasioning considerable dissatisfaction among planters, 
especially in Camaguey and Oriente.”76 In other areas, however, it was easier for the country to 
promote change because it was an opportunity to open new areas of investment not yet 






controlled by US capital and corporate interests, as with tourism. Rotarians worked hard to make 
contributions to that potential industry. 
Architects, engineers, and contractors were among the most common representatives of 
the economic classes who joined the local Rotary Club, and they developed numerous initiatives 
to transform the urban landscape from the sewer system to the buildings’ facade. At the 
suggestion of the architect Emilio Soto,77 the Havana Rotary Club developed a yearly 
competition to award construction projects that produced good-looking building facades for the 
city.78 The prize committee was assembled with the collaboration of the Colegio de Arquitectos 
de La Habana, the Asociación de Pintores y Escultores, and Rotarians, who would recognize in a 
public event the three best façades built in the year.79 For example, in 1927, sixteen facades were 
presented for the competition, and the criteria to select the best three was based on artistic 
rendition, balancing between originality and appreciation for cultural traditions, and the 
building’s contribution to forge an authentic Cuban architectural style. The winner that year was 
prized for having a “beautiful style that, being bound to us by tradition and customs, lends itself 
more than any [of the other competitors] to form our own [Cuban] architecture in which, taking 
advantage of the beautiful and most salient features of the Spanish Renaissance, also satisfies the 
needs of our climate and the habits of our families.”80  
                                                 
77 In 1922, Emilio Soto was listed as the representative of the Colegio de Arquitectos in the Rotary Club. See: “Lista 
general de Socios del Rotary Club de la Habana, en 1 de septiembre de 1922,” La Nota Rotaria 1, no. 1 (noviembre 
1922): 16-17. 
78 “El concurso de fachadas del Club Rotario,” Revista del Colegio de Arquitectos de La Habana 12, no. 1, (enero 
1928): 17-24. 
79 “Discurso del arquitecto sr. Enrique Gil en el acto de la entrega de los premios del concurso de fachadas artísticas 
del Club Rotario de la Habana,” Revista del Colegio de Arquitectos de La Habana 12, no. 1, (enero 1928): 26-27. 
80 Original in Spanish: “Estilo hermoso que, por estar ligado a nosotros por la tradición y las costumbres, se presta 
más que ninguno [de los restantes competidores] para ir formando una Arquitectura [cubana] propia en que, 
aprovechándose los bellos y más salientes rasgos del Renacimiento Español, se satisfagan, también, las necesidades 
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For the economic classes, in addition to the desire of living in an aesthetically pleasing 
environment, the systematic emphasis on the façades suggests an effort to generate visual appeal 
for the island’s visitors. This program was developed in the interest of diversifying the Cuban 
economy by laying the groundwork for tourism as an alternative industry. In 1939, another 
edition of the same competition mentioned the potential of this program for tourism and the goal 
of improving the looks of the city. The incentive to promote “the urban embellishment of 
Havana, [was undertaken] not only for touristic purposes, but also with the firm purpose that our 
city, for its importance as capital of the Republic, improve its external appearance.”81 Horacio 
Navarrete Serrano, president of the National Executive Committee of the Colegio Nacional de 
Arquitectos–and a Rotarian–expressed gratitude to his fellow Rotarians for incentivizing 
architects and proprietors, and for helping to diffuse Cuban culture.82 Almost two decades later, 
in 1957, using the excuse of a regional Rotarian conference, Horacio Navarrete published an 
article in The Rotarian with a suggestive title: “Come to Cuba.”83  
Come to Cuba meant business. The author invited the reader to travel to Cuba with the 
entire family: “come with your wives, your children, and your friends. You are cordially invited 
                                                 
de nuestro clima y los hábitos de nuestras familias.” See: “El concurso de fachadas del Club Rotario,” Revista del 
Colegio de Arquitectos de La Habana 12, no. 1, (enero 1928): 17-24. 
81 Original in Spanish: “para estimular el embellecimiento urbano de la Habana, [fue desarrollado] no tan sólo con 
fines turísticos, sino también con el propósito firme de que nuestra ciudad, por su importancia como capital de la 
República, mejore su aspecto exterior.” See: Luis Bay Sevilla, “Concurso de fachadas del Club Rotario,” 
Arquitectura: Órgano oficial del Colegio Nacional de Arquitectos 7, no. 71 (junio 1939): 206-215. 
82 “Expresó también Horacio Navarrete [Serrano], en nombre del Colegio Nacional de Arquitectos, el 
agradecimiento de esta institución al Club Rotario por la importancia y atención que ha concedido siempre a la 
Arquitectura de nuestro país, citando como ejemplo elocuente el presente concurso anual de fachadas artísticas, que 
es un estímulo para los arquitectos y propietarios, a la vez que constituye un medio de difusión y exteriorización de 
nuestra cultura.” Luis Bay Sevilla, “Concurso de fachadas del Club Rotario,” Arquitectura: Órgano oficial del 
Colegio Nacional de Arquitectos 7, no. 71 (junio 1939): 206-215. In the early 1930s the Colegio de Arquitectos de 
La Habana changed its name to Colegio Nacional de Arquitectos.  
83 Horacio Navarrete, “Come to Cuba,” The Rotarian 90, no. 6 (June 1957): 18-21. 
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to the Pearl of the Antilles.”84 The invitation to the visitor promoted a family-friendly, pleasure 
escapade along with the business event, and obviously to spend more on the trip. There is also a 
subliminal message in the front page of the article. The largest graphic image in Navarrete’ 
article was a map created by Seymour Fleishman divulging the most prominent industries on 
every region of the island. In a very subtle manner, the article announced the industries in which 
the visitor could find investment opportunities: tourism, mining, oil extraction, pineapple, 
henequen, sponges, crocodile leather, rice, cattle ranching, fishing, wood, bananas, rum, and 
coconuts.85 Sugar and tobacco were part of the picture, but they would no longer be the only 
industries associated with Cuba.  
Lobbies for Local and National Interests: The Networks of Power 
The economic transactions between the United States and Cuba have been the subject of 
historical inquiry for decades, but the island’s trading relations with other nations remain 
understudied.86 In the early years of the republic, under the presidency of Tomás Estrada Palma, 
Cuba signed two commercial treaties, one with the United States (1903) and the second with 
Italy (1904).87 There is evidence of lobbying interests to promote trade agreements with 
Argentina (1904), Spain (1904) and Britain (1905), but these efforts were unsuccessful.88 Cuba 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
85 Horacio Navarrete, “Come to Cuba,” The Rotarian 90, no. 6 (June 1957): 18-21. 
86 Oscar Zanetti Lecuona, “El comercio exterior de la república neocolonial,” 45-126.  
87 The reciprocal trade agreement between Cuba and the United States of 1903 was renewed and replaced by a 
second commercial agreement signed in 1934. See: Cuba. Tratado de reciprocidad comercial entre la República de 
Cuba y los Estados Unidos de América; Cuba. Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United States of America 
and Cuba, and exchange of notes. Aside from the scholarly interest in the commercial interchange between Cuba 
and the United States, the historiography has paid scant attention to other trading relations established with Cuba. 
Little is known about the commercial treaty with Italy signed in 1904. See: Cuba. Tratados, convenios y 
convenciones celebrados por la República de Cuba desde 1903 a 1914, 171-183. 
88 A considerable number of authors studied both reciprocity treaties signed with between Cuba and the United 
States, 1903 and 1934. However, other commercial agreements have not attracted the interest of investigators, with 
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would not sign another commercial agreement through the next four presidential terms, until 
1927. In stark contrast with his predecessors, Gerardo Machado signed six agreements–two in 
his first term and four in the second term. The treaties signed by the fifth Cuban president aimed 
to bolster commercial relations with Spain (1927), Canada (1927), France (1929), Japan (1930), 
Portugal (1931), and Chile (1933). Yet, the scholarship has ignored each one these agreements, 
as well as the goals of Machado. 89  
No other political leader had done more to diversify the Cuban economy and expand the 
nation’s trading networks. Machado’s presidency worked to solve the two major issues affecting 
the nation: sugar mono-production and overconcentration of the nation’s export into a single 
market, the United States. To the first end, Machado signed a new tariff into law in 1927, the 
                                                 
the exception of Jorge Renato Ibarra Guitart. He focused on the failed treaty between Cuba and Britain: El Tratado 
anglo-cubano de 1905: Estados Unidos contra Europa. About the lobbying efforts to establish treaties with 
Argentina and Spain, see: Informe dado por la Cámara de Comercio de Santiago de Cuba, a consulta del Sr. 
secretario de hacienda sobre la celebración de un Tratado de Comercio entre Cuba y la República Argentina; and 
“Foreign Affairs of General Interest,” The Week's Progress: A Select Review of World News & Views 24, no. 419 
(November 19, 1904): 448-450. 
89 See: “Tratados comerciales concertados por la República de Cuba desde su fundación,” Cuba Importadora e 
Industrial 11, no. 122 (mayo de 1936), 69; Adrián Milo Borges, Compilación ordenada y completa de la legislación 
cubana de 1899 a 1950, ambos inclusive, vol. 3., 37 and 51; Julio Le Riverend, Historia económica de Cuba, 599-
600. Le Riverend describes these agreements vaguely and suggests that the historical actors behind these were 
preparing Cuba to face the Wall Street Crash of 1929, as if they could foresee what was going to happen. He said 
that “la situación especial en que quedaba el comercio de Cuba a medida que se acercaba la depresión general a 
fines de la década de los 20 facilitó la concertación de (…) convenios comerciales similares al de Italia [the added 
emphasis is mine MFB].” Le Riverend then argues that these agreements were not particularly fruitful, but in doing 
so he dismisses the coordinated effort to diversify Cuban economy developed by Machado’s presidency. Le 
Riverend points out that “la mayor parte de estos instrumentos no tuvo la eficacia ni la perduración –en algunos 
casos– que podría esperarse de los mismos, ni deben considerarse, salvo excepción, como ventajosos o, cuando 
menos, equitativos para el país. Abarcaban un comercio de reducida cuantía o se limitaban a garantizar una 
participación en el mercado de las Partes Contratantes de algunos productos especialmente importantes para ambos 
y que, a consecuencia de la restricción general del comercio, habían ido perdiendo terreno. Por otra parte, como es 
sabido, ninguno de estos Tratados afectaba o disminuía siquiera el margen de preferencia que favorecía a los 
productos norteamericanos en Cuba. Eran propiamente negociaciones sobre el escaso campo del comercio cubano 
que podía quedar sustraído a los efectos de nuestras relaciones con Estados Unidos.” This last part is probably the 
most important in his assessment, the idea that these agreements did not overrule the 1903 reciprocity treaty with the 
United States and therefore the US domination over the island. It constitutes a misinterpretation to expect that these 
agreements would do what the Cuban revolution did 30 years later in a spring of radicalism. My main point of 
contention about his views is that this approach misses the underlying intentions of the Cuban government at the 
time: to undercut the overconcentration of the nation’s foreign export to the United States. 
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most nationalist legislation of its time, which also remains utterly unstudied.90 To accomplish the 
second goal, Machado developed what can be identified as a campaign to break the cycle of 
dependency on the United States by forging international agreements with other countries and 
fostering new trading partners. His administration made a coordinated effort to find markets for 
Cuban production beyond the United States and solve the major existential crisis in the island’s 
economy. However, instead of examining these developments as political goals of the 
presidency, the analysis needs to focus on the business interests pushing the government in that 
direction.   
Businessmen from the westernmost Cuban province, Pinar del Río, and the region with 
the largest concentration of tobacco growers, launched a campaign that would favor the export of 
production remnants not taken by cigar factories in Havana. These agricultural export interests 
saw Spain as an excellent market for exporting both manufactured and raw tobacco. The 
economic classes from this province used Rotarian networks to advance their goals and 
developed a collaboration with the local chamber of commerce in the province to produce a 
memorandum and explain the necessity to find a market for production surpluses. Shortly 
                                                 
90 Hortensia Pichardo, explains the nationalist nature of the legislation and follows the same interpretative line 
developed by Le Riverend: “Es un hecho histórico que los Aranceles de 1927 favorecieron el desarrollo de algunas 
industrias ligeras, otorgándoles protección mediante aumento de derechos a las manufacturas extranjeras que podían 
hacerle competencia ruinosa (zapatería, confecciones, jabonería y perfumes entre otros y productos alimenticios 
elaborados café, etc.). Asimismo, se rebajaron adeudos o derechos a materias primas como el, petróleo crudo, el 
hierro, el algodón, los hilos, la madera blanca para envases. No fue culpa de los Aranceles si el capital financiero 
norteamericano controló luego esas industrias «nacionales». La política arancelaria no era, no podía ser 
independiente de la estructura económica semicolonial del Estado cubano. [Then she adds,] No es preciso aclarar 
que los Aranceles dejaron intactos los derechos preferenciales de que disfrutaban los productos norteamericanos de 
acuerdo con el mal llamado Tratado de Reciprocidad de 1903.” Therefore, this is an established view in the 
historiography expecting that a policy would do what a whole radical revolution did in a different historical context. 
See: Hortensia Pichardo Viñals, Documentos para la historia de Cuba, 329. The presidency of Gerardo Machado is 
severely criticized by the historiography because of its staunch antilabor stances and his disposition for using 
violence to retain power, but it needs to be revisited. Machado was not a revolutionary and his goals to achieve the 
economic independence of Cuba were expected to be reached by reforming the nation and, in his worldview, 
workers could be spared to achieve nationalist goals. 
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afterward, they submitted a letter to the Secretariat of the Presidency outlining their interests and 
enclosing the memo:  
Since the rate of [tobacco] consumption within the nation is very small compared to the 
[agricultural] production and the [processing capacity of] tobacco and cigar-making 
industry within the nation, [Cuban cigar factories] do not have the capacity to process all 
the tobacco [from Pinar del Río], it is necessary and indispensable to find [foreign] 
markets for the surplus produced in tobacco leaves and raw material. [At the same time], 
in order for the tobacco and cigar-making industries to be able to augment their 
productive capacities, it is equally necessary that markets be found [to encourage] this 
meager production.91 
The idea of coordinating a trade agreement with Spain to export tobacco surpluses had 
been in the making since the beginning of the republican period. However, the economic classes 
in Pinar del Río had better success in obtaining such treaty once they started using business 
networks to advance their goals. These local entrepreneurs promoted a commercial treaty from 
their assemblies within the local Rotary Club, which had been founded in 1925. The economic 
classes used the Rotarian network for the defense of local industries and businessmen’s interests 
in the province as their primary objective. In their own words: “the Rotary Club of Pinar del Río, 
[acknowledged to be] always attentive to the nation’s problems, but [was] even more interested 
in local matters, and especially in those that are related to the principal source of wealth within 
the province in which it operates, [therefore] it is truly concerned with every matter affecting 
tobacco within its diverse manifestations of agricultural production, industrial matter [tobacco 
                                                 
91 Original in Spanish: “Porque el consumo nacional [de tabaco] es muy pequeño comparado con la producción 
[agrícola] y la [capacidad de procesamiento de la] industria tabaquera y cigarrera nacional, no tiene capacidad para 
elaborar [en las fábricas de tabacos cubanas] toda la producción [de Pinar del Río], es necesario, es indispensable, 
encontrar mercado [en el extranjero] para el remanente de hoja producida, para el remanente de materia prima. [De 
igual modo] para que la industria tabaquera y cigarrera puedan aumentar su capacidad productora, es así mismo, 
necesario, buscar mercado para esa pobre producción.” See: C. M. de la Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar del Río en 
sus 4 primeros años, 143. 
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manufacture], and main export item [for the region].”92 This is how business leaders opted to 
defend the patria chica; their words demonstrate an expression of provincial patriotism.  
This is also an expression of economic nationalism, though at a provincial level, that 
counters the narrative presenting the economic classes within the island as a single and unified 
social class. Pinareño businessmen were a small segment within the economic classes of the 
island, but that did not prevent them from exerting constant pressure on the national government 
to achieve their goals. They were relentless in their efforts to obtain approval for the agreement 
with Spain, constantly questioning the national authorities about it. A brief chronology of the 
steps undertaken to achieve their objectives reveal the traces of business interests and the 
lobbying mechanisms that a given industry used to ensure an international agreement.  
The actions taken to get the treaty with Spain reveal a clear regional interest to favor 
primarily Pinar del Río province. The first steps were taken in December 1925, when the Pinar 
del Río Rotary Club–founded only a few months before, in May 1925–called on the city’s 
Chamber of Commerce to support the conclusion of a commerce treaty with Spain.93 The 
following year, in May 1926, these Rotarians agreed “to review the petitions that must be made 
to Spain as part of the trade agreement (…) in relation to the interests of Pinar del Río;” 
noticeably mentioning only the province, not the nation.94 By July 1926, club members had 
already contacted a number of industry groups to study the treaty, such as the Association of 
Tobacco Harvesters and Storage Facilities Owners, the Association of Cigar and Cigarette 
                                                 
92 C. M. de la Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar del Río en sus 4 primeros años, 141. 
93 Original in Spanish: “Se solicita de la Cámara de Comercio de esta ciudad apoye gestiones para concertar un 
tratado de comercio con España” C. M. de la Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar del Río en sus 4 primeros años, 58. 
94  Original in Spanish: “Se acuerda estudiar las peticiones que deben hacerse a España en el tratado comercial que 
se intenta, en relación con las conveniencias de Pinar del Río.” C. M. de la Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar del Río 
en sus 4 primeros años, 59. 
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Makers, the trade journal El Tabaco, and the Federation of Pro-Industry Associations. They then 
met with the Secretary of State after reviewing the matter with the Comisión Revisora de 
Aranceles (a customs and excise commission). 95 Significant headway was made during this 
meeting, and “the secretary of state accepted a proposal that was included in the agreement, 
which obligated Spain to buy a fixed amount of raw tobacco annually.”96 Rotarians also looked 
for the support of all civic entities, and that of the authorities in charge of regional 
administration, as they agreed to “request the support of [other Pinar del Río] local associations 
and the Provincial Governor in campaigning for the trade agreement.”97  
Club members were undeterred in pursuing their objectives, and at every opportunity 
Rotarians were quick to turn to government officials at all levels to reaffirm provincial interests. 
In March 1927, members of the club asked the Secretary of State “for information as to the state 
of negotiations concerning the trade agreement with Spain.”98 Once the news arrived that there 
would be a visit from the President of the Republic to the capital of the province, club members 
decided that they had to meet with him and deliver “a report on the status of tobacco in the 
                                                 
95 Original in Spanish: “Rionda informa de la entrevista con el Secretario de Estado en relación con el tratado 
comercial con España, después de estudiar el asunto en la Comisión Revisora de Aranceles, en la redacción del a 
revista “El Tabaco,” en la Asociación de Almacenistas y Cosecheros, en la Unión de Fabricantes de Tabacos y 
Cigarros, y en la Federación de Sociedades Económicas.” C. M. de la Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar del Río en 
sus 4 primeros años, 60. 
96 Original in Spanish: “Fue aceptada por el Secretario de Estado, la proposición que se le hizo de que incluyese en 
el tratado la obligación por parte de España de adquirir anualmente determinada cantidad de tabaco en rama.” C. M. 
de la Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar del Río en sus 4 primeros años, 60. 
97  Los rotarios acordaron “solicitar el apoyo de las corporaciones locales y del Gobernador Provincial a las 
gestiones que se hacen en pro del tratado comercial con España.” C. M. de la Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar del 
Río en sus 4 primeros años, 60. 
98  Original in Spanish: “Se pregunta al Secretario de Estado cómo están las negociaciones del tratado con España.” 
See: C. M. de la Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar del Río en sus 4 primeros años, 62. 
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region and [the necessity] of the agreement with Spain.”99 The last two pieces of evidence are 
related to the efforts that began in from May 1927. First, they used Rotarian networks to lobby 
for their interests as they “agreed to lobby within the Rotarian Clubs from the [25th] District to 
get an approval for Senator Cortina’s bill for the defense of tobacco in the House of 
Representatives.”100 Second, club members decided to “organize a meeting for mayors of the 
province to support the negotiations in obtaining the trade agreement with Spain.”101 Thus, the 
club not only sought to expand the interest group’s support base within civil society, but it also 
sought the backing of all local government officials. 
The Commercial Treaty Between Cuba and Spain was finally signed in July 1927 and it 
established reciprocal treatment, for the products listed in the agreement.102 Spain’s wines, 
mineral waters, condensed milk, and other preserved foodstuff benefited from this agreement. 
Cuban sugar and tobacco were at the center of the talks, but the price of sugar in the international 
market remained high during the negotiation process, and therefore Cuban sugars only received 
temporary importation benefits. Despite Cuban tobacco’s high pricing, Pinar del Río’s 
businesses achieved their goal of finding a market for the remnant raw and manufactured 
                                                 
99 Original in Spanish: “Se acuerda entregar al Honorable Sr. Presidente [de la República] en si visita a esta ciudad, 
un informe de la situación del tabaco en la región y [la necesidad] del Tratado Comercial con España.” C. M. de la 
Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar del Río en sus 4 primeros años, 62-63. 
100 Original in Spanish: “Se acuerda promover una labor dentro de los Clubs del Distrito para conseguir que se 
apruebe en la Cámara el proyecto de Ley de defensa del Tabaco del Senador Cortina.” C. M. de la Rionda , El Club 
Rotario de Pinar del Río en sus 4 primeros años, 63. 
101 Original in Spanish: “Se acuerda convocar una Asamblea de Alcaldes de la Provincia, que apoye las gestiones 
encaminadas a la concertación del Tratado de Comercio con España” C. M. de la Rionda, El Club Rotario de Pinar 
del Río en sus 4 primeros años, 63. 
102 El tratado “estipulaba el tratamiento recíproco de nación más favorecida respecto de productos enumerados en el 
texto.” See: Julio Le Riverend, Historia económica de Cuba, 599-600. See also: “Tratados comerciales concertados 
por la República de Cuba desde su fundación,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 11, no. 122 (mayo de 1936), 69; and 
Adrián Milo Borges, Compilación ordenada y completa de la legislación cubana de 1899 a 1950, ambos inclusive, 
vol. 3., 37 and 51. 
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tobacco, and also obtaining assurances that such buyer would acquire a fixed amount of the 
production. The Compañía Arrendataria de Tabacos, which leased the Spanish state’s monopoly 
on tobacco,103 “usually bought very little Cuban tobacco, because of its high price.”104 But 
Cuban tobacco interests prevailed and “the [Spanish] government resigned itself to sacrificing 
the importation tax and not only obliges the Arrendataria to acquire Cuban tobacco annually for 
a minimum value of nine million, but [also] considerably reduces the customs duties of the 
Cuban [cigar] production. Cigars [from the island], in effect, will pay 25 pesetas per kilogram, 
net weight, instead of 48, gross weight.”105 Thus, the Cuban tobacco lobby from the Pinar del 
Río region succeeded in obtaining a national policy to benefit their patria chica and the pockets 
of local businessmen.  
In another occasion, despite the continuous lobbying efforts from Uruguay, Cuban 
business leaders organized themselves using the same networks to impede the signing of a trade 
agreement between the two countries. The trade balance between Cuba and Uruguay remained 
favorable to the South American nation up to the early 1930s, as both countries interchanged 
products under the general tariff regime. For example, from 1926 to 1931 the overall trade 
                                                 
103 The monopoly of Spanish tobacco was leased from 1887 to the Compañía Arrendataria de Tabacos until 1944. 
See: Eva Chamorro and Macario Cámara, “Relación de agencia y monopolio. El caso del tabaco en España (1887-
1986),” Revista de Contabilidad-Spanish Accounting Review 19 no. 1 (2016): 132-141. 
104 “La Compañía Arrendataria de Tabacos compraba muy poco tabaco cubano, a causa de su elevado precio” See: 
“Cuba en el Extranjero: Significación del tratado hispano-cubano,” Revista Bimestre Cubana 22, no. 2 (1927): 765-
767. 
105 Original in Spanish: “El gobierno [español] se resignó a sacrificar el interés fiscal y no solo obliga a la 
[Compañía] Arrendataria [de Tabacos] a adquirir anualmente tabaco cubano por valor mínimo de nueve millones, 
sino que [además] reduce considerablemente los derechos arancelarios de las labores cubanas. Los cigarros 
[provenientes de la isla], en efecto, pagarán 25 pesetas por kilogramo, peso neto, en vez de 48, peso bruto.” See: 
“Cuba en el Extranjero: Significación del tratado hispano-cubano,” Revista Bimestre Cubana 22, no. 2 (1927): 765-
767.  
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balance was favorable to Uruguay with over $ 1.2 million. However, the pattern of adverse 
economic interchange for Cuba with Uruguay began to reverse in 1930.106  
The change was caused by the continuous increase in tasajo (jerked beef) tariffs.  
Machado’s 1927 tariff increased tasajo import duties from $4.74 to $8 pesos per 100 kilos. In 
1930, the rate increased to $12, beginning the trade balance shift in favor of the island. Early the 
following year, duties were raised again to $20, and a few months later to $25. Consequently, by 
1932 Uruguayan tasajo was no longer imported into Havana.107  
Cuban government officials “gave as a reason for the rise of importation rights to tasajo 
the need to promote and protect the national industry and the consumption of fresh meat.”108 The 
1927 tariff, and its instruments to manage successive increments, helped to expand the livestock 
industry in Cuba and to transform it into a profitable business. Up to that point, foreign 
competition had suffocated the island’s production of meat, with foreign meat satisfying the 
needs of the internal consumer market. The new tariff progressively reduced the amount of 
imports and favored the local production of meat to supply the national market. A total of 
thirteen new tasajo factories were opened in Cuba because of the tariff: three in Havana, two in 
Matanzas, three in Santa Clara, and five more in Camagüey. Oriente province was not lagging, 
                                                 
106 Skillfully, the speaker selected one of those years to make a case, arguing that the commercial interchange was 
mutually beneficial to both nations. He chose 1930 because on that year the trade balance was favorable to Cuba. 
Still, it is revealing to see the patterns of commercial interchange between the two nations. On that year Uruguay 
sold $1,100198 to Cuba ($988,597 jerky, $6,776 garlic, $5,042 canned meat, $572 onions, and other canned 
foodstuffs) and Cuba sold to Uruguay $1,104853 ($671,345 in spirits –aguardiente de caña, and it represented the 
80% of foreign sales of this product–, $208,682 non-manufactured tobacco, $92,789 raw sugar, $52,585 sisal twine, 
$40,568 twisted tobacco, $31,298 refined sugar, $3,208 rum, $885 de-stemmed tobacco, $544 cigarettes, and $368 
fine-cut tobacco–picadura). Benjamín Fernández y Medina, Porqué debe celebrarse el Tratado de Comercio de 
Cuba con el Uruguay, 3-4. 
107 Benjamín Fernández y Medina, Porqué debe celebrarse el Tratado de Comercio de Cuba con el Uruguay, 4-5.  
108 Ibid. Original in Spanish: “dieron como razón de la subida de los derechos al tasajo la necesidad de fomentar y 
proteger la industria nacional tasajera y el consumo de carne fresca.” 
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and livestock interests transformed into lobbyist advocating for this industry in eastern Cuba.109 
This process demonstrated two possibilities: one, Cuban producers had the capacity to substitute 
importations and supply the national market in a short period of time; and two, Cuban 
government officials were capable of developing the instruments to protect the national economy 
and strove to do so.110 As a result of their actions there was a rush to invest in livestock, which 
expanded the national economy, opened more sources of wealth that would remain in the hands 
of Cuban nationals, and created more job opportunities for the working classes.  
Cuban government officials had two possible routes to promote and protect the national 
economy. The first one was to expand the production and reduce importations and, the second, to 
encourage more trading partners to reach a point in which the Cuban economy could be severed 
from US control mechanisms. But, it appears that these two courses of action were mutually 
exclusive. Consider the example of Benjamín Fernández Medina, the Uruguayan ambassador in 
Cuba who addressed the Havana Rotary Club on September 1932 promoting commerce with the 
South American nation.111 Uruguayan meat producers were eager to recover the Cuban market 
for their businesses and Fernández Medina became their voice in the island. The ambassador 
argued that economic relations were mutually beneficial for both countries, but he threw in an 
interesting punch line in his words pointing to what was “wrong” in Cuban political economy. 
The South American Ambassador rubbed salt in the wound indicating that Cuban foreign trade 
                                                 
109 Maikel Fariñas Borrego, “District 25: Rotary Clubs and Regional Civic Power in Cuba, 1916-1940,”, 240. 
110 Proposing that Cuban government officials or state administrative personnel worked to advance national interests 
is not necessarily self-evident. For decades a considerable body of the historical literature has painted these 
individuals as sold out to foreign interests, corrupt people, or incompetents. Only one example to prove otherwise 
cannot counter such an established narrative, but it serves to point that the historiography needs to revise its position 
and investigate further.  
111 Benjamín Fernández y Medina, Porqué debe celebrarse el Tratado de Comercio de Cuba con el Uruguay, 3. 
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premises were “wrong,” because of the island’s “relations with the United States,” and that given 
such troubled relationship Cuban national interests would be best served in keeping and 
nurturing other foreign partners.112 Both reciprocity treaties Cuba signed with the United States 
were detrimental to the Cuban economy and discouraged diversification, but achieving economic 
independence from the United States required a seemingly contradictory approach to the 
protection of Cuban industries. 
There were other repercussions to the end of the natural trading relationship with 
Uruguay. The commercial interchange with Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay was affected in the 
absence of a Cuban merchant fleet. The island’s exports to those nations were usually 
transported by shipping lines offering services between Cuba and Uruguay. From 1932 onwards, 
Cuban exports to other South American countries had to use other foreign-chartered shipping 
services and thus making the island’s exports less competitive because of the added freight 
cost.113 Worse, in 1933 Uruguayan authorities responded with reprisal to the increased tasajo 
importation rights by adding a 50 percent surcharge to Cuban products exported directly or 
indirectly to the South American nation.114 The Cuban alcohol export industry was the most 
                                                 
112 Fernández Medina said: “for Cuba, which has the example in itself of what a wrong economic and tariff policy 
represents, especially in its relations with the United States, it is of vital importance to conserve all its other foreign 
markets and the possibilities of increasing them.” Original in Spanish: “Para Cuba, que tiene el ejemplo en sí misma 
de lo que representa una equivocada política económica y arancelaria, sobre todo en sus relaciones con los Estados 
Unidos, es de una importancia vital el conservar todos sus otros mercados exteriores y las posibilidades de 
aumentarlos.” Benjamín Fernández y Medina, Porqué debe celebrarse el Tratado de Comercio de Cuba con el 
Uruguay, 13.  
113 “Como consecuencia de esa paralización de las compras de Cuba al Uruguay, las compañías navieras que 
mantenían servicio directo entre puertos de ambos países, se vieron obligadas por la falta de flete en una de las 
direcciones de ese tráfico, a suspender los viajes con grave quebranto de nuestras exportaciones, no solamente al 
Uruguay, sino también a las demás Repúblicas de la América del Sur en general (Argentina, Brasil y Paraguay), lo 
cual ha hecho que nuestros envíos a aquellas Repúblicas, tengan que hacerse por medio de transbordos en puertos 
extranjeros, cuyos gastos extras recargan considerablemente los costos de los mismos en dichos países, colocándolos 
en condiciones de inferioridad a los artículos análogos de otros orígenes.” M. G. R., “El Tratado comercial con 
Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 (1934): 17 and 19. 
114 “Esa agresión económica por parte de Cuba a los productos del Uruguay, tuvo además su culminación con el 
establecimiento por parte de esta última citada República en Julio de 1933 de un recargo, de 50% sobre los derechos 
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severely affected by the loss of this market. In addition, other Cuban productions such as 
henequen and tobacco were impacted and had no other recourse than to reduce their production 
and fire many workers.115 Cuban sugars were unable to compete with beet sugar and the shipping 
capacity of European producers to transport their products and control the South American 
market. 
Cuban alcohol export interests had a stronger presence in the South American market and 
they began to lobby for a treaty with Uruguay also. In 1934, an article in Cuba Importadora e 
Industrial–an important financial publication in the island–promoted trading with the South 
American nation.116 Miguel González Rodríguez, the author, advocated for a commercial treaty 
with Uruguay claiming that the natural trade between the two nations stopped because of the 
adoption of measures to protect an industry that did not exist up that point in time. The author 
expressed that “the natural traffic that existed between both Republics without being stimulated 
by any Trade Treaty stopped working because of the unilateral adoption of measures of an 
artificial nature, under the pretext of a supposed protection of the interests of a certain one, non-
existent at that time, local economic industry, and to the detriment of natural productions of the 
country, whose legitimate rights were forgotten.”117 These words help to explain why the 
                                                 
arancelarios que rigen para los demás países, a todos los productos originarios de Cuba que se importen directa o 
indirectamente en aquella nación, cuya medida fue adoptada como represalia al injustificado ataque de Cuba al 
intercambio comercial de ambos mercados.” M. G. R., “El Tratado comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e 
Industrial 9 (1934): 17 and 19. 
115 “En el orden general de la economía cubana, el daño fue mucho mayor, puesto que la merma ocurrida en nuestras 
exportaciones a aquella República, obligó a nuestros industriales a reducir su producción, desplazando como 
consecuencia a una parte importante de la población obrera empleada en esas industrias.” M. G. R., “El Tratado 
comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 (1934): 17 and 19. 
116 M. G. R., “El Tratado comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 (1934): 17 and 19. 
117 Original in Spanish: “El tráfico natural que existía entre ambas Repúblicas sin estar estimulado por ningún 
Tratado de Comercio, dejó de funcionar por la adopción unilateral de medidas de un carácter artificial, bajo el 
pretexto de una supuesta protección a los intereses de una determinada, inexistente en aquella fecha, industria 
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economic diversification was never an easy route for those who favor it. For every step forward 
in creating a more balanced national economy there was always a strong backlash against it.   
Entrepreneurial innovations had to struggle against established industries and foreign 
interests invested in Cuba. The resistance to economic diversification was double because the 
forging of a new industry affected already established industries in the country (the national 
alcohol export industry) and the foreign interests focused on selling their products to Cuba 
(foreign tasajo industry). The situation reveals an intricate panorama in which many actors and 
economic interests combined to halt diversification efforts. For those defending the alcohol 
industry, it was also possible to argue that losing the customs collections on jerky affected the 
national economy. This argument is supported by two main reasons. The first one is that the 
Cuban economy relied heavily on customs collections for its national budget (there was not yet 
an established income-based taxation).118 Between 1923-1927, the custom house in Havana 
collected an average of $ 972,034 pesos a year solely on tasajo.119 By losing the importation 
rights on tasajo, the national administration was short of almost a million pesos a year to balance 
the budget. Second, Cuban trade balance with Uruguay had changed in the recent years and it 
was now favorable to the Antillean island.120 It is not out of bounds considering that for some in 
Cuba it would be a risk to bid for the creation of new industries when there was already an 
                                                 
antieconómica local, y con perjuicio de producciones naturales del país, cuyos legítimos derechos fueron olvidados.” 
M. G. R., “El Tratado comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 (1934): 17 and 19. 
118 José María Pérez Cubillas, “El impuesto sobre la renta personal y el cincuentenario de la República,” Anuario de 
la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Derecho Público (1952): 51-77. 
119 M. G. R., “El Tratado comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 (1934): 17 and 19. 
120 La pérdida del intercambio comercial con Uruguay, “contribuyó con motivo de la anulación de los ingresos por 
concepto de derechos sobre el tasajo, a la merma de nuestras recaudaciones aduanales, que fueron siempre la base de 
nuestra situación presupuestal.” M. G. R., “El Tratado comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 
(1934): 17 and 19. 
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advantageous trade situation for Cuba with Uruguay. Therefore, the creation of new national 
industries was expensive, provoked internal and external opposition, and would have required a 
long-run national strategy in the conditions of Cuban capitalism. 
Within a more mercantile economic-mindset to the national economy, the more Cuba 
exported the greater the country’s wealth. The concept that prosperity was in correlation to the 
increase of exporting goods was deeply rooted in those export interests: “the economic capacity 
of the country is directly related to the volume of our sales abroad, which are those that provide 
the necessary means for subsistence and the progress of production of an internal nature.”121 The 
successes that the exportation of sugar brought to the island generated a mercantile ideological 
approach to the national economy: “In other words: the greater the export, the greater the 
monetary income in the country, the higher production in excess of national consumption, the 
greater number of people dedicated to work, better wages and salaries, the greater purchasing 
power of the country, better prices for local consumer products.”122 Fernando Ortiz’s seminal 
work Cuban counterpoints, emanates from the discussions Cubans were having among 
themselves in the 1930s, and one of the main points in the debate was whether the island should 
                                                 
121 Original in Spanish: “La capacidad económica del país guarda una relación directa con el volumen de nuestras 
ventas al exterior, que son las que aportan los medios necesarios para la subsistencia y el progreso de la producción 
de carácter interior.” M. G. R., “El Tratado comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 (1934): 17 
and 19. 
122 Original in Spanish: “En otras palabras: a mayor exportación, mayor ingreso monetario en el país, mayor 
producción en exceso al consumo nacional, mayor cantidad de personas dedicadas al trabajo, mejores jornales y 
sueldos, mayor poder adquisitivo del país, mejores precios para los productos de consumo local.” M. G. R., “El 
Tratado comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 (1934): 17 and 19. The autor added: “Por lo que, 
aplicando este principio económico de la repercusión a los productos de la ganadería, que por representar menos del 
1% del total de nuestras exportaciones generales debe considerarse como industria de abastecimiento interno, 
resultará, que a mayor poder de consumo en la nación, corresponderá un mejor precio para el ganado, y mejores 
perspectivas, por lo tanto, para la industria pecuaria del país, que ha sido hasta ahora la única que ha expresado su 
oposición al Tratado basada al parecer en un espejismo falto de fundamento.” 
196 
continue to focus its economy on producing goods for the world market or prioritizing the needs 
of its internal market.123  
Following the counterpoints model created by Fernando Ortiz, a duel between the 
exportation of raw alcohols and the importation of tasajo illustrates the dilemmas of relying on 
the export economy to generate capital. Cuban cattle ranchers were opposed to the establishment 
of any agreement with Uruguay that would affect their interests. Alcohol export interests 
expressed that “the country's livestock industry, … has so far been the only one that has 
expressed its opposition to the treaty [with Uruguay].”124 Cuban aguardientes were the chief 
export product shipped to the South American nation, generating an average of $275,000 pesos a 
year. Other export products were tobacco and binder twine. Sugar was not an export item to 
Uruguay. The alcohols manufacturing interests considered the livestock industry as a lesser 
business endeavor because it was an “internal supplier” and not an export industry. For 
exporters, it was a mistake yielding to the demands of internal suppliers. In their own words, 
they contended that “it is not possible … to please the economically mistaken points of view of 
an industry [livestock], that although respectable for what it means as a producer of wealth, has 
the character of an internal supplier, it will injure primordial interests such as those of the 
industries of export. We therefore advocate the conclusion of this Treaty, considering it 
beneficial for the general economy of the nation.”125 It becomes evident that the protection of the 
                                                 
123 Fernando Ortiz, Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar: advertencia de sus contrastes agrarios, 
económicos, históricos y sociales, su etnografía y su transculturación. 
124 M. G. R., “El Tratado comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 (1934): 17 and 19. 
125 Original in Spanish: “No es posible (…) complacer los puntos de vista económicamente equivocados de una 
industria, que aunque respetable por lo que significa de productora de riqueza, tiene el carácter de abastecedora 
interna, se vayan a lesionar intereses primordiales como son los de las industrias de exportación. Abogamos por lo 
tanto por la concertación de este Tratado por considerarlo beneficioso para la economía general de la nación.” M. G. 
R., “El Tratado comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 (1934): 17 and 19. 
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nation’s internal market and the defense of consolidated export industries produced antagonist 
mindsets. This also helps to explain why the goal of economic diversification was not easily 
achievable, precisely because of the legacy of centuries of sugar mono-production and 
concentration in the international market deforming the economy. The reemergence of a 
livestock industry after the 1927 tariff and the conflicts with alcohol exporters illustrates the 
complex situation of the Cuban economy.126 Uruguayan authorities made repeated appeals to the 
Cuban government officials, who responded with delay tactics.127 Entrepreneurial innovations 
had to struggle against established industries and foreign interest in Cuba.   
Cattle ranchers from Oriente province mobilized to protect the livestock industry from an 
agreement with Uruguay. On May 1937, in the town of Jiguaní, the economic classes gathered in 
the local Rotary Club and stood up to defend the national industry. These individuals launched a 
campaign to protect their interests only eleven days after this association was chartered by 
Rotary International, meaning that local entrepreneurs used this network as the weapon of choice 
to advance their goals. They claimed to be “taking into consideration the importance of the 
livestock industry in our country, [and therefore] the Rotary Club of Jiguaní unanimously 
opposes the trade agreement with Uruguay by reason that this stated agreement is greatly 
detrimental to what we consider to be our second largest national industry.”128 Members of this 
                                                 
126 I suggest that it was a “reemergence” because the first profitable economic endeavor in Cuba was cattle ranching; 
which developed right after the conquistadors’ gold rush. Settlers in the island developed a subsistence economy and 
a much more prosperous livestock industry up to eighteenth century. See: Reinaldo Funes Monzote, 
“Especialización azucarera y crisis de la ganadería en Cuba, 1790-1868,” Historia Agraria no. 57 (agosto 2012): 
105-134.  
127 “A restablecer ese tráfico cubano-uruguayo tiende la gestión reiteradamente hecha por el Gobierno del Uruguay 
cerca de las Autoridades cubanas, las cuales por una u otra circunstancia vienen posponiendo el afrontar este 
asunto.” M. G. R., “El Tratado comercial con Uruguay,” Cuba Importadora e Industrial 9 (1934): 17 and 19. 
128 Original in Spanish: “Teniendo en cuenta la importancia de la industria ganadera en nuestro país, se acuerda por 
unanimidad oponerse El Club Rotario de Jiguaní al Tratado Comercial con Uruguay por traer dicho convenio 
comercial grandes prejuicios a la que consideramos la segunda Industria Nacional o con la Ganadería,” See: Graco 
Escalante Beatón, presidente del Club Rotario de Jiguaní, “Acta sesión 31 de mayo de 1937,” Legajo 2407, Número 
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club undertook immediate and multilevel actions to do battle with foreign interests. First, they 
made the negative implications of this agreement for the country known to the highest national 
authorities by filing complaints in the telegrams sent “to the presidents of the republic, the 
chamber of representatives, the senate, and secretaries of agriculture and state.”129 Second, the 
club notified Rotarians across the province and throughout the nation to coordinate collective 
actions. The economic classes assembled in the local Rotary Club from Jiguaní to ask their peers 
across the country for “help and cooperation [in the fight] before the Central Powers in the 
campaign launched to oppose the aforementioned trade agreement”130 In the end, Cuba never 
signed an agreement with Uruguay because of the economic nationalism of the businessmen in 
the island.  
These events demonstrate that business leaders on the island did indeed act on nationalist 
sentiments—they sought to protect the country as well as their pockets. The historiography has 
misinterpreted the evidence because of an excessive reliance on the sources to understand Cuba-
US relations without approaching how Cuban interests were managed in relations with other 
nations. Many authors reached the mistaken conclusion that such nationalist sentiments did not 
exist among the economic classes. Cuban businessmen, in addition to being the victims of the 
                                                 
5, Fondo Gobierno Provincial, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Santiago de Cuba. Abelardo Boronat Medina, whose 
main occupation in the club was marked as cattle rancher, mobilized the rest of the club obtaining an unanimous 
consensus from his fellow club members.   
129 “Quedando nombrados los compañeros doctor Mendieta [Francisco Mendieta Echevarría, abogado] y el señor 
Abelardo Boronat [Medina, ganadero] para redactar los telegramas que se acordó pasar a los presidentes de la 
República, Cámara y Senado y Secretarios de Agricultura y Estado…” See: “Graco Escalante Beatón presidente del 
Club Rotario de Jiguaní, Acta sesión 31 de mayo de 1937,” Legajo 2407, Número 5, Fondo Gobierno Provincial, 
Archivo Histórico Provincial de Santiago de Cuba. 
130 Original in Spanish: “la ayuda y cooperación para [luchar] ante los poderes Centrales en la campaña que se 
iniciara oponiéndonos a dicho tratado comercial.” See: “Graco Escalante Beatón presidente del Club Rotario de 
Jiguaní, Acta sesión 31 de mayo de 1937,” Legajo 2407, Número 5, Fondo Gobierno Provincial, Archivo Histórico 
Provincial de Santiago de Cuba. 
199 
pressure from the US government, were portrayed as responsible for the misfortunes that befell 
them. Yet, it is important to point that the economic classes were not fully capable to defend the 
nation from the advances of the US businesses. A host of factors ranging from US military 
intervention, political interference, and economic pressure from the US government—
particularly using the sugar quota as a tool for domination—combined with the unmatched 
power that US corporations established in the island to limit what Cuba could do to protect itself. 
Both reciprocity treaties signed in 1903 and 1934 were central to US domination in the island; if 
the evidence of economic nationalism around tasajo imports surfaced it is only because the 
United States did not export tasajo to the island and therefore Cuban entrepreneurs were free to 
develop this industry. Nevertheless, the inability to defend the national interests and curtail the 
US penetration of the economy was added to the accumulated as grievances towards the United 




Envisioning Capitalist Alternatives: Looking Back, Looking Forward 
The bulk of the literature–which permeates all educational levels in Cuba, including the 
institutions where the historiography is created and debated (universities, research institutes, 
academic conferences)–has produced a view of the past where the upper and middle classes were 
opposed to the working classes and the country’s sovereignty. Capitalism, the bourgeoisie, and 
close relations with the United States were characterized as incompatible with the full 
independence of the Cuban nation, and these ideas have become deeply rooted in the minds of 
the people of the island. These interpretations of the past developed mainly on the island and in 
the Spanish-language literature–although they have had echoes in US scholarship that merit a 
separate investigation. However, the misconstrued memory of the Republican period and 
capitalism affects the capacity of the island to move forward.  
The focus on the history of revolutionaries and anti-capitalist struggles has produced 
misguided impressions in which reformers worked against the national interest as they attempted 
to solve economic problems within the margins of capitalism. This view of the past prevents 
changes and reforms in the country because those educated after the revolution believe that any 
economic opening would resuscitate the past dependency on the United States. Many historians 
have focused on the students’ movement, the formation of leftist organizations, and the rise of 
the labor movement, omitting the role of the business leaders that were part of the same 
nationalist movements. The body of scholarship focused on student and labor movements argued 
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that the nationalist period emerged to counter the anti-nationalism of Cuban business leaders and 
their defeatist position towards the United States.  
My investigation revealed that many business leaders on the island developed roadmaps 
for reform, transformed into promoters of capitalist change, and devised numerous initiatives to 
increase nationalist awareness. The negative memories about those who called themselves the 
economic classes in the years before the revolution, has produced a pervasive culture of hostility 
towards any economic opening. The mentality among decision-makers on the island considers 
local entrepreneurs–cuentapropistas1–as a veiled menace rather than an asset for the nation. This 
is precisely how my investigation engaged two levels of discussions. First, it argued against a 
body of the historiography that assumed the Cuban revolution was an inevitable outcome given 
the socioeconomic conditions in the island, while simultaneously minimizing the attempts by 
reformers to steer the country towards economic independence gradually and within the margins 
of capitalism. Second, it provides the basis to open a debate about the current view of 
entrepreneurship on the island, which is very limited and counterproductive for economic 
development.   
The aspirations held by many businessmen and the economic thinkers on the island 
eventually received attention, but not by whom they expected. A speech from Fidel Castro in 
October 1959 echoed many of the ideas expressed by José Comallonga Mena decades earlier. 
Castro addressed the importance of economic diversification for national development.2 Raúl 
                                                 
1 “Cuentapropistas” are those self-employed on the island; this is within the limited reforms that have taken place in 
the last twenty years. It is a neutral term that refers to local producers and service providers for profit as individuals 
who work by themselves; this is notion avoids using terms such as bourgeoisie, capitalists, entrepreneurs, and 
businesspeople. Thus, “cuentapropistas” is a safe word both for the government and for entrepreneurs.  
2 Fidel Castro: “o le pregunto al pueblo si está de acuerdo o no con que nosotros sembremos aquí el arroz que 
podemos producir en vez de importarlo; las grasas que podemos producir en vez de importarlas; el algodón que 
podemos producir en vez de importarlo; los alimentos que podemos producir en vez de importarlos, para darle 
trabajo a más de medio millón de compatriotas nuestros que no tienen en qué emplearse (APLAUSOS).  Yo le 
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Cepero Bonilla, the Cuban Secretary of Commerce for the Revolutionary Government in 1960, 
expressed very similar goals to those articulated decades earlier by Luis Machado Ortega. 
Cepero Bonilla indicated that “we must not sell or buy in a single market. Economic 
independence is achieved with the diversification of foreign markets.”3 However, no credit was 
ever given to subjects of this study in the histography precisely because they envisioned 
capitalist alternatives for the nation and their goals did not align with those of the Revolution.  
The memory of Cuban business leaders and economic thinkers seeking to advance their 
nation was lost, and historians traced other origins to explain 1959 that would deny any 
nationalist “bourgeoisie.” The memory of the pre-revolutionary period has moved to the extreme 
of considering business leaders as an antinational social class because they were not sufficiently 
radical. This limited understanding of nationalism as an ideology privative of the left and 
emanating from revolutionary heroes creates a confusion in which such sentiments can only be 
expressed in a socialist, a working-class friendly, and an antiimperialist language. My findings of 
nationalism expressed in terms of reform and voiced in non-radical terms, as well as the anti-
American feelings among business leaders, demonstrates that the historiography needs revision. 
My dissertation explains why it has been so difficult for the country to move forward 
with reforms. Opening the country to changes and supporting entrepreneurs has many critics on 
                                                 
pregunto al pueblo si está de acuerdo o no con los planes de industrialización del Gobierno Revolucionario 
(EXCLAMACIONES DE APROBACION).” Fidel Castro, “Discurso pronunciado ante el pueblo congregado en el 
Palacio Presidencial para reafirmas su apoyo al gobierno revolucionario y como protesta contra la cobarde agresión 
perpetrada contra el pacífico pueblo de La Habana por aviones procedentes de territorio extranjero,” October 26, 
1959, Discursos e intervenciones del Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz, Presidente del Consejo de Estado de la 
República de Cuba, http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/.  
3 Original in Spanish: “No debemos vender o comprar en un solo mercado. La independencia económica se 
conquista con la diversificación de los mercados exteriores.” Cepero Bonilla, Raúl. La Independencia económica se 
conquista con la diversificación de los mercados exteriores. Discurso del Dr. Raúl Cepero Bonilla, en la 
inauguración de la Exposición Soviética de Ciencia, Técnica y Cultura. La Habana: Echevarría, 1960.  
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the island because of the history books’ depiction of business leaders as opponents of their nation 
and complicit with US interest on the island. In a recent article, Oniel Díaz Castellanos, a 
business consultant in Havana, commented on the “seven capital prejudices about the private 
sector in Cuba,”4 preconceptions against economic opening and entrepreneurship. They believe 
that the emerging private sector is responsible for inequalities in Cuba; that any offer to support 
the private sector would be a return to capitalism; that the greed of businesspeople on the island 
is what causes corruption; that the concentration of private property would affect ordinary 
people; that cuentapropistas do not care about their community.5 These prejudices have been 
entrenched in the minds of the people through 60 years of historiography producing a narrative 
of nationalism in which entrepreneurs are not trustworthy and have an agenda that goes against 
the nation. My investigation demonstrates the limits of that interpretation and opens new 
interpretative pathways for the historiography.  
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Cuba. Edición conmemorativa del cincuentenario de la independencia 1902-1952 y del 
centenario del nacimiento de José Martí, (La Habana: Talleres litográficos de Artes 
Gráficas, 1954), 951-952. 
Antuña, María Luisa and Josefina García Carranza, Bibliografía de Juan Marinello. La Habana: 
Editorial Orbe, 1975. 
Arango y Parreño, Francisco de. “Discurso sobre la agricultura de La Habana y medios de 
fomentarla (1792).” in Obras. 148-202. La Habana, Cuba: Imagen Contemporánea, 2005. 
Barbero, María Inés. “Business History in Latin America: A Historiographical Perspective.” 
Business History Review 82, no. 3 (autumn, 2008): 555-575. 
Barcia, María del Carmen. Capas populares y modernidad en Cuba, 1878-1930. La Habana: 
Fundación Fernando Ortiz, 2005. 
Beckert, Sven. “History of Capitalism,” in American History Now, edited by Eric Foner and Lisa 
McGirr, 314–335. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011. 
Benjamin, Jules R. The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of 
Liberty in an Age of National Liberation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
Besser, Terry L. and Nancy J. Miller, “The Risks of Enlightened Self-Interest: Small Businesses 
and Support for Community,” Business & Society 43, no. 4 (December 2004): 398-425. 
Blanco Herrera, Julio and Enrique J. Montoulieu, El azúcar de Cuba en 1939: Al gran pueblo 
norteamericano, el pueblo cubano. La Habana: F. Solana, 1939. 
Cairo Ballester, Ana. El Grupo Minorista y su tiempo. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias 
Sociales, 1979. 
Callejas Opisso, Susana et. al. Historia de Cuba: Nivel medio superior. La Habana: Editorial 
Pueblo y Educación, 2011.  
Cámara de Comercio de la República de Cuba [Juan Sabatés]. El problema económico de Cuba: 
Causas, efectos, soluciones; exposición elevada al señor presidente de la república por 
la Cámara de Comercio de la República de Cuba. La Habana: Imp. F. Castro y Ca., 
1939. 
Camus, Agnès. “Le Rotary-club: Une forme de sociabilité américaine dans le bocage normand,” 
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Díaz, Oniel. “Siete prejuicios capitales sobre el sector privado en Cuba.” On Cuba (27 marzo, 
2018) https://oncubamagazine.com/economia-negocios/siete-prejuicios-capitales-sector-
privado-cuba/ 
Dirección Política de las F.A.R. [Jorge Ibarra Cuesta], Historia de Cuba. La Habana: Dirección 
Política de las F.A.R., 1967. 
Duharte, Rafael and Radamés de los Reyes. La burguesía santiaguera, 1940-1950. Santiago de 
Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 1983. 
“Enrique Montoulieu: Arquitectura e Ingeniería, Cuba” EnCaribe. Enciclopedia de Historia y 
Cultura del Caribe, https://www.encaribe.org/es/article/enrique-montoulieu/1550 
Errington, Frederick and Deborah Gewertz. “The Wewak Rotary Club: The Middle Class in 
Melanesia,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 3, no. 2 (June 1997): 333-
353 
211 
Fariñas Borrego, Maikel. “District 25: Rotary Clubs and Regional Civic Power in Cuba, 1916-
1940,” in State of Ambiguity: Civic Life and Cultural Form in Cuba's First Republic, 
Steve Palmer, José Antonio Piqueras, and Amparo Sánchez Cobo, eds., 231-250. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2014. 
________. Sociabilidad y cultura del ocio: Las élites habaneras y sus clubes de recreo, 1902-
1930. La Habana: Fundación Fernando Ortiz, 2009. 
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